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The landscape within which human rights are protected and realised has 
changed dramatically in the last few decades. One of the main driving 
forces for this change is economic globalisation and the weakening of the 
traditional state. In many parts of the world, the private sector is 
becoming increasingly involved in performing functions that have 
traditionally been reserved for the state. Even the provision of basic 
services, such as water, is not exempt from this development. Private 
sector involvement varies from the outright sale of public assets to the 
outsourcing of essential service delivery functions. Moreover, the public 
sector is pressurised to ‘downscale’ and make efficiency gains by placing 
certain trading functions at arms length in semi-private entities. The result 
of all of this is the increasing commodification of the provision of basis 
services, such as water. 
However, such basic services are guaranteed within a human rights 
framework as part of international law. In principle, it is only states that 
are the bearers of human rights obligations in international law. The 
extent to which private entities can bear human rights obligations remains 
controversial and human rights law is not concerned with whether the 
ultimate provider of socio-economic goods and services is either the state 
or the individual. 
This book contains a compilation of papers dealing with access to 
water. In South Africa, many cities and municipalities have delegated 
bulk water purification and management to private water services 
providers. Some view this as abdication from state responsibility and a 
violation of the constitutionally protected right of access to sufficient 
water. Others, including the state, argue that private sector involvement is 
indispensable for realising access to water. The chapters in this book are 
based on presentations at a seminar that was held in Utrecht, the 
Netherlands, in March 2005. The seminar was entitled ‘Water Delivery in 
South Africa and the Netherlands: Public or Private?’ and it was 
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organised by the Community Law Centre (University of the Western 
Cape) and the Institute of Constitutional and Administrative Law (Utrecht 
University).  
The article by De Gaay Fortman sheds a sharp and piercing light on 
the essence of access to water as an entitlement rather than an abstract 
right. He argues that a sole focus on access to water as a human right that 
becomes real only through standard-setting, supervision and enforcement 
ignores the actual content of rights as instruments for transformation. 
Mbazira offers a case study that brings home the reality of two South 
African municipalities attempting to deliver this entitlement through 
engaging private contractors. He concludes that the privatisation of water 
delivery and the insistence on cost recovery negatively impacts on access 
to water becoming a reality.  
Johnson approaches the growing momentum for private sector 
involvement in water delivery in South Africa from a democratic 
perspective. By means of a legal analysis of a selection of public-private 
partnership contracts, she answers the question as to whether the practice 
of these partnerships in fact lives up to the ideals and advantages with 
which they are normally associated. De Visser makes a comparison with 
the Netherlands and discusses a move to the contrary: in the face of a 
strong trend towards liberalisation of network sectors in the Netherlands, 
the Dutch government has firmly rejected any private sector involvement 
in water delivery. 
The restructuring of Johannesburg’s water services management is 
discussed by Schmitz. He relays the story of a city walking the tightrope 
between opportunities for investment and efficiency gains through 
privatisation on the one hand and the need for retaining state control and 
state accountability on the other. Raven, Warner and Leeuwis present a 
case study of integrated water management in the Lower Blyde in South 
Africa. They painfully expose how the various governmental and private 
stakeholders fail in reaping the benefits that would flow from the 
integration of an existing water irrigation project with improved access to 
drinking water for disadvantaged communities. They conclude that the 
 ix
progressive legal framework for multi-stakeholder participation is by no 
means a guarantee for success. 
In sum, the contributions put access to water in a human rights 
perspective. They explore the benefits and disadvantages associated with 
either public or private delivery of water. The book is useful not only for 
human rights lawyers but also for those involved in public policy making 
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Privatisation of water delivery is a human rights issue in two distinct 
ways. Firstly, it implies an institutional change that will tend to im-
pinge on existing access to water, and hence affect human rights im-
plementation. Secondly, access to safe water is an entitlement, which, 
although obviously linked to basic human dignity, is still far from be-
ing realised for everyone. The issue here is that privatisation tends to 
affect human rights as a transformational mission, too. Thus, not sur-
prisingly, water issues receive a great deal of attention in the human 
rights debate. Indicative in this respect are two recent articles in sub-
sequent issues of the Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, one on 
access to water as a human right and the other on that right in the light 
of “the human rights-based approach to development”.1 
In its General Comment No. 15 (2002) the United Nations Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights declares water 
straight away as being “indispensable for leading a life in human dig-
nity”. As such it “is a prerequisite for the realisation of other human 
rights.”2 Without indulging in any further effort to first establish a cer-
tain measure of conceptual clarity, the Committee immediately takes 
the following position: 
 
The human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, 
acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for per-
sonal and domestic uses. An adequate amount of safe water is 
necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk 
                                                 
♠  Professor in Political Economy of Human Rights, Netherlands Institute of Hu-
man Rights, Utrecht University. The author expresses his gratitude to Emma 
Sydenham, Co-ordinator of EqualinRights, for many helpful suggestions and 
comments. 
1  See Tully 2005: 35-64; Filmer-Wilson 2005: 213-242. 




of water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cook-
ing, personal and domestic hygienic requirements.3 
 
In what follows in this General Comment we encounter an endeavour 
that seeks to combine deductive reasoning –rights derived from posi-
tive international law that would have to be implemented- with induc-
tive efforts to determine what people require in order to sustain their 
daily livelihoods. Indeed, the two approaches are completely mixed 
up, as becomes clear in the following statement: 
 
The Committee notes the importance of ensuring sustainable 
access to water … as it is required for a range of different pur-
poses, besides personal and domestic uses, to realize many of 
the Covenant rights. For instance, water is necessary to produce 
food (right to adequate food) and ensure environmental hy-
giene (right to health). Water is essential for securing liveli-
hoods (right to gain a living by work) and enjoying certain cul-
tural practices (right to take part in cultural life). Nevertheless, 
priority in the allocation of water must be given to the right to 
water for personal and domestic uses. Priority should also be 
given to the water resources required to prevent starvation and 
disease, as well as water required to meet the core obligations 
of each of the Covenant rights.  
 
In this chapter an attempt will be made to keep the two approaches 
distinct, although naturally not separated. The primary focus will be 
on what I should like to call “upstream human rights”, meaning the 
upstream struggle that people at grassroots level face when attempting 
to realise their rights under the law. “Downstream human rights”, on 
the other hand, refers to the venture to move the protection of basic 
human dignity from international standards to people at the grassroots. 
Let us first have a look at that endeavour. 
 
 
                                                 
3  Ibid., p. 2. 
 











Figure 1 Human rights in a downstream perspective 
 
The concentric circles presented in Figure 1 schematically exemplify 
human rights as a downstream effort: from standards set internation-
ally downward towards people’s daily lives. Human rights, as we 
know, constitute an attempt to protect basic human dignity by law.4 
As an international endeavour this effort is of relatively recent origin. 
It is a highly juridical venture, grounded in three stages: standard set-
ting, supervision of observance, and enforcement. It is particularly the 
latter that has proved to be rather difficult. Actually, as international 
implementation of the standards tends to be extremely weak –vide the 
usual fate of Concluding Observations of the various Treaty Bodies 
with regard to both country reports and complaint cases- the whole 
                                                 




emphasis in the downstream human rights venture tends to be on fur-
ther specification of rights and duties. In the case of water this ap-
proach resulted in General Comment No. 15 of the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, declaring a 
“human right to water” as being inherent in the Covenant.  
A first conceptual question is of course whether such a proclama-
tion is really required. A Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) had already been passed in 1948, which subsequently has 
been endorsed to such an extent that its core articles in respect of the 
protection of basic human dignity are generally regarded as customary 
international law.5 It includes, inter alia, the right to a standard of liv-
ing adequate in terms of health and well-being (article 25). Article 12 
of the ICESCR defines the right to health as “the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and men-
tal health”.6 As the specification of what that entails in article 12, para 
2 under a, b, c, and d is obviously not limitative, the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights might well have 
addressed water entitlements in its previous General Comment (No. 
14).  
Yet, water became the subject of a separate General Comment, viz. 
No. 15 in which the following reasoning is employed: 
 
The right to water clearly falls within the category of guaran-
tees essential for securing an adequate standard of living, par-
ticularly since it is one of the most fundamental conditions for 
survival … [It] is also inextricably related to the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health (art. 12, para. 1) … 
 
In downstream human rights circles, representing -just to recall- those 
quarters that are primarily concerned with the protection of human 
dignity from the perspective of international standard-setting and su-
pervision, issues discussed in this respect include the question whether 
sets of claims that have not been explicitly recognised in legally bind-
ing documents, might nonetheless be seen as “inherent”, “tangential” 
                                                 
5  Cf. Klein Goldewijk and De Gaay Fortman 1999: 7. 
6  On the right to health see Toebes 1999. 





or “implied” rights.7 Evidently, the Committee opted for the inherent 
position, connecting the “right to water” primarily to article 11 (ade-
quate living standard, with particular emphasis on housing and food) and 
article 12 on health. However, it found more links:  
 
The right [to water] should also be seen in conjunction with 
other rights enshrined in the International Bill of Human 
Rights, foremost amongst them the right to life and human dig-
nity. … The right to water has been recognized in a wide range 
of international documents, including treaties, declarations and 
other standards. For instance, Article 14, paragraph 2, of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women stipulates that States parties shall ensure to 
women the right to “enjoy adequate living conditions, particu-
larly in relation to […] water supply”. Article 24, paragraph 2, 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child requires States 
parties to combat disease and malnutrition “through the provi-
sion of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water” … 
The right to water has been consistently addressed by the 
Committee during its consideration of States parties’ reports, in 
accordance with its revised general guidelines regarding the 
form and content of reports to be submitted by States parties 
under articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, and its general comments. 
 
Thus, the newly declared right to water would appear to stand on firm 
juridical ground. Nevertheless, the whole downstream venture is faced 
with three critical limitations8: 
 
(1) Protection of human dignity by law assumes “law and order” in 
the sense that law functions as a way of guaranteeing security of 
people in their person, in their possessions and in their deals (im-
plying that pacta sunt servanda), and settling disputes based upon 
conflicting interests in an ordered manner. However, in many a 
politico-juridical setting the role of universalist state law is rather 
constrained. 
                                                 
7  See, for example, Tully 2005: 37. 
8  For a more detailed discussion of these limitations see De Gaay Fortman and 




(2) The values behind human rights norms have to be “received” in 
the sense of a cultural reception of the law.9 In reality there tend 
to be serious politico-cultural constraints, although these may 
well differ depending upon the concrete context. 
(3) Human rights norms do not reflect all core aspects of justice in 
the same way. It is particularly in respect of the principle of 
equality as more than just formal equality of all before the law 
that their meaning is rather limited. The reason is that inalienable 
subjective rights tend to be formulated in a rather absolute man-
ner: everyone has the right to …, whereas the struggle for social 
justice has to be directed against substantive socio-economic ine-
quality that is of a relative nature. Indeed, human rights appear to 
function inadequately as a normative instrument in combating 
growing socio-economic inequality. 
 
A review of these limitations with regard to water instigates the follow-
ing brief comments: 
 
(1) Luckily, law is more than just state law, official courts and en-
forcement agencies. If, indeed, the realisation of fundamental 
norms binding the use of power were purely dependent on formal 
legal processes, deficits in the enforcement of crucial standards 
would be much worse in many an environment. Fortunately, 
however, law can also work through informal mechanisms or, in 
another terminology, as living law.10 While ‘law’ manifests itself 
as regulation of power, living law has the nature of ‘anti-power’. 
For example, through protest and resistance the building of a dam 
that would cut people off from their existing water supplies may 
actually become impossible even if it had been incorporated in an 
official act of parliament. In a similar vein, agencies supplying 
water to households may be forced to tolerate tapping off prac-
tices that are not based on any formal contract. Notably, entitle-
                                                 
9  See De Gaay Fortman 1995:  62-78. 
10  While the term ‘living law’ is used in different meanings I use it here in the 
sense of informal processes of setting, monitoring and enforcing norms pertain-
ing to order and justice within a certain community. See De Gaay Fortman 
2001: 11. 





ments protected by living law may well be affected by privatisa-
tion policies. 
(2) Politico-cultural reception of access to safe water as a human 
rights issue is bound to require collective action. Indeed, in many 
a politico-economic context the transformation of declared rights 
into acquired rights with guaranteed freedoms and entitlements 
for everyone, calls for long and enduring struggles. As for civil 
and political rights, it is the political order that has to be con-
fronted. In the case of economic, social and cultural rights it is the 
entitlement (sub)systems that lie behind structural non-
implementation which would have to be changed. This means a 
confrontation with the economic powers that be. 
(3) Notably, in struggles for access to water and sanitory services a 
core issue is socio-economic inequality. While in international 
human rights standards the principle of substantial rather than 
just formal equality is poorly embedded,11 religion-based views 
on justice tend to take a much deeper and more encompassing 
perspective. Reference may be made, for example, to Christian 
social thinking as developed in both the Roman Catholic Church 
and the Ecumenical Movement.12 Indeed, integration of the prin-
ciple of equitable distribution –posited by the UN General As-
sembly resolution on the Right to Development- requires an em-
bedding of human rights struggles in pertinent religious settings 
rather than just in secular human rights discourse. 
 
Actually, all three observations point to a need for more than just down-
stream efforts that spell out all possible implications of human rights in 
terms of access to water. An upstream human rights perspective appears 
to be essential. This requires, first of all, some basic understanding of the 
meaning of rights in processes of acquiring basic necessities such as safe 
water and sanitary services.  
 
 
                                                 
11  See De Gaay Fortman 2003: 161 ff.  




3. ACCESS TO WATER IN THE LIGHT OF RIGHTS, ENTITLEMENTS 
AND CLAIMS 
 
Perusing general comments of the committees supervising the implemen-
tation of the various covenants and conventions, as well as the vastly in-
creasing bulk of literature discussing these, one is struck by a rather fun-
damental confusion in human rights terminology. Evidently, terms as 
“rights”, “entitlements”, “access”, and “freedoms” are used both as syno-
nyms and as elements of a cocktail in which they can be freely mixed.  
In General Comment No. 15 of the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights water is principally classified as a 
right but generally discussed as an entitlement. Crucial is the statement 
already quoted at the onset of this chapter: “The human right to water 
entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and 
affordable water for personal and domestic uses.” At this point, one ques-
tion has to be asked first: do rights really entitle people? If that were gen-
erally true, why then do so many people in our world today lack “suffi-
cient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for per-
sonal and domestic uses”? I would rather speak of entitlement failure in 
that respect: 1.2 billion persons on this earth suffer from lack of access to 
potable water, not because resources are lacking but as a result of defi-
cient entitlement.13  
A natural response to such terminological criticism could be: “It is 
true that entitlements following from rights do not always materialise but 
that means no more nor less than that rights are often violated. Unfortu-
nately, this applies above all to human rights in general and to economic, 
social and cultural rights (ESC rights) in particular.” Should we conclude, 
then, that ESC rights are rights without remedies? Indeed, in much of the 
literature we find comparable arguments. Rather typical for much human 
rights discourse in the United States, for example, is Wronka’s distinction 
                                                 
13  See Sen 1981. Problematic is, however, that Sen identifies entitlements with 
rights, meaning “legal rights” as opposed to the “moral rights” that we know as 
human rights. In the Human Development Report 2000 –which is substantially 
based on Sen’s conceptual work- the terminology has moved towards “abstract” 
rights and “concrete rights”. In my view a significantly more comprehensible 
way to address the issues involved in structural non-implementation of human 
rights is through a clear distinction between (abstract) rights and (concrete) 
entitlements. See De Gaay Fortman 2000.  





between “rights as ideals”, “rights as enacted” and “rights as realized”.14  
Thus, General Comment No. 15 would simply constitute the beginning of 
a process, moving from the proclamation of a right to water as an ideal 
through enactment in national legislation towards realisation of the enti-
tlements necessary to acquire safe water from day to day. 
This view would imply that those lacking access to safe water and 
sanitary services would have to wait first for local enactment. However, it 
is precisely in respect of their transformational role that human rights 
may operate as a powerful weapon before any local legislation has been 
effectively enacted. Notably, people’s struggle is tuned to daily acquire-
ment in the sense of sustainable livelihoods, rather than abstract rights. 
Subjective rights constitute neither more nor less than a commitment to-
wards legal protection of related interests on the part of those holding 
them. Thus, in case of dispute the owner of a thing will invoke her prop-
erty right. In fact, ownership implies abstract acknowledgement of claims 
based on the rightholder’s interests. Entitlements, in contrast, refer to 
concrete protected opportunities to satisfy one’s needs. Indeed, what 
makes entitlements that meaningful is actual legitimate access to specific 
resources and actual legitimate command over definite goods and ser-
vices. Entitlement is concrete, in other words, while the qualification “le-
gitimate” refers to authoritative protection. Naturally, concrete titles may 
well find such authoritative protection in rights, as is clearly the case 
when owners who actually possess a property use it to acquire what they 
need. It is on the basis of entitlements that we may claim what we require 
in terms of daily livelihoods.  
Let us look at shelter as an illustration here. Owners who had to flee 
the land retain their property rights but as refugees they loose the oppor-
tunity to claim daily access in order to attain a roof over their head. A 
person with a lesser right, a tenant for example, who still occupies the 
place, does not own it and yet remains entitled to find shelter. Obviously, 
that entitlement is based on another right: tenancy. Noteworthy is the po-
sition of the tolerated squatter: a de facto entitlement without any formal 
right to protect it.  
 
If they had to choose, people would obviously prefer entitlements with-
out rights to rights without entitlements. Indeed, in efforts to sustain our 
                                                 




daily livelihoods it is entitlements that count, as they constitute the basis 
for our claiming behavior. 
 
What is meant here may be illustrated with a figure: 
 
Figure 2  Overcoming Acquirement Failure (B. de Gaay Fortman) 
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What really counts then, is people’s acquirements, or its failure. Why 
do certain people fail to acquire what is essential in respect to their 










which efforts are made to acquire what people need in terms of 
sustainable livelihoods. In situations of structural acquirement failure, 
these are usually highly adverse in terms of extreme pressure on 
resources in the context of a mal-functioning economy, bad 
government, severe structural inequalities and serious socio-cultural 
constraints.  
Given the environment, what a person acquires in terms of daily 
livelihoods is then based on two pillars: actually employed activities 
and honored claims. Those two sources of acquirement are closely 
related. For example, in order to work for an income one has to be 
entitled to do so. In fact, a job tends to be much more than just a 
matter of “tenancy” of labor as it used to be envisaged in Roman law 
(locatio conductio operum); it is also an institutional entitlement that 
means a great deal more than just being paid. A farmer who wishes to 
work on a piece of land needs access to start with. While people’s 
activities are rooted in their capacities, claims find their basis in 
entitlements, i.e. authoritatively protected (and hence legitimate) 
access to resources and similar command over goods and services. 
Our entitlements are rooted in access to resources, protected by 
private law, institutions of a more or less autonomous character and/or 
the State. Hence, there is a need for a functioning system of civil and 
commercial law, for institutions protecting entitlements of those 
associated with them, e.g. family, traditional communities but also 
modern associations, and for a State protecting, arranging and 
rearranging people’s entitlements in an effective and fair way. 
Strikingly, the state appears to play a pivotal role in the whole 
process: in its influence on people’s capacities through provision of 
basic public services like health and education; in its protection of 
private entitlement systems, including those of an institutional rather 
than purely individual nature; and in the way in which it directly or 
indirectly arranges and rearranges entitlements. 
Notably, water privatisation shifts the State’s authority with regard 
to water access from direct public command over the required re-
sources towards a responsibility for the effective functioning of pri-
vate law as a system guaranteeing already acquired access to safe wa-
ter. Moreover, through such schemes it cannot escape its responsibili-




this connection, international human rights law implies that by em-
barking upon such schemes states cannot escape their responsibilities 
to respect, to protect and to fulfill their human rights obligations fol-
lowing from the standards to whose observance they are committed. 
What does that imply in terms that are more concrete? 
 
 
4. UPSTREAM APPROACHES TO THE REALIZATION OF WATER 
NEEDS 
 
At the top of Figure 2 we see human rights still hanging in the air. In 
efforts to sustain daily livelihood their role would have to materialise 
in two distinct ways: by protecting already secured entitlements essen-
tial for upholding basic human dignity and by functioning as an inspi-
ration to start the entire human rights venture upstream, i.e. from the 
perspective of everyone. To understand the meaning of the latter, let 




Figure 3 Human rights in an upstream perspective 
 
The entire course of action begins here with people themselves in 
processes of self-identification as rightsholders. The dual endeavour is 





to find protection against all actual and potential abuse of power, and 
to secure the fundamental freedoms and basic entitlements that follow 
from respect for everyone’s basic human dignity. Notably, human 
rights are empowering. As Alston has argued: “It has the potential to 
empower people at the grassroots level into believing that they have a 
right to education, to health care or to any of the other rights pro-
claimed in the international instruments.”15  
 
The Human Development Report 2000 with its thematic focus on 
Human Rights discusses the implications of this interpretation of the 
human rights venture in chapter 4: Rights empowering people in the 
fight against poverty. At this point the whole so-called “rights-based 
approach” has to be made concrete. Naturally, this appears to be far 
from easy. Basic economic rights such as the right to a decent stan-
dard of living (article 25, UDHR) “are not just development goals”, it 
is rightly noted (p. 73), yet, such “rights do not mean an entitlement to 
a handout” (id.). Thus, a person without access to safe water cannot 
simply go to court and claim the necessary provision. This view is 
also held by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, a judicial insti-
tution that bases its judgments on sweeping legal provisions such as 
article 27 (1) which states that “Everyone has the right to have access 
to … “sufficient food and water”. However, in such a juridical setting 
one should never forget that rights correspond with duties and that the 
primary persons to whom duties apply are the rightsholders them-
selves. Indeed, my human right to health demands, first of all, my own 
efforts to secure a healthy environment, including access to safe water 
and sanitary services. It is only when such endeavours touch upon se-
rious constraints in which others are involved that the responsibilities 
of these other dutybearers are activated. 
Problematic in this respect is that, although the whole idea of 
rights is based upon the expectation that evident violations would lead 
to contentious action resulting in redress, human rights often remain 
without effective implementation. This is due to two crucial obstacles: 
                                                 
15  Philip Alston, The Rights Framework and Development Assistance, Symposium 
Paper – A Human Rights Approach to Development, Oslo 1998, quoted by Wil-




firstly, the often prevailing inadequacy of law as a check on power, 
and secondly, the lack of reception of these rights in many cultural 
and politico-economic contexts.  
Yet the implication of such critical constraints in the operational 
impact of universal human rights is not that these rights lose all mean-
ing in processes of development and the attack on poverty. While in 
Western history individual human rights have been afforded a place in 
the statute books at the end of processes of societal transformation, in 
most of the developing world these internationally accepted standards 
merely stand at the beginning of emancipation and social change. 
Their function, in other words, is not so much protection (notably, 
what ought to be protected would still have to be acquired), but rather 
transformation. Moreover, these internationally recognised rights play 
their part not merely as legal resources (implying a reliance on func-
tioning legal systems), but also as political instruments in the sense of 
internationally enacted standards of legitimacy that are meant to gov-
ern any use of power.  
Actually, a judicial case-by-case approach to concrete violations 
of human rights is just one possible option in efforts to realise human 
rights. Legal literacy programmes are a way of raising people’s 
awareness of rights in general. A political case-by-case approach uses 
protest and other forms of dissent as ways of protecting fundamental 
interests against policies and action that violate people’s human dig-
nity. Even in the lives of those already facing daily hardships, such 
resistance appears to be often necessary. The most pressing chal-
lenges, however, lie in persistent non-implementation of human rights. 
It is the economic, political and social structures behind such situa-
tions that would have to be addressed. Here collective action would be 
called for, aiming at structural reforms. 
These four distinct types of human rights strategies may be illus-
trated by a simple matrix showing the focus of human rights with re-
gard to two major functions, protection and transformation, as well as 
two categories of means towards implementation: legal resources and 
political instruments.  
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I should now like to illustrate this matrix on human rights strategies 
with examples relating to water. 
The left upper box refers to contentious action in order to protect 
actual freedoms and entitlements. The following case16 had to do with 
inhabitants of a block of flats in South Africa in 2001.17 A resident 
took successful legal action against the local council for disconnection 
of water supply to the flats as a response to non-payment of water 
charges. The High Court ordered reinstatement of water supply on the 
grounds that the conditions and procedures for disconnection had not 
been “fair and equitable” in accordance with the South African Water 
Services Act 108 of 1997.  The Council had not given reasonable no-
tice of termination or the opportunity to make representations. This 
prevented any application of the rule that water supply may not be 
discontinued if it results in a person being denied access to basic water 
services due to non-payment, where that person proves inability to pay 
for basic services. The water supply to the flats thus had to be rein-
stated. 
In its legal reasoning, the court referred to the constitutional right 
in South Africa to access to water [section 27(1)(b)] as well as the In-
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ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), 
and General Comment 12 of the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights on the Right to Food.18 
From a strategic perspective, it appears to be important to follow 
up such judicial successes with accurate monitoring of the follow-up 
and, if necessary, political pressure towards enforcement. In the fa-
mous South African Grootboom case19, for example, the mandatory 
order of the Constitutional Court of South Africa still demanded po-
litical pressure towards its execution. Incidentally, in South Africa the 
Grootboom case had an important effect on evictions from squatter 
areas in general, particularly from a preventive perspective. Indeed, 
while the four boxes of the upstream human rights strategy matrix of 
figure 4 can be distinguished, they cannot be separated. 
 The right upper box relates, for example, to cases that are brought 
to court even when litigants know they have a zero chance of direct 
success. The whole endeavour then becomes an exercise in conscienti-
sation. Another way of aiming at legal awareness-building or legal 
literacy is found in quasi-judicial activism through the use of public 
tribunals. While lacking any formal authority, these can have a sig-
nificant impact on people’s awareness of their rights, in turn strength-
ening their position vis-à-vis the Government by empowering them to 
demand the needed water services. Such tribunals can be constituted 
both ad hoc and on a permanent basis. An example of the latter is the 
International Water Tribunal, an independent non-governmental fo-
rum for adjudicating water issues. An independent jury evaluates 
cases on the basis of a declaration the Tribunal formulated, the “Am-
sterdam Declaration”. 
 
In one decision of the International Water Tribunal, a physician and 
engineer brought a case against the Israeli government on the grounds 
of a violation of the right to health of Arab villagers living in non-
recognized areas. The applicant argued that Israel was deliberately not 
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connecting “unrecognized villages” to the national drinking water 
network, to which neighboring Jewish communities had access, as 
part of its Planning and Building Law. The applicants presented evi-
dence of a connection between outbreaks of disease, such as hepatitis 
among children, and a contaminated and insufficient water supply, 
and argued that the applicable zoning law is discriminatory. The Tri-
bunal found that the denial of water by the Government as a means to 
enforce zoning or planning had a negative impact on the health of 
those living in the villages and was unjustifiable. This decision was 
handed down despite the fact that the precise nature of the Govern-
ment’s obligation to provide adequate water and sanitation had not 
been determined.20  It advised the Government to connect the villages 
to the water network and find equitable alternative solutions to plan-
ning and zoning in cooperation with those affected.21 
Highly relevant in respect of the use of legal resources to secure 
people’s basic entitlements is public (or social) action litigation. India 
is the primary example here. As explained by Chief Justice Bhagwati 
in a booklet entitled Law as Weapon, the Supreme Court of that coun-
try took the view 
 
that it was necessary to depart from the traditional rule of locus 
standi and to broaden access to justice by providing that where 
a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or a class 
of persons who by reason of poverty, disability or otherwise are 
socially and economically in disadvantaged positions and are 
unable to approach the court for relief, any member of the pub-
lic or social action group acting bona fide can maintain an ap-
plication in the High Court or the Supreme Court seeking re-
dress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or 
class person.22   
 
It was also felt that such persons acting on behalf of the marginalised 
and underprivileged could not be expected to incur the expenses re-
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 http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/ripple/chapter2.html. 
21  Kanaaneh, McKay & Sims 1995: 190-205. 




quired for a regular writ petition to be filed in court. Hence, “episto-
lary jurisdiction” developed, where the court could be moved by not 
more than a letter on behalf of the disadvantaged group. Naturally, 
from an upstream human rights perspective this development, aptly 
depicted as the Supreme Court of India becoming the Supreme Court 
for Indians23, constitutes a highly significant advance in connecting 
upstream collective action with national and international standards 
and mechanisms. One particular High Court case may serve as an il-
lustration here: 
For the Kerala High Court in Attakoya Thangal v. Union of India 
(1990),24 Justice Sankaran Nair, recognised that: “The right to sweet 
water and the right to free air, are attributes of the right to life for 
these are the basic elements which sustain life itself.”25 Petitioners in 
this case claimed that a Government scheme for pumping up ground 
water in order to supply potable water to the coral isles of Lakshad-
weep would upset the fresh water equilibrium, leading to salinity in 
the available water resources and causing long-term harm in violation 
of their right to life under article 21 of the Constitution.  
The Kerala High Court, in its judgment, ordered a report to ana-
lyse the situation on the basis of the petitioner’s claims. On reviewing 
the results, it determined that the scheme could not go ahead without 
endorsement by the competent Ministry of Science and Technology 
and the Ministry of Environment, in satisfaction of sufficient safe-
guards, restrictions and effective monitoring at all levels of the 
scheme. Justice Sankaran Nair held that if considered necessary, statu-
tory regulations should be made and a responsible agency set up for 
monitoring the functioning of the system. Above all, he maintained 
the onerous responsibilities of the Executive Government in providing 
civic amenities and the fact that “the administrative agency cannot be 
permitted to function in such a manner as to make inroads, into the 
fundamental right under Art. 21 (the right to life)”.  
The two lower boxes in the Human Rights Strategies matrix con-
cern the use of human rights as political instruments. The left one in-
                                                 
23  Upendra Baxi, as quoted by Bhagwati 1990: 111. 
24  http://www.dundee.ac.uk/iwlri/Documents/Treaties/NationalCases/Attakoya 
Thangal v. Union of India.pdf [accessed 22 October 2005]. 
25  Judgement above, para 8. 





cludes social protest against political and economic decisions resulting 
in serious negative consequences in terms of people’s entitlements to 
safe water. The International Rivers Network, for example, supports 
local communities working to protect their rivers and watersheds. It 
fights “to hold destructive river development projects…”26 An illustra-
tion is the World Bank’s Lesotho Highlands Water Project “sold as a 
way of pulling Lesotho out of poverty while supplying water to South 
Africa”. On September 21, 2005, some five hundred people from 
dam-affected communities marched in the capital Maseru to express 
their grievances, including “lack of water and sanitation in resettled 
communities”. 
Obviously, in terms of entitlements protection such collective ac-
tion is of great importance, whether coupled with judicial action –the 
left upper box- or not. International NGOs like the International Riv-
ers Network play an important part in monitoring plans and policies 
that are evidently in contravention of the prerequisite of people’s par-
ticipation and equitable distribution of benefits as stipulated in art 2 
(3) of the UN General Assembly Resolution of 1986 on the Right to 
Development (GADRD). In policies for water privatisation, too, a 
careful monitoring of effects on existing entitlement positions serves 
as a necessary basis for effective protection.  
In a world in which failure in the implementation of human rights 
tends to be structural rather than just incidental, the right lower box is 
especially important. At this point we touch upon human rights as in-
ternationally endorsed standards of legitimacy, to be used in collective 
efforts to transform economy, polity and society.  
 
 
5. RIGHTS-BASED STRATEGIES TO SECURE SUSTAINABLE ACCESS 
TO WATER  
 
The character of human rights as ‘declaratory’ rather than ‘conclusive’ 
affects economic, social and cultural rights in particular and manifests 
itself especially in countries in the South. This has to do with a socio-
                                                 





economic context: no jobs, no access to land and hence extreme pres-
sure on scarce productive resources. Such conditions appear to breed 
frustration and aggression rather than recognition of other people’s 
freedoms and needs. But there is also a political setting that finds its 
background in the history of colonialism and its effects on the distri-
bution and control of power, both internationally and in local contexts. 
As a result, the struggle for social justice in the developing world 
faces serious constraints. Internationally, that endeavour has not 
yielded impressive fruits up until now. As a result of decisions taken 
in the name of economic progress, the poor often have to face increas-
ing hardships. In that dim light the idea emerged to connect the strug-
gle for human development to human rights.  
The already cited Human Development Report 2000 with its spe-
cial focus on human rights, constituted a first response to UN Secre-
tary General Annan’s appeal for a ‘mainstreaming’ of human rights. 
What is meant here is the incorporation of human rights standards in 
day-to-day economic and political decision-making. Indeed, a persis-
tent effort towards integrating development, security and governance 
through a compelling focus on the human being – human develop-
ment, human security and human rights – characterises the approach 
taken in the Human Development Reports of the United Nations De-
velopment Program. It is basic human dignity that links the three to-
gether. 
 
Notable in the discourse that is usually employed in this connection is, 
first of all, the use of the term “approach”. Apparently, the idea is no 
longer to plan, steer or direct but just to approach poverty and the 
need for development. This terminology is in line with the earlier shift 
in emphasis from development as programming structural improve-
ment of the economy to human development as “a process of expand-
ing the real freedoms that people enjoy.” The language used here is 
Amartya Sen’s (see, for example, his Development as Freedom27). It 
is indeed, particularly Sen’s thinking that appears to have influenced 
the Human Development Reports in general and the 2000 Report on 
the human rights approach to development in particular. In an earlier 
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publication to which the Human Development Report 2000 refers, Sen 
had already summarised the case for human rights from a develop-
mental perspective in three aspects: “(1) their intrinsic importance, (2) 
their consequential role in providing political incentives for economic 
security, and (3) their constructive role in the genesis of values and 
priorities”.28  
The United Nations Development Program has translated the con-
structive role of human rights principally in a policy to create “ena-
bling environments”. Indeed, they admit, poverty is a brutal denial of 
human rights. However, what that means concretely is that environ-
ments must be established under which people can realise their rights 
under the law. Yet, many people live in disabling environments; hence 
the first challenge is a struggle from below to secure the concrete enti-
tlements that are supposed to be protected.  
As opposed to all the specific rights that one could deduce from 
the International Bill of Human Rights, Figure 3 above is based on a 
starting point in what one might call inductive rights or rather induc-
tive entitlements. The essence at this juncture is what people at the 
grassroots themselves see as the minimum necessities required in or-
der to respect and protect their basic human dignity? Not surprisingly, 
empirical research has shown that access to water scores very highly 
here. While for women in Bangladesh, for example, an end to domes-
tic violence appeared to come first, access to water came second and a 
private wash place third.  
Despite the tremendous weight of safe and accessible water, trav-
eling around our world today confronts one continuously with a huge 
human rights deficit in this respect. A global deficit indeed, for with a 
more equitable distribution the average global per capita income 
(2004) of US$ 5,130 would be more than sufficient to secure access to 
safe water for everyone. With an average per capita income of US$ 
2,630 this point can still be made for just South Africa. However, just 
out of Cape Town airport the visitor is already confronted with 
Khayelitsha Site C and its despicable sanitary conditions. For those 
living there in conditions of continuous hardship, water appears to be 
                                                 




a matter of filthy buckets to be carried on simple trolleys from there to 
here. 
What then is the answer? The international community now sees 
the answer in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which 
stipulate, amongst other things that by 2015 the percentage of people 
lacking access to clean water must be halved. Laudable, indeed, as 
that would mean major progress in poverty reduction. Yet, three major 
issues remain. First, if that target is reached as a result of significant 
steps forward in China, this will not be of much comfort for those in 
South Africa who are still lacking access to safe water. In other words, 
the MDGs should be brought down to each and every local level, in-
cluding Khayelitsha Site C. A second question arises, however: which 
half of the people there is to have access to clean water by 2015, and, 
more critically, which half is not? A third issue concerns people suf-
fering here and now. Would it be of much console to them that in 
2015 things will be better? The MDGs constitute an exercise in 
benchmarking, and such endeavours tend to be useless without solid 
monitoring and action as to developments today.  
Consequently, although the millennium development goals may 
well be seen as a firm step forward in global responsibility for the 
predicament of the world’s poor, they remain rather abstract statistics. 
A global attack on poverty requires a firmer basis: human rights as a 
tool for collective action. Actually, as the core notion is that people 
living in daily hardship have rights, like everyone else, and that these 
rights should serve as the starting point in every development strategy, 
the term “approach” is not correct. As tools in struggles against the 
injustices that lie at the roots of poverty, human rights are above all a 
conviction and a commitment. Consequently, rights-based strategies 
would appear to be the more appropriate terminology. 
A major challenge in rights-based strategies is always to identify 
not only rightsholders but duty bearers too, and to call the latter to 
their obligations. At this point it is important to note that water priva-
tisation does not discharge the state from its responsibilities to guaran-
tee both water delivery and access to it. We find an example of the 
interplay of actors in Bolivia, where in 1999 the Government granted 
a water and sewer services concession to Bechtel, a single-bidder 
multi-national water corporation enjoying World Bank Support. Popu-





lar unrest over this decision soon after forced the government to reac-
quire control. However, as is commonly the case, private sector par-
ticipation was a precondition to development assistance and reacquisi-
tion rendered the government liable for cancellation of its conces-
sion.29 Notable in such an upstream action based on human rights as 
political standards of legitimacy is the capacity to redress non-State 
actors as duty bearers. This is a crucial issue in rights-based strategies, 
distinguishing these from state-focused approaches such as the MDGs. 
The behavior of a broad range of actors impacts directly and signifi-
cantly on the access of those living in poverty to water of sufficient 
quality and quantity. Notably, General Comment 15 of the UNCESCR 
fails to redress non-State actors in any substantive manner. However, 
an upstream movement focuses more on private rather than solely 
government actors and can extend to industrial and agricultural appli-
cations rather than just personal use. As Tully has noted:  
 
the impact of the human rights approach upon global water re-
source allocation will be marginal. General Comment 15 – is 
limited to sufficient and continuous water for personal and do-
mestic use. Household use constitutes just six percent of global 
water consumption, with industrial applications 20 percent and 
agriculture 74 percent.30  
 
To illustrate the need to connect downstream with upstream action, let 
us now end this enquiry with a water project that may be seen as in-
dicative for the required connection between productive endeavors 
and a human rights-based focus on (re)distribution. I am referring here 
to the Vitens venture in Mozambique. Vitens Ltd is a Dutch company 
with a great deal of experience in water delivery. In 2005 its custom-
ers received a flyer entitled WATER FOR US WATER FOR THEM. Water, it 
said, is a life issue, and while we simply open our tap and get it, for 
one billion people in our world today this is far from a reality. What 
we should do now is not a matter of giving but sharing: sharing our 
knowledge and expertise. Hence, Vitens customers are called upon to 
contribute to a new foundation: Water for Life. 
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The relevant documents show that this is a so-called PPP project -
Public Private Partnership- with three major partners:  the Mozambi-
can Water Board (FIPAG: Fundo do Investimento e Património do 
Abastecimento de Água), the Netherlands Government (Development 
Co-operation), and Vitens. Furthermore, the African Development 
Bank also decided to participate. The project aims at impressively in-
creased proportions of the local population in four towns, which 
would get access to clean water. As such it is based on MDG 7: to en-
sure environmental sustainability. One of its targets, following from 
an extension in 2002 in Johannesburg, is directly linked to safe drink-
ing-water and basic sanitation. It specifically calls to: 
 
halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking-water and basic sanitation. 
 
As is not uncommon in regard to the MDGs, the world is on track to 
meet the drinking-water target, but according to the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO), sub-Saharan Africa lags behind.31 Thus, progress 
between 1990 and 2002 appears to fall short of what would be needed 
to achieve the MDG target of 75% coverage by 2015. Hence, the 
choice for Mozambique appears to be well-considered, and the same 
is likely to be true for the choice of the four towns and the townships 
within these. Yet, there are some valid queries: 
 
•  Is there any co-ordination among donors in general as to their 
policies on increasing water delivery, on a global, regional as 
well as a local basis? 
•  As the Vitens field visits in Mozambique revealed a serious 
institutional, financial, operational and managerial weakness 
in the running of the local Empresas de Agua (EdA), an im-
proved functioning of these entities would seem to require 
more than just an external institutional training component in 
the project. How is that crucial issue being addressed? 
•  Especially important are the participatory and distributional 
issues stipulated in article 2 (3) of the GADRD of 1986. 
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There are evidently linked issues concerning water pricing, 
billing, collection and cutting off policies, for example. What 
procedures have been established to guarantee accountability 
of all actors involved in the project? 
•  Another obvious concern is the effect of the project on con-
scientisation inside the Netherlands. Vitens’ customers are 
requested to contribute just once to the Water for Life foun-
dation. Why not ask them to agree to a supplement on their 
own water bill, entailing a permanent link between water 
consumption here and there? 
 
The point is that endeavors towards increased productivity should al-
ways be accompanied by (re)distributional efforts focusing on enti-
tlement systems and their (mal)functioning. In practice this requires an 
involvement of strong civil society organisations, willing and able to 
connect the laudable downstream venture with upstream collective 
action. Naturally, a company like Vitens cannot be expected to organ-
ise entitlement (sub)systems analysis, public pressure, advocacy and 
lobbying at the Moçambican national and local level.  One would 
hope, then, that the donor government (in this case the Netherlands) 
raises such issues up with the national and local NGO world. In meth-
odological terms the whole challenge is to connect downstream pro-
duction tuned MDG policies with upstream rights-based strategies.  
In South Africa, the development of a strong civil society happens 
to be much further advanced than in neighboring Mozambique. In-
deed, in that country impressive research is being conducted by non-
governmental agencies into the effects of privatisation and commer-
cialisation of water delivery on water entitlements.32 Hence, it might 
be helpful if Dutch non-governmental co-financing entities active in 
both South Africa and Mozambique were to enhance South-South co-
operation in rights-based water strategies. 
Finally, it is primarily at the global level that rights-based strate-
gies are required in order to address inequities. Indeed, the huge gap in 
global income distribution –per capita income in the richest country, 
Luxembourg, is an incredible 450 times higher than in the poorest 
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one, the Democratic Republic of Congo- is reflected in access to wa-
ter, too. Hence, structural reforms in international water governance 
should get top priority on the agendas of global bodies such as the G8 
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This paper is concerned with the liberalisation of water services in the 
Netherlands and South Africa. It will examine the legal framework for 
water delivery in both countries and pay attention to the policy and legal 
developments surrounding the liberalisation of the delivery of potable wa-
ter. The aim of this paper is to highlight important developments and 
ideas that could spur a further debate on the comparison between the two 
countries. 
First, definitions will be introduced for some of the terminology used 
in the paper. 
Second, the general Dutch policy on the liberalisation of network sec-
tors will be discussed as it provides a useful overview of some important 
considerations in the discourse about liberalisation of network sectors. 
This will be followed by some remarks on the Dutch legal framework on 
water delivery with specific reference to recent developments aimed at 
halting privatisation moves in the water sector. The paper will continue 
by presenting an overview of the South African legislation that makes up 
the framework for water delivery by municipalities. Some examples of 
liberalisation efforts will be discussed briefly and finally, the develop-
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1.1 Network sectors and competition 
 
The provision of potable water is a network sector. In network sectors, the 
provision of the service is dependent on the existence of a network, 
namely the water piping infrastructure. Other examples of network sec-
tors are electricity, telecommunication, internet-access and railway ser-
vices. What sets network sectors aside from many other types of service 
delivery is that they generally have the characteristics of a ‘natural mo-
nopoly’: residents do not have the freedom to choose their service pro-
vider. Naturally, this opens up the possibility of abuse of that monopoly at 
the cost of the user. It necessitates a strong role for the government in the 
delivery of that service.  
On the other hand, those who advocate the insertion of the element of 
competition point towards the benefits of competition between service 
providers: the pressure of competition and the watchful eye of critical 
shareholders will provide incentive to providers to perform. They will at-
tempt to distinguish themselves through lower prices and better quality. 
Competition will result in room for innovation and will increase the pro-
ductivity of delivery processes. Citizens will enjoy more choices and 
there will be room for entrepreneurial activity.1 
Various modalities of competition can be distinguished.2 Competition 
between networks means that customers are offered the choice between 
various networks. Competition on the market entails that one or more pri-
vate entities operate and compete on the same network for customers. 
Competition about the market refers to a situation where the infrastruc-
ture remains in public hands whilst private agencies can compete for a 
concession. Competition through comparison is a modality in which pub-
lic or private entities are compared by a supervisory entity on the basis of 
benchmarking. 
                                                 
1  See, for example, TK 1999-2000, 27 018, nr. 1 p. 7. 
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paper entitled “Public interests and Market Regulation”, TK 1999-2000, 27 018, nr. 
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It is apposite to clarify the terminology used in this paper. Various terms 
and concepts, such as ‘privatisation’, ‘liberalisation’, ‘restructuring’ and 
‘placing a government agency at a distance’ are used and their capricious 
use can lead to misconceptions.  
Liberalisation is referred to as the introduction of competition in a 
(network) sector. The aim of liberalisation is to capitalise on the pressure 
that is generated by competition on price and quality. It could but does 
not have to include privatisation. Privatisation is the selling of public as-
sets to the private sector. It is usually the last step in a process of intro-




The rather ambiguous term ‘restructuring’ has been chosen to facilitate a 
comparison of various initiatives and processes in South Africa and the 
Netherlands that do not qualify as liberalisation. Restructuring refers to 
the process of taking a public service, provided directly by the govern-
ment, and placing this service ‘at a distance’ whilst ensuring a certain de-
gree of control. The Dutch speak of verzelfstandiging which literally 
means ‘providing independence’. This is not akin to privatisation because 
the utility remains in public hands. The primary aim of the restructuring is 
not to insert competition but rather to make efficiency gains by establish-
ing ‘autonomous’ public units that provide the service. 
 
This paper continues by outlining some of the important developments 
surrounding liberalisation and privatisation of potable water delivery in 
the two countries. 
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2. LIBERALISATION OF THE NETWORK SECTORS IN THE NETHER-
LANDS 
 
In 1999, developments in network sectors of electricity, water and rail-
ways prompted the Dutch Parliament to request the national Cabinet to 
take a position on the privatisation and restructuring of those sectors.3 In 
response, the cabinet issued a policy paper entitled ‘Public interests and 
market regulation’. The question posed in the paper was how the govern-
ment could most effectively safeguard public interests in these sectors. 
The emphasis was put on two themes, namely the consequences of liber-
alisation for ‘customers’ and supervision of the performance of these 
companies.4 
In this policy paper, the Dutch government underscored its commit-
ment to liberalisation of network sectors. It indicated that the public inter-
est is not necessarily best served by public property. The principle was 
put forward that the modality with the most intensive form of competition 
must be opted for if it is technically and economically attainable.5 The 
term ‘economically attainable’ must be understood to mean that a market 
can be created where companies effectively compete. Government thus 
unequivocally pronounced a preference for as much liberalisation of as 
many network sectors as possible. This commitment was phrased in the 
‘Third Way’ vocabulary of the nineties: ‘governments should steer, not 
row’ and ‘if government operates as a director, instead of an actor it will 
be able to firmly determine the rules according to which the market serves 
the public interest’. The prevailing notion is that the government should 
concern itself with market regulation (marktordening) and anticipate pos-
sible market failures in this regulatory scheme.6 
 
                                                 
3  Debate in Lower House on the Department of Economic Affairs’ budget 26/27 Oc-
tober 1999 and General Budget Debate in Senate on 16 and 17 November 1999. 
4  TK 1999-2000, 27 018, nr. 1, p. 1. 
5  TK 1999-2000, 27 018, nr. 1, p. 18; See also Blokland & Van Zijp 2002: 21. 
6  Blokland & Van Zijp 2002: 23. 
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In identifying what the role of government is in ensuring that the market 
serves the public interest the Cabinet distinguished five phases, namely: 
• identifying public interests involved; 
• translating these into clear norms or conditions; 
• establishing strong and independent supervision; 
• determining the modus of market regulation; and 
• deciding on the ownership of utilities. 
These five phases will be briefly alluded to. 
 
2.1 Public interests 
 
Government defined the public interests involved in network sectors as 
including the following: 
 
• Universal service delivery. Public services must be available to all 
consumers at roughly the same price.  
• Protection against the power of the provider. The inherently un-
equal relationship between the provider and the consumer necessi-
tates protection by the government. 
• Security of delivery. The absence of a possibility to immediately 
change to another service provider when the service breaks down, 
combined with the essential nature of the service necessitates se-
curity of delivery. 
• Product quality. There are distinct features of a public service, the 
quality of which belongs to the public interest. Examples are those 
aspects of a service that have an impact on health and security, 
such as the level of contamination of water, the secure transport of 
electricity amongst others. Both the establishment of norms and 
controlling compliance is the government’s task. 
• Integrity of the market. The government must protect the integrity 
of the market by countering monopolies and abuse of monopo-
lies.7 
                                                 
7  TK 1999-2000, 27 018, nr. 1, p. 8. 
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The above imperatives should then guide the government in devising sec-




The Dutch government made it clear that supervision and market regula-
tion are more important than the issue of ownership. After many years of 
experience with the restructuring of organs and the placing of specific 
government agencies ‘at a distance’ the conclusion is that public owner-
ship creates an illusion of public involvement which cannot be translated 
into direct political instruction. Ownership control, which entails govern-
ment using its position as shareholder or its ability to appoint members to 
a board of directors or a board of trustees, has proved to be largely inef-
fective in exercising supervision.  
These insights were prompted within the constitutional doctrine of 
‘ministerial accountability’: the accountability of national Ministers to 
Parliament.8 Ministers are politically responsible for all acts and omis-
sions performed within the departmental hierarchy. However, the ac-
countability is limited by the notion that there can be no accountability 
without powers. This, combined with the restructuring of central state 
agencies into public utilities and a concomitant decrease of the Minister’s 
powers vis-à-vis those agencies resulted in the doctrine of ‘ministerial 
accountability’ losing much of its use as a mechanism to exercise control 
over delivery.  
The cabinet stated that government needs to guarantee the public in-
terests through public means. The notion of independent supervisory enti-
ties was presented as the preferred option. In sum, experience has shown 
that being sole shareholder is not sufficient for the state to effectively su-
pervise the performance of a privatised service. Public supervision, pref-
erably by an independent entity is necessary.9 
The reasoning of the government is interesting because, on the one 
hand, it firmly believes in the benefits of liberalisation and it trusts that 
                                                 
8  Article 42(2) of the Dutch Constitution. 
9  Blokland & Van Zijp 2002: 22 
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shareholders (and consumers) will immediately punish underperfor-
mance.10 However, when it comes to situations where government itself is 
(sole or majority) shareholder, it warns that the expectations are too high 
and it apologises for the limited influence it can exert through private in-
terests. 
 
2.3 Market regulation 
 
The Dutch government is at pains to say that competition is not regarded 
as a goal in itself but rather as a means to provide service providers with 
an incentive to optimise their performance.11 Determining the modus of 
market regulation deals with the question as to whether or not competi-
tion could be useful in safeguarding the public interests. 
The various modalities of competition, referred to above, are at play 
here, except to say that competition between networks is not (yet) possible 
with water and electricity. It currently takes place only in the internet 
connection (telephone line vs. cable) and telecommunication (mobile vs. 




The final question is the issue of ownership, namely whether the agency 
that delivers the public service is in private hands or public hands. In the 
policy paper, Cabinet expresses the opinion that ultimately, regulation 
and supervision are more important than the issue of ownership. How-
ever, supervision and public ownership could result in a conflict of inter-
ests and, therefore, private ownership is, in principle, the preferred op-
tion.12 
 
The general Dutch policy on liberalisation of network sectors is clearly 
predisposed to far-reaching liberalisation with private ownership as the 
                                                 
10  TK 1999-2000, 27 018, nr. 1, p. 14. 
11  TK 1999-2000, 27 018, nr. 1, p. 5. 
12  TK 1999-2000, 27 018, nr. 1, p. 5. 
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preferred end result. Government’s role should be limited to regulation 
and supervision, rather than involvement in the provision of the service 
itself. Moving to one of the network sectors, namely the delivery of pota-




3. WATER SERVICES IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Article 22 of the Dutch Constitution instructs the government to ‘take 
measures to promote public health’. The government’s duty to provide 
potable water is generally derived from this socio-economic right. How-
ever, this is not interpreted to mean that the government itself must neces-
sarily exercise the production, distribution and delivery of potable water. 
The European Union regards competition in the water sector as a mat-
ter that has little or no communitarian importance. It is therefore left to 
the Member States to develop and implement policy. European Commu-
nity Law leaves it up to the Member States to determine the structure of 
the potable water delivery. Directives are concerned with the quality of 
water delivered rather than with the way in which the water is delivered.13 
It is understood that this exception to the principles of competition and 
free market is justified in light of the specific nature of the service. 
Currently, the delivery of potable water is conducted by approxi-
mately 20 regional water utilities. These private water utilities are owned 
by provinces and municipalities with the exception of the Water Com-
pany Amsterdam (Waterleidingbedrijf Amsterdam), which is a depart-
ment of the municipality of Amsterdam. However, in principle, there are 
no legal impediments to a water utility selling assets to private parties.14 
The question as to whether or not the water sector should undergo a proc-
ess of liberalisation was still left open in 1998 when the Cabinet issued a 
                                                 
13  Directive 98/83/EC 3/11/1998 Concerning the quality of potable water (PbEG L 
330). TK 2001–2002, 28 339, nr. 3 p. 7. 
14  TK 1997–1998, 25 869, nr. 1, p. 9. 
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‘Framework Memorandum on Water Infrastructure Act’ (Hoofdlijnen No-
titie Waterleidingwet) in which the following statement appeared:15 
 
The cabinet does not support privatisation of water delivery but it does 
support the introduction of instruments that could improve efficiency. 
Bench marking can be considered in that respect, as well as other mo-
dalities of market functioning which must still be investigated.16  
 
Government thus appeared at least to be interested in a modality of mar-
ket functioning whereby the operational task of the water utility is out-
sourced.17  
Developments in the sector itself caused the process to be fast-
tracked. These developments concerned, amongst other things, the in-
creasing cooperation between energy corporations and water utilities and 
the emergence of ‘multi utility’ corporations. The transfer of parts of the 
authority over water utilities to private corporations (electricity utilities 
have been privatised) was therefore on the cards.18 The Dutch Lower 
House passed a motion, directing the Cabinet in 1998 to take the neces-
sary measures, to ensure that water utilities remain in public hands and to 
submit a Bill to that extent.19  
In 2002, the Cabinet submitted a Water Infrastructure Amendment 
Bill.20 In the Explanatory Memorandum, government stated unequivo-
cally that the provision of water to households will, also in the future, re-
main completely in the hands of the State.21 In fact, the key theme in this 
Bill was the wish of Parliament and of government to ‘guarantee the pub-
lic nature of water provision’ and this principle is to be laid down in a 
                                                 
15  TK 1997–1998, 25 869, nr. 1. 
16  TK 1997–1998, 25 869, nr. 1, p. 10. 
17  TK 1997–1998, 25 869, nr. 1, p. 26. 
18  TK 2002–2003, 28 339, nr. 6, p. 2. For example, NUON, a large, privately owned, 
multi utility took over NV Waterleiding Friesland, thereby signalling a development 
in the direction of privately owned water utilities. See TK 2002–2003, 28 339, nr. 6, 
p. 12. 
19  ‘Motie Feenstra’, TK 1997-1998, 25 869, nr. 2. 
20  TK 2001–2002, 28 339, nrs. 1–2. 
21  TK 2001–2002, 28 339, nr. 3 p. 1. 
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proposed new article 1a of the Water Infrastructure Act. The government 
wants to retain full ownership of the water companies by provinces and 
municipalities.22 In anticipation of the Bill and the processing of the Bill, 
government published an announcement in the government paper 
(Staatscourant), which stated that legislation to secure the public owner-
ship of existing water utilities was being prepared. New companies, re-
sulting from mergers, could therefore no longer expect to enjoy the same 
status as the existing ones.23 As the activity of the delivery of potable wa-
ter is subject to government affording the deliverer a suitable status, this 
effectively placed a moratorium on the selling off assets to private enti-
ties. The Water Infrastructure Amendment Act came into operation on 1 
July 2005. 
The amended Water Infrastructure Act gives the existing water utili-
ties the exclusive right to produce and deliver water. The sale of interests 
in water utilities to entities which are not ‘qualified legal entities’24 is 
prohibited.25 Actions that amount to the selling of interests in water utili-
ties,26 the selling of or use of water infrastructure as collateral27 or the is-
suing of new shares must be reported to the Minister. Importantly, the 
conclusion of an agreement whereby the authority over the utility is exer-
cised by or together with third parties or whereby the transfer of authority 
                                                 
22  TK 2001–2002, 28 339, nr. 3, p. 4. 
23  TK 2002–2003, 28 339, nr. 6, p. 12. 
24  The Bill defines a ‘qualified legal entity’ as: 
• a public legal entity; or 
• a corporation: 
o whose constitution stipulates that its shares are to be held by public legal 
entities only  
o that is not legally bound to share the authority over its water business with 
entities other than public legal entities or corporations as meant in this 
definition. 
The last part appears to cater specifically for the ‘multi utility’ corporations that en-
gage in more than just the delivery of water, such as for example, NUON, who en-
gages in, amongst other things, water delivery and the delivery of electricity. 
25  Article 3m. 
26  Article 3l(1)(b). 
27  Article 3l(1)(c) and (d). 
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is, in practice, facilitated, must also be reported.28 Should the Minister 
conclude that an interest in, or authority over a utility is transferred con-
trary to the above prohibitions, he or she can issue directives to reverse 
the consequences of these illegal actions. Such a directive can be backed 
up by a legal instruction (last onder dwangsom).29 
The Explanatory Memorandum explains the choice for public owner-
ship by debating the various modalities for competition in the water sec-
tor. First, competition between networks is practically impossible. Sec-
ond, competition on the market, that is, allowing more than one provider 
to use the network, was rejected. Not only would this modality be very 
complicated from a technical point of view but also problematic against 
the backdrop of the need to guarantee the quality of the water delivered.30 
If various agencies use the same infrastructure, water of varying quality 
would mix and it would become impossible to guarantee the quality of 
water or even to identify parties responsible for the delivery of water of 
inferior quality.31 Competition about the network could have been an op-
tion and is in fact used in, for example, France. However, the Cabinet 
stressed that every step in the process leading up to the delivery of water 
to customers ultimately has an impact on the quality of the service pro-
vided. This necessitates integrated quality management, which is then 
translated into a preference for the ownership and management of the in-
frastructure as well as the production and distribution of potable water to 
remain in the same hands.32 This is an important aspect that distinguishes 
water delivery from electricity delivery: transporting electricity does not 
materially affect the quality of the product whereas the method and qual-
ity of transporting water is critical in terms of the quality of the product.33 
The amended Water Infrastructure Act also contains a new article 3p, 
which establishes a duty for water utilities to connect to the water infra-
                                                 
28  Article 3l(1)(f). 
29  Article 3o. 
30  TK 2001–2002, 28 339, nr. 3 p. 2.  
31  TK 2002–2003, 28 339, nr. 6, p. 9 and nr. 3 p. 2. 
32  TK 2001–2002, 28 339, nr. 3 p. 3. 
33  TK 2002–2003, 28 339, nr. 6, p. 3. 
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structure and deliver water to anyone who so requests. The Act continues 
to state that tariffs and conditions must be ‘reasonable, transparent and 
non-discriminatory’. The Minister is then empowered to determine regu-
lations to give further content to article 3p. 
 
3.1 Outsourcing of management and operational aspects 
 
Interestingly, in articles 3l(f) and 3m of the Water Infrastructure Act, 
government appears to part with the idea of outsourcing critical aspects of 
water delivery. This article prohibits the ‘management’ (exploitatie) of 
water utilities by entities that are not ‘qualified legal entities’.34 It seeks to 
prevent the situation where such a third party is given the opportunity to 
influence decisions of the water utility and control those assets that are 
essential to the delivery of the service. The article is not meant to impede 
the outsourcing of tasks, such as the design and construction of infrastruc-
ture and water metering, to legal entities that are not qualified in terms of 
the Act. In such instances, the water utility remains responsible for the 
management of the utility and for the quality of the water delivered. The 
situation changes when the management of water provision is performed 
by a third party.35 Such a third party then becomes the provider of potable 
water. Control over the water utility would then effectively be transferred 




The only remaining methodology for inserting an element of competition 
in the water sector was thus the use of the least intensive form; which is 
benchmarking.36 Indeed, the government proposes to regulate the maxi-
mum tariffs for each water utility on the basis of comparisons between the 
various utilities. This should provide an incentive to water utilities to im-
prove their performance and, importantly, to ensure that their customers 
                                                 
34  See Explanatory Memorandum, TK 2001–2002, 28 339, nr. 3, p. 11. 
35  TK 2002–2003, 28 339, nr. 6, p. 19. 
36  Blokland & Van Zijp 2002: 21. 
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profit from efficiency gains.37 The performance of water utilities will be 
measured according to criteria that relate to financial performance but 
also to water quality, the environment and service levels amongst others. 
Most water utilities supported the key theme of the Bill. Some com-
panies called on government to permit private parties to hold minority 
interests in the new water utilities. However, the government opted for a 
100% government interest in order to avoid tension between profit maxi-
misation and quality maximisation.38 
 
3.3 Supervision  
 
During the parliamentary process, the question as to how water utilities 
must be supervised reared its head time and time again, despite govern-
ment’s insistence that the Bill was primarily meant to secure the public 
nature of water utilities. Prior to the new legislation, supervision took 
place through ownership control by municipalities and provinces. Water 
utilities had already embarked on voluntary benchmarking. Against the 
background of government’s insistence on independent supervision of 
network sectors and its rejection of supervision through private means 
(i.e. ownership control: exercising the rights attached to shares belonging 
to municipalities and provinces) it was not unlikely that government 
would follow through its preference for independent supervision. 
Surprisingly, the Deputy Minister concluded in a letter to the Senate 
(Eerste Kamer),39 that government does not intend changing the current 
decentralised supervision design. The department came to the conclusion 
that the decentralised supervision through private means suffices in terms 
of securing the quality and delivery of water. Combined with a compul-
sory benchmarking, this should be sufficient. In sum, government intends 
to maintain the ‘decentralised supervision’ through private means and 
combine it with compulsory benchmarking.40 
                                                 
37  TK 2001–2002, 28 339, nr. 3, p. 3-4. 
38  TK 2001–2002, 28 339, nr. 3 p. 6. 
39  Eerste Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 28 339, E. 
40  Eerste Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 28 339, C 2, p. 2. 
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3.4 Assessment of developments in Netherlands 
 
Against the background of its obvious preference for liberalisation of 
network sectors it is interesting that the Dutch government so clearly 
marks off water delivery as a public task. Section 22 of the Constitution is 
being translated into a legislated notion of water delivery as a public task. 
Developments that qualify as ‘precursors’ to the privatisation of water 
utilities are effectively halted by this legislation. 
Interestingly, in its policy paper on liberalisation of network sectors, 
government is at pains to argue that public property, combined with the 
notion of semi-autonomous utilities does little to ensure safeguarding the 
public interests. However, as far as the system of ‘decentralised supervi-
sion’ in the water sector is concerned, the conclusion appears to be quite 
the opposite: the current system of municipalities (and provinces) exercis-
ing supervision over water utilities through ownership control suffices 
and there is no need for independent supervision. 
After examining the Netherlands’ general policy on liberalisation of 
network sectors and reviewing the debate on the Water Infrastructure Act 
in light of this policy, this paper will now address the background to po-




4. POTABLE WATER SUPPLY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
South Africa’s Bill of Rights includes a right of access to water. Section 
27(1)(c) affords everyone the right to have access to sufficient food and 
water. Municipalities are responsible for the delivery of potable water. 
Schedule 4B of the Constitution lists ‘Water and sanitation services lim-
ited to potable water supply systems and domestic waste-water and sew-
age disposal systems’ as a local government competency. Supervision is 
conducted by national and provincial governments. They must see to the 
municipalities’ performance of this function by regulating the exercise by 
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municipalities of their executive authority.41 The national Minister, re-
sponsible for water affairs, determines the institutional and policy frame-
work within which water is delivered, sets minimum standards for water 
delivery and is responsible for monitoring and supervising water delivery 
by the municipalities. 
South Africa’s challenges in terms of the supply of potable water are 
enormous. The extension of water infrastructure to areas that were de-
prived of water and sanitation during apartheid has been and is one of the 
government’s top priorities. At his State of the Nation Address in 2004, 
President Thabo Mbeki committed his government to ensuring access to 
clean running water for all households within five years.42 The White Pa-
per on Municipal Service Partnerships says that ‘it has been conserva-
tively estimated that the total cumulative backlog is about R47-53 billion, 
with an average annual backlog of R10.6 billion… if these backlogs are 
addressed through public sector resources alone, many communities will 
receive adequate services only in the year 2065.’43 It is clear that govern-
ment is firmly intent on involving the private sector in the extension of 
delivery of potable water. 
 
4.1 Legal framework for water supply 
 
The Water Services Act, which is the key Act in terms of the institutional 
framework for water delivery, provides that ‘[e]veryone has a right of ac-
cess to basic water supply and basic sanitation’44 and that every institu-
tion involved in water delivery must take reasonable measures to realise 
these rights. 
In translating this into an institutional design, the Act makes a distinc-
tion between water services authorities and water services providers. Wa-
ter services authorities45 are responsible for ensuring access to water in 
                                                 
41  S 155(7) Constitution; see also ss 154(1) and 139 of the Constitution. 
42  See Steytler 2004: 4. 
43  Municipal Service Partnerships White Paper of 2000 at p. 1. 
44  S 3(1) Water Services Act. 
45  Section 1(xx) Water Services Act 108 of 1997. 
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their jurisdictions.46 They obtain bulk water from Water Boards, which 
are public bodies that are set up for that purpose.47 A water services au-
thority is expected to regulate water delivery through its by-laws.48 In line 
with the constitutional design which says that municipalities are responsi-
ble for the delivery of potable water (see above), the Water Services Act 
designates municipalities as water services authorities. A water services 
provider refers to any person who provides water services to consumers49 
with the approval of the water services authority.50 The Act goes on to say 
that no person may use water services from a source other than a water 
services provider nominated by the water services authority having juris-
diction in the area in question without the approval of that water services 
authority. The Act instructs water services authorities to closely monitor 
the performance of the water service provider. A water services authority 
can also act as a water service provider. The Act instructs it to manage 
and account separately for those functions.51 The above distinction be-
tween service authority and service provider, a pivotal aspect of the Water 
Services Act, leaves room for the liberalisation of water delivery because 
the Act is silent on the public or private nature of the water services pro-
vider. Third parties can be contracted in by municipalities, nominated as 
water service providers, and be tasked to provide water to consumers.  
When comparing this to the new legislation in the Netherlands, it is 
clear that this type of outsourcing of the ‘management’ of water schemes 
to private contractors would not be permitted in the Dutch context: it 
would offend articles 3l(f) and 3m of the Water Infrastructure Act.52 In 
other words, as far as the outsourcing of ‘management’ of water schemes 
is concerned, the South African legal design allows for more far-reaching 
liberalisation compared to the Dutch legal design. If one considers that, in 
                                                 
46  Section 11 Water Servces Act 108 of 1997. 
47  In certain (rural) areas, Water Boards are also involved in the retail sale of water. 
48  S 21(1) Water Services Act. 
49  Section 1(xxi) Water Services Act 108 of 1997. 
50  S 22(1) Water Services Act. 
51  S 20(1) Water Services Act. 
52  Proposed articles 3l(f) and 3m of Water Infrastructure Act. 
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general, the Dutch government has a strong preference for liberalisation 
of network sectors, this exception becomes particularly noteworthy. 
However, in South Africa, this kind of restructuring of municipal ser-
vice delivery is also subject to critical local government legislation, such 
as the Municipal Systems Act. The Municipal Systems Act requires a 
municipality to follow a particular procedure if it wants to change the way 
in which it delivers a service. Importantly, when a municipality decides 
how to restructure its water delivery system, it must first assess the possi-
bilities of an internal service delivery mechanism (such as a department 
or a business unit of the municipality).53 The assessment must include the 
costs and benefits of delivering the service internally, the municipality’s 
(future) capacity and the extent to which improvements of the municipal-
ity’s administration could facilitate the internal delivery.54 After the as-
sessment has been completed the municipality may explore an external 
service delivery mechanism, whereby it must, among other things, take 
into account the views of the community and of organised labour.55 It is 
important to emphasise that the municipality may not explore external 
mechanisms, before having assessed the possibility of internal delivery. 
McDonald and Ruiters argue that the Act places the public sector ‘on 
equal footing’ with the private sector: 
 
Although a municipality must ‘first assess…internal mechanisms’ 
when evaluating service delivery options, it may, at the same time, 
‘explore the possibility of providing the service through an external 
mechanism’.56  
 
It is submitted that the phrase ‘at the same time’ incorrectly suggests that 
a municipality can explore internal and external mechanisms simultane-
ously. In so doing, it falsely permits the conclusion that the public and 
private sectors are placed on an equal footing. This does not do justice to 
the Systems Act’s instruction to municipalities to not liberalise service 
                                                 
53  S 78(1) Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000; Evans 2004: 11. 
54  S 78(1)(a) Municipal Systems Act. 
55  S 78(3) Municipal Systems Act. 
56  McDonald and Ruiters 2004: 26 (emph. added). 
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delivery without having disqualified internal service delivery on rational 
grounds. The Supreme Court of Appeal described the purpose of the pro-
cedure as one that: 
 
compel[s] a municipality, in the stated circumstances, when consider-
ing ‘how’ [to deliver a municipal service], to consider first how it 
could be done through an appropriate internal mechanism. Only after 
that has been done may the provision of the service through an exter-
nal mechanism be considered.57 
 
The Act goes on to identify the municipality’s responsibilities in the event 
of liberalisation of (water) delivery. The municipality remains responsible 
for regulating the provision of the service, monitoring the provider’s per-
formance, including the service in its planning and controlling the setting 
of tariffs.58 The external service provider may be given the right to set 
tariffs, albeit within the limits set by the municipal council.59 The Act lists 
the elements that can be passed on to the external service provider. They 
include: service delivery planning, operational planning and management, 
undertaking social and economic development related to the service, cus-
tomer management, financial management and the collection of service 
fees.60 The municipality must ensure the continuity of the service and 
must take over the service if the external service provider fails to de-
liver.61 
 
4.2 Municipal entities 
 
Local government legislation provides for the establishment of municipal 
entities. Municipalities can, alone or together with other municipalities 
                                                 
57  South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) v City of Cape Town Case No: 
262/02 at para. 13, available at <http://www.law.wits.ac.za> (accessed 14 January 
2005). 
58  S 81(1) Municipal Systems Act. 
59  S 81(3) Municipal Systems Act. 
60  S 81(2) Municipal Systems Act. 
61  S 81(2)(d) Municipal Systems Act. 
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establish or acquire ownership control in companies whose aim is to pro-
vide that particular service.62 Municipalities can also establish service 
utilities.63 The Act defines ‘ownership control’ as including at least the 
following powers: 
• appoint/remove majority of the board of directors 
• appoint/remove the chief executive officer 
• majority of votes in meetings of board of directors or in general meet-
ings.64 
 
These utilities could also be contracted in by other municipalities to pro-
vide water services.65 In fact, large water utilities, such as Rand Water 
(Johannesburg) and Umgeni Water (Durban) are even engaged in private 
contracts to run services outside of the country.66 This legal framework 
for municipal entities sets the scene for the establishment of utilities, 
similar to the Dutch water utilities.67  
 
4.3 Liberalisation initiatives 
 
When viewed through the prism of the definition introduced at the begin-
ning of this paper, it becomes clear that South African legislation permits 
liberalisation of the water sector through competition about the market 
(concession to manage and operate water services). It also permits and 
stimulates the ‘corporatisation’ of water services by providing a frame-
work for the establishment of water utilities owned by municipalities. 
Experiences to date with competition about the market have not 
shown the kind of successes that were anticipated. The 30-year manage-
                                                 
62  S 82(1)(a) en (b) Municipal Systems Act. 
63  S 82(1)(c) Municipal Systems Act. 
64  S 1 Municipal Systems Act. 
65  S 76(b)(i) Municipal Systems Act. 
66  Rand Water is involved in ventures in, amongst other countries, Jordan and Ghana. 
Umgeni is involved in Nigeria. See McDonald and Ruiters 2004: 29. 
67  Albeit that South African provinces cannot take part in municipal entities, which 
sets them apart from many Dutch water utilities. 
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ment and operations concession in Nelspruit (Mpumalanga Province) is a 
case in point. The concession was granted by the Nelspruit municipality 
to Greater Nelspruit Utility Company (GNUC), a joint venture between 
Dutch Nuon and British BiWater. This so-called ‘Nelspruit Water Con-
cession’ was hailed as the type of public-private partnership that is 
needed to ensure investment to extend and sustain water services. GNUC 
was to manage and operate water service delivery and ensure infrastruc-
ture investment to extend services. Indeed, infrastructure was extended to 
previously excluded areas.68 However, GNUC experiences great difficul-
ties in handling the South African realities, particularly deep poverty and 
non-payment for water services.69 Non-payment for municipal services is 
a phenomenon that continues to seriously impede the functioning of local 
authorities. Grinding poverty, combined with the legacy of non-payment 
as a means of protest against illegitimate apartheid local authorities render 
it a pernicious problem. Smith argues that these realities render the South 
African context unfit for concessions because these matters require politi-
cal involvement: ‘It is a political issue when it comes to poor people’s 
ability to pay.’70 
Another example is the 10-year concession granted by the Fort Beau-
fort Transitional Local Council to Water Services South Africa (WSSA), 
a subsidiary of French water-multinational Suez. The contract entailed 
that WSSA would manage and operate water and sanitation services in 
return for whopping management fees.71 Curiously, the municipality car-
ried the risk for non-payment by residents, which impacted on the con-
tract payments. When payment crises continued these fees started absorb-
ing a fifth of the municipality’s budget.72 Inevitably, the municipality de-
faulted on the payments. This prompted WSSA to threaten discontinuing 
water delivery to the municipal residents. Court intervention was neces-
sary for the municipality to have the contract nullified (on the ground that 
                                                 
68  Smith, Gillet & White 2004: 135. 
69  Smith 2003: 8. 
70  Smith 2003: 9. 
71  De Visser 2002: 11. 
72  Ruiters 2004: 159. 
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public participation procedures were not followed before the contract was 
entered into).73  
It is suggested that the above examples highlight two important con-
siderations. First, liberalisation of water provision inevitably results in 
more rigorous cost recovery: water provision is further commodified and 
is provided on the basis of ability to pay rather than on the basis of need. 
Second, there is a frightening lack of ability at municipal level to enter 
into the right contracts, to clearly delineate responsibilities between ser-
vice provider and service authority and to monitor performance of the 
service provider. Liberalisation of water service delivery is too often used 
as a panacea for problems that require political involvement. 
Both these considerations are far less poignant in the Netherlands. 
Ability or willingness to pay for water consumption is generally not a 
problem. The odd water disconnection74 does not warrant the same kind 
of suspicion as the massive water disconnections in impoverished South 
African townships do. The long standing experience with market-based 
partnerships in the Netherlands and a generally well-equipped and skilled 
municipal staff will go a long way in ensuring that the right contracts are 
entered into. 
An element that points towards accepting the need for liberalisation in 
South Africa is the need for water conservation. The commodification of 
water and stringent cost recovery methods, such as progressive tariffs sys-
tems could prove useful in conserving water. Jonker remarks that there 
appear to be no significant problems surrounding achieving the delivery 
                                                 
73  De Visser 2002: 11. 
74  In principle, water utilities determine the conditions under which they provide their 
service. The proposed legislation will insert a clause that requires these conditions 
to be “reasonable, transparent and non-discriminatory”.  See TK 2002–2003, 28 
339, nr. 11, p. 1. Currently, clause 9 of the General Conditions on Potable Water 
(Algemene voorwaarden drinkwater) (that are generally used by water utilities) 
stipulate that the water utility is entitled to cease water delivery if the consumer does 
not honour a payment plan.  The water utility may not use this power unless it is 
warranted by the failure on the part of the user to honour the agreement.  In addi-
tion, the water will not be disconnected if the user applies within 10 days to the Me-
diation Commission (Geschillen Commissie). 
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of the required quantity of water in the Netherlands.75 South Africa faces 
a situation of increasingly problematic water scarcity. Increasing de-
mands, urbanisation and climate change are putting enormous strain on 
South Africa’s ability to supply water. For example, residents of Cape 
Town are getting used to water restrictions being imposed on them in the 





As stated earlier, supervision of South African water service delivery is 
performed by the national department of Forestry & Water Affairs and 
the national department of Provincial and Local Government. 
Smith argues that supervision of large public-private partnerships such as 
the Nelspruit Concession by national government fails: 
 
…neither the national Departments of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF) or Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) have sufficient 
knowledge of the Nelspruit PPP to be able to act effectively as watch-
dog.76 
 
Smith proposes an independent regulator to oversee these partnerships. 
This kind of independent supervision would be along the lines of the 
abovementioned Dutch general policy which entails a preference for in-
dependent supervision. However, in the case of water delivery, this option 
was rejected in the Dutch water sector. 
 
4.4.1 Supervision by the courts? 
The legal framework for socio-economic rights in the South African Con-
stitution provides an additional dynamic to the comparison between the 
Netherlands and South Africa. Socio-economic rights in the Dutch Con-
stitution are generally interpreted by government and by the courts as ‘in-
                                                 
75  Jonkers 2001: 18. 
76  Smith, Gillet & White 2004: 139. 
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structions’ to government that are not enforceable by citizens. Socio-
economic rights in the South African Constitution, however, are phrased 
and interpreted as fundamental rights that impose on the state both nega-
tive and positive duties and, importantly, they are justiciable in court.  
Mention has already been made of the right of access to water, as en-
shrined in section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution. In its landmark Groot-
boom judgment,77 the Constitutional Court established a test by which a 
court is to judge whether government is violating duties imposed by 
socio-economic rights, such as the right of access to water. Importantly, 
the standard set by the Constitutional Court stopped short of identifying 
an individual entitlement to a particular government services, such as wa-
ter, housing or medical care. Critical to the assessment of the state’s per-
formance in light of socio-economic rights is the question as to ‘whether 
the legislative and other measures taken by the state are reasonable’.78 
The ‘reasonableness’ test extends to programmatic requirements such as 
the clear allocation of responsibilities over various state actors and finan-
cial and human resources. It also requires government policies to cater for 
both long and short term needs. Policies that ensure long term progress 
but exclude or ignore those whose needs are most urgent are not ‘reason-
able’. 
It is submitted that the latter element in particular, injects the possibil-
ity of judicial intervention into the liberalisation debate. If liberalisation 
policies in South Africa merely achieve statistical advances in the exten-
sion of water infrastructure, organisational efficiency and water conserva-
tion whilst confronting the most vulnerable sections of society with rigor-
ous cost recovery methods such as the disconnection of water delivery, 
the courts are likely not to shy away from deciding that these policies are 
‘unreasonable’ for want of compliance with section 27(1)(c) of the Con-
stitution.79  
                                                 
77  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
78  At para. 41. 
79  De Visser, Cottle & Mettler 2003: 49. 
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The emergence of case-law on socio-economic rights in South Africa is 
particularly interesting against the backdrop of the Dutch discussion sur-
rounding supervision of liberalisation efforts in network sectors. It has 
already been noted that the proclaimed failure of supervision through 
ownership control by the government is not entirely consistent with the 
strong reliance on supervision by private shareholders. In addition, gov-
ernment did not follow through its preference for independent public su-
pervision in the water sector by deciding that decentralised supervision 
through private means is a satisfactory means of supervision. The ques-
tion may be asked as to what this means for the accountability of gov-
ernment towards citizens for the quality of service delivery. How much 
accountability does voter representation on a municipal council that owns 
a minority interest in a water utility translate into? The fact of the matter 
is that Dutch citizens, in their dealings with public utilities, experience 
themselves to be customers of a service delivered through the market, 
rather than citizens, receiving a service for which government is respon-
sible. They rely on consumer protection rules to protect their interests 
whilst government takes its instruction from article 22 of the Constitution, 
which entails a socio-economic right. By comparison, South African citi-
zens are offered some protection by enforceable socio- economic rights 
which the courts are ready and willing to use to review government poli-
cies. This review does not result in an individual entitlement of the claim-
ant. This would indeed be difficult to uphold in many respects, not in the 
least with reference to the doctrine of separation of powers between the 
executive, legislative and judicial branch of government. However, the 
‘reasonableness’ test provides a useful tool for citizens to hold govern-
ment accountable. Why should Dutch citizens not be entitled to have the 
courts review the reasonability of liberalisation processes? This would 
prove particularly useful in the face of government’s strong preference for 
as much liberalisation of as many network sectors as possible. 
It will of course be argued that, amongst other things, the phraseology 
of article 22 of the Dutch Constitution does not permit an interpretation 
whereby courts review the ‘reasonability’ of government programmes. 
Article 22 is phrased as an instruction to government rather than as an en-
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titlement for individual citizens. However, it is suggested that a ‘reason-
ability review’ does not hinge on the question as to whether or not the 
relevant clause is phrased as an individual entitlement. In delivering the 
Grootboom judgment, the Constitutional Court of South Africa did not 
investigate individual entitlements. It rather assessed whether or not gov-
ernment’s policies, legislation and programmes are reasonable against the 
backdrop of the instruction embedded in the Bill of Rights. When viewed 
like this, the difference with the doctrine surrounding article 22 of the 
Dutch Constitution suddenly seems less obvious. 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper has examined the discussion in South Africa and the Nether-
lands surrounding the liberalisation and restructuring of water services. It 
is clear that there is a vast difference between the two countries. The 
Netherlands does not have to deal with vast infrastructure backlogs and 
does not face the same water shortages as South Africa. The level of ex-
perience and extent of government’s regulatory capacity to oversee the 
liberalised delivery of services can hardly be compared.  
The Dutch government’s overall policy is clear: liberalisation of net-
work sectors is proffered as the key to more efficiency, lower prices and 
better quality. However, the Dutch government is drawing the line before 
the privatisation of water utilities and is firming up the legal framework 
surrounding its public responsibility. In the context of this paper, the pro-
hibition of private sector involvement in the actual management and op-
eration of water services is noteworthy because this is permitted in South 
Africa and in fact one of the emerging trends. Contrary to what might be 
expected (considering the political profiles and history of governments in 
both countries) the Dutch legal framework is now less receptive of liber-
alisation of the water sector than South Africa is. Local government legis-
lation, most notably the Municipal Systems Act, indeed puts up a barrier 
to hasty liberalisation and restructuring processes. However, it is ex-
pected, in the long run, these procedural impediments will not stop the 
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South African government’s clearly outlined policy in favour of liberali-
sation from being implemented. The gigantic infrastructure backlogs that 
were mentioned perhaps leave South Africa with no other choice but to 
harness private sector investment into water delivery.  
It was suggested that the South African approach on socio-economic 
rights offers insights that should prompt a debate on revisiting the inter-
pretation of socio-economic rights in the Dutch Constitution. The South 
African Constitutional Court unlocked the dichotomy between unaccept-
able individual entitlements and meaningless statements of intent. It pro-
vided a functional standard of ‘reasonableness’ against which govern-
ment’s performance can in fact be measured. In the face of diminishing 
democratic controls and loss of accountability with respect to liberalised 
service delivery, a rethink of the role of the courts in enforcing the socio-
economic rights included in the Dutch Constitution seems apposite. 
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III Privatisation and the Right of access to sufficient 










The different ways water privatisation has taken place in South Africa 
include out-sourcing (the operation, management and maintenance of 
the water systems), lying of new pipes and making new connections. 
This is in addition to meter installation and reading, debt collection 
and the carrying out of disconnections. In the same context the 1996 
Constitution protects the right of access to sufficient water.1 Though 
international human rights law is neutral on privatisation it is con-
cerned that it should not compromise the enjoyment of human rights.2 
It is also concerned that the process of privatisation ensures participa-
tion and consultation with the people. In the South African context, 
though the Constitution recognises the horizontal application of the 
Bill of Rights, the ultimate responsibility to ensure that all human 
rights are realised falls on the state. Privatisation per se, does not ex-
onerate the state from this responsibility. 
Government disputes the fact that it has privatised water and in-
stead chooses to call it ‘outsourcing’ or ‘delegated water manage-
ment’. From a conservative point of view privatisation is associated 
with the complete divestiture of public assets. This paper will, how-
ever, argue that privatisation may take place without divestiture. Other 
forms of privatisation include leasing concessions, servicing contracts, 
                                                 
♣  Researcher; Socio-Economic Rights Project, Community Law Centre, Univer-
sity of the Western Cape; LLB (Hons), LLM, Dip (LP), E-mail: <cmba-
zira@uwc.ac.za> This paper is based on a report of a case study carried out by 
the Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape on the two loca-
tions: Luhkanji and Amahlati. (Hereafter referred to as the Report).  
1  1996 Constitution, Act No  108 of 1996. 
2  Tsemo 2003: 2. 
PRIVATISATION AND THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO SUFFICIENT WATER IN  
SOUTH AFRICA 
 58 
public/private partnerships as well as operation and management ar-
rangements.  
In Lukhanji and Amahlati, the operation of the water systems has 
been ‘outsourced’ to Water and Sanitation Services South Africa 
(WSSA). WSSA is a South African subsidiary of the French 
multinational corporation Suez (formerly Suez Lyonnaise) which has 
been involved in the provision of water services in many parts of the 
world.3 Although the privatisation of water has seen improved ser-
vices in both Lukhanji and Amahlati, the two municipalities are strug-
gling to cope with financial obligations under the contracts. The mu-
nicipalities have been forced to resort to debt collection mechanisms 
such as pre-paid meters, water restrictors and rigorous debt recovery. 
These methods have affected the enjoyment of the right of access to 
sufficient water. The municipalities’ indigent people’s policies, even 
though commendable, have not been publicised adequately. 
 
 
2. WHAT IS WATER PRIVATISATION? 
  
The term privatisation derives from economic and political models 
that define the relationship between the public authorities and the citi-
zens in respect of delivery of public services. Though privatisation has 
been associated mainly with the full divestiture of state assets it in-
cludes the various forms of delegation of public duties to the private 
sector.4 Privatisation may take the following forms: partnerships be-
tween public and private institutions, leasing of business rights by the 
public sector to private enterprises, outsourcing or contracting out 
specific activities to private actors, and management or employee 
buyout.5 
 
                                                 
3  WSSA has managed water services in Argentina, Indonesia, Philippines and the 
United Kingdom amongst others. 
4  Bond,  McDoonald & Ruiters 2003: 10 – 13. 
5  See Chirwa 2004: 220.     
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In relation to water: 
 
[p]rivate sector participation in the delivery of water services can 
take a variety of different forms – from one person fixing water 
pipes in a small section of a township to a large multi-national 
corporation providing bulk water supply and bulk sewerage treat-
ment. The size and types of contracts can vary as well, from a one-
year fee-for-service, renewable contract to a thirty year license. 
Ownership of asserts also varies, with the state retaining owner-
ship in some cases and the private company in others.6 
 
According to Booysen: 
 
... [i]n many analyses ‘privatisation’ is used to encompass the 
range of manifestations of private sector involvement in the deliv-
ery of public services, not just with reference to divestiture or the 
complete transfer of public enterprise to a private actor. This con-
ception of privatisation articulates with the Department of Water 
Affairs’ ‘private operation’ – the operation of water assets by the 
private sector, done on behalf of government, and through a lease 
contract, concession, or a build-operate-train-transfer (BOTT) 
contract. Private operations may include: support services (con-
sulting, outsourcing meter reading, cleaning, maintenance), con-
tracting (construction, operations, management) …7 
 
In both contracts as considered in the case study, the municipalities 
have not relinquished ownership of the water system to WSSA. 
WSSA’s responsibilities, for which a monthly payment is made, are 
described as:  
 
... management, operation and maintenance of the system; reha-
bilitation of the existing system; keeping and updating all records 
required for the proper management of the system; and other re-
sponsibilities as may be agreed upon by the parties.8   
 
Though ownership of the system has not been relinquished to the pri-
vate water provide, the Lukhanji and Amahlati contracts nevertheless 
perpetuate a form of privatisation. The Municipalities have chosen to 
                                                 
6  Bond,  McDoonald & Ruiters 2003: 10. 
7   Booysen 2004: 8 (footnotes omitted). 
8  Clause 3.1 of both contracts. 
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delegate to a private service provider functions that they could have 
discharged themselves. Whether they are justified in doing this is not 
the scope of this paper.  
 
2.1 The policy basis for privatisation 
 
Victoria Johnson has excellently discussed the policy basis for privati-
sation of public services in South Africa. She also discusses what she 
describes as ‘drivers’ and ‘dangers’ for ‘outsourcing’.9 She makes ref-
erence to two government white papers: the White Paper on Local 
Government of 1998, and White Paper on Municipal Private Partner-
ships of 2000, as the basis for ‘outsourcing’ in South Africa.10 The 
1998 White Paper lays down a set of ‘guiding principles’ for munici-
palities to follow in determining the mechanisms of service delivery. 
These include: accessibility of services, affordability, quality of prod-
ucts, accountability, integrated development, sustainability, value-for-
money, ensuring and promoting competitiveness of local commerce 
and industry and promotion of democracy.11 The White Paper lists the 
various outsourcing mechanisms available to municipalities. These 
include: corporatisation, public-public partnerships, partnerships with 
community-based organisations and non-governmental organisations, 
contracting out, leases and concessions and transfer of ownership 
(which the White Paper describes in brackets as ‘privatisation’).12 This 
description appears to derive from the misconception that it is only 
complete transfer of ownership of public assets that amounts to priva-
tisation. But as already discussed above, ownership is a question of 
degree: contracting out, leases and concessions are also a form of pri-
vatisation. Privatisation can result in complete divestiture of assets 
were all proprietary interests are transferred to a private entity. But it 
could also occur with a transfer of limited proprietary rights which 
                                                 
9  Victoria: 2004.  
10  The white papers will be referred to as the 1998 and 2000 white papers respec-
tively. 
11  See summary by Victoria 2004. 
12  Para 2.2. For a detailed description of the different mechanisms, see Victoria 
2004: 7 – 9. 
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may take the form of leases for defined periods after which the prop-
erty reverts to the public entity.   
The 2000 White Paper concretises the 1998 paper and lists the 
benefits of outsourcing. According to Victoria: 
 
... this policy document is careful to point out that outsourcing is 
not Government’s ‘preferred’ option for improving service deliv-
ery, it is merely one of many service options which should receive 
equal status. However, the underlying arguments and descriptions 
of the benefits of outsourcing in this White Paper certainly leave 
an impression of, if not a ‘preferred’ option, certainly a highly de-
sirable one.13  
 
The drivers identified include: efficiency, skills transfer, lower costs, 
value-for-money, certainty of the municipality as regards its costs and 
social upliftment and/or economic development.14 Victoria categorises 
the drivers as follows: capital investment, value for money, greater 
efficiency, skills transfer, and risk transfer. She groups the dangers as 
follows: accountability, public buy-in (public participation, transpar-
ency, etc.), consumer protection, inappropriate risk allocation and pro-
tection of service environment. The first three of these groups have far 
reaching effects for human rights, and in particular the right to enjoy a 
specific service. According to Victoria: 
 
[o]ne of the greatest dangers in outsourcing a service is the risk of 
loss of accountability on the part of the municipality. The munici-
pality, no longer face to face with its community and one step re-
moved from actual service delivery, may be tempted to divest it-
self entirely of its responsibility to the consumers. In other words, 
it may be inclined to remain passive and just leave the contractor 
to get on with the job. This poses a great risk to the community 
which the municipality serves.15 
 
Additionally, the absence of transparency and public participation is ‘a 
threat to the country’s democratic principles and to the success of the 
                                                 
13  Victoria 2004: 11 (footnote omitted). 
14  See summary by Victoria 2004: 10 – 11. 
15  Victoria 2004: 8. 
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outsourcing itself … [This] could lead to service boycotts, damage to 
infrastructure and thus prejudice to the service delivery itself’.16  
Without undermining the relevance of public participation and 
transparency to human rights, the most important threat to poor people 
is absence of consumer protection. The absence of consumer protec-
tion may decrease affordability and accessibility. The principles be-
hind privatisation, such as cost recovery and subsidy removal are in-
herently detrimental to the enjoyment of socio-economic rights.17 The 
profit-motivated nature of the private sector and its operation on the 
basis of business principles shifts attention on the wealthy at the ex-
pense of the poor. Systems serving those with ability to pay may be 
preferred to those serving poor people.   
 
 
3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE RIGHT TO WATER 
 
3.1 The 1996 Constitution 
  
The 1996 Constitution entrenches a justiciable Bill of Rights with a 
range of rights; these include the socio-economic rights. Section 
27(1)(b) provides that: 
 
27 (1) Everyone has the right to have access to – 
…. 
Sufficient food and water; … 
 
Section 27(2) provides that: ‘[t]he state must take reasonable legisla-
tive and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of each of these rights.’ Section 26(2), which is 
the same as section 27(2), has been construed in the Grootboom 
case.18 The Constitutional Court held that ‘[w]hat constitutes reason-
able legislative and other measures must be determined in the light of 
the fact that the Constitution creates different spheres of government: 
                                                 
16  Victoria 2004: 39. 
17  Chirwa 2004: 228. 
18  2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
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national government, provincial government and local government.’19  
A reasonable programme must clearly allocate responsibilities and 
tasks to the different spheres of government and ensure that the ap-
propriate financial and human resources are available.20 Though each 
sphere of government must accept responsibility for the implementa-
tion of particular parts of the programme, the national sphere of gov-
ernment retains the responsibility of ensuring that all the programmes 
and strategies are adequate to meet the State’s constitutional obliga-
tions.21 The programme must be balanced and flexible and must in 
addition to the medium and long term needs, make provision for the 
short-term needs.22 ‘Those whose needs are the most urgent … must 
not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving realisation of the 
right’.23 
The term progressive realisation ‘shows that it was contemplated 
that the right could not be realised immediately’ but ‘accessibility 
should be progressively facilitated: legal, administrative, operational 
and financial hurdles should be examined and where possible lowered 
over time.’24 In the context of privatisation, the government still bears 
the ultimate responsibility of ensuring progressive realisation of the 
rights. Unless the state puts in place special measures, contractual or 
otherwise, it is hard to force private actors to progressively realise 
rights. 
In the TAC case,25 the Court applied the reasonableness test to find 
that the government’s programme of providing Nevirapine was unrea-
sonable. This is because the government programme confined the drug 
to selected research sites, thereby denying those outside these sites 
access to health care services. 
Though the Court has not been confronted with a right of access to 
water case, the same principles above would apply to such case. What 
is lacking from the cases, however, is an exhaustive definition of the 
content of the rights. In the Grootboom case, though a distinction was 
                                                 
19  Para 39. 
20  As above. 
21  Para 40. 
22  Para 43. 
23  Para 44. 
24  Para 45. 
25  2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC). 
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drawn between ‘the right of access to adequate housing’ and ‘the right 
to adequate housing’,26 access to housing was not defined sufficiently. 
The Tac case has been criticised for the virtual absence of any analysis 
of what the right to have access to health care services involves.27 In 
future, the Court may wish to borrow from the approach adopted at 
the international level to give content to the right to water. 
 
3.2 The right to water at the international level 
 
The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) has given content to the right in the context of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).28  
 
The CESCR has stated that: 
 
[t]he use of the word ‘including’ [in article 11 of the ICESCR] in-
dicates that this catalogue of rights was not intended to be exhaus-
tive. The right to water clearly falls within the category of guaran-
tees essential for securing an adequate standard of living, particu-
larly since it is one of the most fundamental conditions of sur-
vival.29  
 
The right contains both freedoms and entitlements: ‘freedoms include 
the right to maintain access to existing water supplies … and the right 
to be free from interference, such as ... arbitrary disconnections or 
contamination of water supplies’. ‘[T]he entitlements include the right 
to a system of water supply and management that provides equal op-
portunity for people to enjoy the right to water.’30 The water must be 
adequate for human dignity, life and health. ‘The adequacy of water 
should not be interpreted narrowly by mere reference to volumetric 
quantities and technologies. Water should be treated as a social and 
                                                 
26  Para 35. 
27  Bilchitz 2003: 6 . 
28  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. 
29  General Committee No. 15. 
30  General Comment No. 15, para 10. 
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cultural good, and not primarily as an economic good.’31  The factors 
that have to be considered when determining adequacy include: avail-
ability, quality, and accessibility. 
The obligation to realise the right to water is on the state even 
when the services have been privatised. Paragraph 24 of its General 
Comments, the CESCR provides that: 
 
[w]here water services … are operated or controlled by third par-
ties, States parties must prevent them from compromising equal, 
affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable 
water. To prevent such abuses an effective regulatory system must 
be established, in conformity with the Covenant and this General 
Comment, which includes independent monitoring, genuine public 
participation and imposition of penalties for non-compliance.  
 
The state must monitor the third party’s compliance with the right and 
‘must be prepared to intervene, for instance by terminating the con-
tract if there is one, or by providing redress to the victims of the viola-
tion.’32 
 
3.3 Legislation and benchmarks 
 
3.3.1 The Water Services Act 
The Water Services Act (the Act)33 is South Africa’s framework legis-
lation for the realisation of the right of access to sufficient water. The 
main objective of this Act is to advance the right of access to basic 
water and the right to basic sanitation. The Act re-assures the right of 
access to sufficient water and imposes an obligation on all water ser-
vices institutions, which includes private service providers, to take 
reasonable measures to realise this right. The ranges of matters that 
the Act deals with are discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.3.2  Basic water, limitation and disconnections 
The Act provides procedures that have to be followed before water is 
either limited or disconnected. Section 4 (3) provides as follows: 
                                                 
31  General Comment No. 15 , para 11. 
32  Macbeth  2004: 154. 
33  Act No. 108 of 1997. 
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(3)  Procedures for the limitation or disconnection of water ser-
vices must – 
a) be fair and equitable; 
b) provide for reasonable notice of intention to limit or dis-
continue water services and for an opportunity to make 
representations, unless  
(i) other consumers would be prejudiced  
(ii) there is an emergency situation; or 
(iii) the consumer has interfered with a limited or discon-
tinued service; and  
(c) not result in a person being denied access to basic water 
services for non-payment, where that person proves, to 
the satisfaction of the relevant water services authority, 
that he or she is unable to pay for basic services. [Em-
phasis supplied] 
 
This provision ensures that even those that do not have the means to 
pay have access to at least basic water. By regulations, the Minister 
has set a benchmark by defining the minimum standards for basic wa-
ter supply.34 Regulation 3 provides as follows: 
 
3. The minimum standard for basic water supply services is –  
(a) the provision of appropriate education in respect of ef-
fective water use; and 
(b) a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person 
per  day or 6 kilolitres per household per month – 
(i) at a minimum flow rate of not less than 10 litres 
per minute; 
(ii) within 200 metres of a household; and  
(iii) with an effectiveness such that no consumer is 
without water for more than seven full days in 
any year. 
 
This standard has, however, been criticised for its inadequacy to meet 
the basic levels of water supply: ‘For households of 8 people, six kilo-
litres of water amounts to two flushes of a toilet per person per day 
                                                 
34  Regulations Relating to Compulsory National Standards and Measures to Con-
serve Water 2004. They have been referred to in this paper as “the basic water 
regulations”. 
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and will therefore be completely inadequate.’35 An amount of up to 50 
litres is proposed as sufficient for one’s drinking, sanitation services, 
bathing and preparation of food.36 The World Health Organisation 
(WHO) has not endorsed any standard of water in terms of quantity. It 
has, however, been suggested that ‘intermediate access’ levels will 
result in use of up 50 litres per capita per day and ‘optimal access’ will 
result in even much higher quantities.37 ‘Intermediate access’ is used 
to mean access where water supply is on plot, and ‘optimal access’ to 
mean ‘multiple tap in house’.38 This means that the water needs of 
people vary with the level of access. The closer the water is brought to 
the people the more will be their water needs. Any minimum standard 
should take this factor into account and should be revised as access 
improves. Additionally, it is hard to understand why, despite stating 
that the minimum for each individual is 25 litres, 6 kilolitres is set for 
all households irrespective of the size of a particular household. The 
presumption that on average most households have up to eight people 
may not hold in some cases. Households vary not only in size but also 
in the levels of access, which may call for a case-by-case considera-
tion. However, at this stage one should appreciate the administrative 
hurdles that case-by-case consideration would impose. But simple 
methods, such as grouping households, could be used to reduce on 
such hurdles. 
In Manqele v Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council,39 the 
applicant had her water disconnected on the ground of non-payment. 
She contended that the discontinuation was unlawful and invalid. 
Among other things, she argued that the procedures outlined in section 
4(3) of the Act were not followed.  ‘[T]he discontinuation resulted in 
the applicant and those dependent upon her being denied access to ba-
sic service’.40 She sought an order directing the respondents to main-
tain basic water services to her premises.41 The respondents contended 
                                                 
35  De Visser, Cottle & Mettler 2003 (1): 19, see generally De Visser, Cottle & 
Mettler 2003 (2). 
36  Gleick 1998: 9,  Kidd 2004: 135. 
37  Bartram & Howard 2003: 25 
38  Bartram & Howard 2003: 25. 
39  2002 (6) SA 423 (D). 
40  P 424, para I. 
41  As above para J. 
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that in the absence of the basic water services regulations, the appli-
cant had no enforceable right to water.42 
 
The Court held that: 
 
It is clear that the Water Services Act was directed at achieving 
the right embodied in the Constitution. The difficulty, however, is 
that in the absence  of regulations defining the extent of the right 
to basic water supply, I have no guidance from the Legislature or 
executive to interpret the content of the right embodied in s 3. 
 
The interpretation that the applicant wishes me to place upon s 3 
of the Act, in the prescription of the minimum standard of water 
supply services necessary to constitute a basic water supply, re-
quires me to pronounce upon and enforce upon the respondent the 
quantity of water that the applicant is entitled to have access to, 
the quality of such water and acceptable parameters for ‘access’ to 
such basic water supply. These are policy matters, which fall out-
side the purview of my role and function, and are inextricably 
linked to the availability of resources. Given the fact that the pre-
scribed minimum basic water supply has not yet been promulgated 
…43 
 
It is submitted that the judge misunderstood the applicant’s conten-
tion; the applicant was not calling upon the court to define the mini-
mum basic supply. The argument was that once the respondents had 
set a minimum of basic water supply, they were precluded from inter-
fering with the enjoyment of that right.44 The question was whether 
the respondent’s retrogressive measures were lawful. In the Groot-
boom case, the Court endorsed the definition accorded by the CESCR 
to the term ‘progressive realisation’.45 The CESCR has stated that: 
 
It … imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effec-
tively as possible … [m]oreover any deliberately retrogressive 
measures in that regard require the most careful consideration 
and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of 
                                                 
42  P 426 para J. 
43  P 427 para D – F. 
44  See the contention at p 427 paras A – C. 
45  General Comment No. 9. 
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the rights provided for in the Covenant and the context of the full 
use of the maximum available resources.46[Emphasis supplied]       
 
The Bon Vista case47 represents a departure from the approach in the 
Manqele case. In the Bon Vista case the respondents had discontinued 
the supply of water to a block of flats on the ground of non-payment. 
The applicants contended that the discontinuation was unlawful. The 
Court read section 27(2) together with section 7 of the Constitution, 
against the background of international law, to define the duty on the 
respondents to respect the right of access to water as follows:48  
 
On the facts of this case, the applicants had access to water before 
the Council disconnected the supply. The act of disconnecting the 
supply was prima facie in breach of the Council’s constitutional 
duty to respect the right of access to water. In accordance with 
what is referred to as the two-stage approach, that places a burden 
or an onus on the Council to justify the breach.49 [Footnote omit-
ted] 
 
The Court described the form that the notice of intention to limit or 
discontinue water services as contemplated in section 4(3)(b) of the 
Act should take: 
 
...when a consumer is in arrears in respect of payments for water 
services, the account sent out by the Council contains a standard 
printed section informing him or her that if arrears are not paid, 
the service will be discontinued. Again it is not necessary to de-
cide whether such notices comply with the requirements in the 
Act. Without deciding the matter, however, I must express my 
doubts about whether such a standard notice, if it does not inform 
the consumer of his or her statutory right to make representations, 
meets the requirements of the Act. The right is not to have real 
meaning unless the service provider informs consumers of its exis-
tence, which it could easily do. 
 
                                                 
46  General Comment No. 9, para 9. 
47  Bon Vista Mansions v South Metropolitan Local Council 2002 (6) BCLR 625 
(W). 
48  P 628 – 30, paras 11 – 15 . 
49  P 630 para 20. 
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A genuine opportunity to make representations is particularly im-
portant in the light of the provision that water supply may not be 
discontinued if it results in a person being denied access to basic 
water services for non-payment, where that person proves to the 
satisfaction of the relevant water services authority, that he or she 
is unable to pay for basic water services.50 
 
Though it was, like the Manqele case, decided before the promulga-
tion of the basic water regulations, the Court in Bon Vista relied on the 
Constitution and the Act to operationalise the right to water. The case 
lends itself to the ‘generous’ approach to the interpretation of the Bill 
of Rights. This approach gives a wide, as opposed to a restrictive in-
terpretation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.51 In the Manqele 
case the Court had adopted a very narrow approach to section 27(2) of 
the Constitution. 
 
3.3.3 Water standards and tariffs 
Section 10 of the Act empowers the Minister to prescribe norms and 
standards for tariffs.  The norms are intended to, among other things, 
ensure equitable tariffs for the enjoyment of the right to water. The 
Minister has made the Norms and Standards in respect of Tariffs for 
Water Services in terms of Section 10(1) of the Water Services Act (the 
tariff regulations).52 Regulation 2 requires services institutions among 
others to recover the costs of: water purchase, overheads and capital 
not financed through grant, subsidy or donation. 
Recovery of capital injections has the potential of encouraging 
quality improvements over time. Unfortunately, this is done at the risk 
of commercialising water services. This is especially so when the ser-
vice is left in the hands of the naturally profit-motivated private actors. 
Even though the regulations make provision for subsidisation, it is not 
imposed as an obligation or defined with precision. To provide the 
mandatory basic water, the municipalities have chosen to subsidise 
this by charging incremental tariffs (block tariffs), which increase with 
the volume of water consumed, for those households (presumably 
                                                 
50  P 631, para 26. 
51  See S v Zuma 1995  (2) SA 642 (CC), para 14. 
52  June 2001. 
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middle-class) that exceed the 6 kilolitres of water. But due to the high 
levels of unemployment and the growing consumer debt this may 
prove problematic.53 There is a need for the national government to 
intervene and provide subsidisation where the need arises. This is be-
cause the national government bears the ultimate responsibility to en-
sure the realisation of the socio-economic rights in the constitution. 
But in addition to ensuring the recovery of costs, the tariff regula-
tions require the water services institutions to ensure that all house-
holds have access to basic water supply and basic sanitation.54 This, 
in my opinion, should rank highly over the others. It derives directly 
from the right of access to water as enshrined in the Constitution. In 
fact, the regulations require that the tariffs for households supplied 
through a communal water services work ‘must be set at the lowest 
amount, including a zero amount’.55 However, a trend has emerged 
were communal stand pipes are replaced with pre-paid meters thereby 
limiting access. 
 
3.3.4 The duty to provide access to water 
The Act imposes an obligation on all water services authorities ‘to 
progressively ensure efficient, affordable, economical and sustainable 
access to water services’ to all consumers or potential consumers in its 
area of jurisdiction.56 The extension of the obligation to cover poten-
tial consumers means that even in the absence of any contractual rela-
tionship, potential consumers may compel the authority to provide 
them with water. This duty is complimented in stronger terms by sec-
tion 11(4), which provides that ‘[a] water services authority may not 
unreasonably refuse or fail to give access to water services to a con-
sumer or potential consumers in its area of jurisdiction’.57 
 
3.3.5 Contracts and joint ventures  
According to section 19 water services institutions ‘may only enter 
into a contract with a private sector water services provider after it has 
                                                 
53  See Table 6 of the Report, Tariffs and Fees in Lukhanji and Amahlati , p. 44. 
See Deedat, Pape & Qotole 2001: 18. 
54  Reg. 2(a). 
55  Reg. 5.    
56  S 11(1). 
57  Emphasis supplied. 
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considered all known public water services providers able and willing 
to perform the relevant functions.’58 Before entering into any such ar-
rangements, ‘the water services authority must publicly disclose its 
intention to do so.’59 The Act requires the Minister to ensure that wa-
ter services are provided on an efficient, equitable, cost effective and 
sustainable basis; that the terms of the contract are fair, not only to the 
parties but to the consumers as well; and compliant with the Act.60 
The Minister has promulgated the Water Services Provider Contract 
Regulations (the Contract Regulations).61 The regulations require that 
the contract set forth the manner and means by which any relevant 
portion of the water services development plan will be implemented.62 
This is very important because it binds the contract service provider to 
the terms of the water plan. However, this has practical difficulties. 
Some of the undertakings in the water plan may impose obligations of 
which only a government institution is able to discharge.  
Where the contract provides for the water services provider to 
provide services directly to the consumers, the contract must require 
such provider to prepare and publish a consumer charter.63 This char-
ter must in addition to fulfilling the requirements of section 4, as al-
ready discussed above, provide for a system of dealing with consumer 
complaints and set out a consumer’s right to redress.64 The regulations 
also require that a water services provider should, ‘in terms of the con-
tract ensure access to such information as might be reasonably called 
for by a consumer or potential consumer.’65  
 
 
                                                 
58 S 19(2). 
59 S 19(3). 
60 As above. 
61 August 2001. 
62 Reg. 3(a). 
63 Reg. 13. 
64 As above. 
65 Reg. 18. 
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4. THE LUKHANJI AND AMAHLATI CONTRACTS 
 
Both contracts were concluded pre-1994 when the two locations, Luk-
hanji and Amahlati, were then known as Queenstown and Stutterheim 
respectively. WSSA is the service provider in both contracts. The mu-
nicipalities were persuaded that WSSA would not only implement an 
integrated approach to meet the demands of the consumers, but would 
also provide affordable and acceptable standards of the service fol-
lowed by the ability and willingness to pay.66 The municipalities 
would be saved money by providing ‘world-class’ technical and or-
ganisational services at lower-than-usual municipal costs, while effec-
tively managing the customers,67 and would save the municipalities 
from ‘a technical burden’.68   
 
4.1 The process of entering into the contracts 
 
The current legal regime applicable to the process of out-sourcing at 
the local government level does not apply to these pre-1994 contracts. 
For instance, consultation with stakeholders, and especially with the 
community, was not legally or constitutionally required.69 In Lukhanji 
the municipality put out an open-ended tender, which complied with 
the then valid relevant Municipal Ordinance for tendering proce-
dures.70 In Amahlati a consultant-specialist in water supply and sanita-
tion prepared the tender documents and Aqua-Gold won.71 In Luk-
hanji, the contract was signed on the 18 June 1992 to run for a period 
of 25 years.72 The Amahlati contract on the other hand was signed on 
28 September 1993 to run for a period of ten years.73 After 1994 the 
Lukhanji contract was extended to cover Ezibeleni and Mlungisi.74 
                                                 
66  WSSA “Proposal for Management, Operation and Maintenance of Fort Beaufort 
Water and Sanitation Services” 1995 as quoted by Ruiters 2002: 43.   
67  Ruiters, as above, p. 45 
68  Report, p. 23. 
69  Report, p. 28. 
70  Ordinance 20 of 1974. 
71  See Report, table 4 at p 32. 
72  Annex 1 to the contract. 
73  Annex 1 to the contract. 
74  Booysen 2004: 25. 
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The Amahlati contract came to an end towards the end of 2003. 
WSSA has however continued to provide water, initially on an annual 
but now on monthly renewal basis.75 There are moves afoot to renew 
the contract but this is now subject to the on-going section 78 process 
of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act.76 The Lukhanji con-
tract continues to run to the satisfaction of all the parties. Recently, 
however, the contract has come under severe pressure for re-
negotiation due to the severe and persistent cash-flow crisis.77 After 
1992 Lukhanji saw an increase of the tariffs by over 150 per cent, 
from R 15 to R 38 leading to consumer payment boycotts. 78 By 1997 
and 1999 the consumer debt had rised to R26 million and R35 million 
respectively.79 In Amahlati, by 1997, 45 percent of the town’s 4,468 
households were not paying their bills on a regular basis.80 Though the 
current statistics show that there has been an increase of between 1 
percent and 10 percent annually,81 the debt burden is still a problem. 
The individual debts have soared because of the use of water beyond 
the 6 kilolitres of free basic water.   
 
4.2 Municipality obligations: A case of defection? 
 
Even when services have been privatised the state has an obligation to 
ensure that everyone has access to the service on a progressive basis. 
By both the Lukhanji and Amahlati contracts, the municipalities re-
main responsible towards the consumers. WSSA only supplies the wa-
ter and bills the municipalities.  
What is evident, however, is ignorance on the part of the consum-
ers of the role of WSSA and its relationship with the municipalities.82 
This raises questions as to the level of openness and information 
availed to the consumers. As has been mentioned, at the time of con-
                                                 
75  Booysen 2004: 23. 
76  Act No 32 of 2000 as amended 
77  As above. 
78  Ruiters 2002: 48. 
79  Ruiters, 2002: 49, 50. 
80  Ruiters 2002: 50. 
81  Booysen 2004: 43, 44. 
82  Booysen 2004: 46. 
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clusion of the contracts, the current legal requirements relating to con-
sultation with the public were not applicable. However, the implemen-
tation of the contracts spans through the new legal order. The Consti-
tution confers on everyone a right of access to information required 
for the enjoyment of the rights in the Constitution.83 In addition, 
amongst the rights that the Municipal Systems Act confers on citizens 
in the enjoyment of public services is to demand openness and disclo-
sure of public issues.84 One could conclude that the contracts are sub-
ject to these provisions of the law.   Contrary to this, the two contracts 
have confidentiality clauses, which provide that: ‘[t]he documentation 
contained herein has been developed exclusively by the OPERATOR, 
and shall not be disclosed to third parties without the written approval 
of the OPERATOR.’85 From a positive perspective however, the 
communities know that it is the municipality that is at the forefront of 
water service delivery.86  
Views were expressed on the role that WSSA played behind the 
scenes. Some members of the community, especially in Lukhanji, be-
lieve that the municipality’s pursuit of payment for services was 
linked to the presence of a private company, which is exerting pres-
sure to get paid.87 It was found that “Lukhanji experienced a severe 
‘cash flow’ crisis, which was in a large part attributed to its monthly 
payments to WSSA.”88 However, this is also attributed to the out-
standing sums of up to R95 million, owed by the consumers and 
which is increasing by R1 million every month.89 But unlike Lukhanji, 
which serves many rural areas, Amahlati‘s socio-economic conditions 
are different because it is predominantly white. This reflects on the 
ability of the consumers to pay for municipal services. Lukhanji’s in-
digent people’s bracket is growing by the day, thereby exerting pres-
sure on the municipality’s resources. This goes to confirm the fact that 
in the absence of adequate subsidisation from the national govern-
                                                 
83  Section 32. 
84  Section 5, Municipal Systems Act, No. 32 of 2000. In the TAC case the Court 
said that an reasonable programme must have its contents published, para 123. 
85  Clause 2.2.2. 
86  Booysen 2002: 47. 
87  Booysen 2002: 48. 
88  Booysen 2004: 65. 
89  Booysen 2004: 6. 
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ment, municipalities with large numbers of indigent people (mostly 
rural and unemployed) will find it hard to sustain the provision of ser-
vices on a purely commercial basis. As already mentioned, in the 
Grootboom case, the Court emphasised that the primary responsibility 
to ensure that socio-economic rights are realised rests with the na-
tional government.  
 
WSSA is dissatisfied with the manner in which the municipalities are 
managing customers and has expressed a desire to take over this man-
agement. Though this is masked as necessary for them to take ac-
countability for the service they provide,90 the actual intention is to 
manage the consumer debt.91 They reckon that they would be more 
effective in getting people to pay.92 They are also of the opinion that 
this would create sustainable service delivery in what they refer to as 
‘adding value’.93 The relationship between WSSA and the consumers 
will become a purely business one if WSSA takes over. WSSA may 
not be in a position to pursue the pro-poor and indigent people’s poli-
cies that the municipalities have adopted. Though bound by contract 
to do so, enforcement problems would arise. It is also true that peo-
ple’s socio-economic circumstances change, and so should the pro-
poor people policies. Long-term contractual undertakings have a po-
tential of instilling rigidity. In the Grootboom case, the Court under-
scored the importance of flexibility in government programmes, 
which must be designed to respond to unforeseeable changes.94 
 
4.3  Access to water, basic free water, and the pro-poor people 
policies 
 
Like all the other municipalities, and in accordance with the basic wa-
ter regulations, both Lukhanji and Amahlati provide the 6 kilolitres of 
free water. But by 2004, free basic water was estimated to have been 
supplied to 644, 000 people or 40 percent in the whole of Amathole 
                                                 
90  Booysen 2004: 45. 
91  Booysen 2004: 45. 
92  Booysen 2004: 45 
93  Booysen 2004: 45. 
94  Para 43. 
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District.95 In Lukhanji, it is estimated that 50 percent have been sup-
plied with the water.96 The Constitution and the Act guarantee this 
right to everyone. There is no indication that the state lacks the capac-
ity either due to resources or other constraints to make this free water 
immediately available to everyone. In both localities, the community 
voices indicate ignorance of the existence of this water. A duty is im-
posed on the state to educate all persons on the existence of a right and 
how best to enjoy it. Regulation 3(a) of the Basic Water regulations 
imposes a duty on the state to educate people on water use. Properly 
interpreted, this education should also include education on the avail-
ability of the free water. In the Bon Vista case the Court was of the 
view that the right is not to have real meaning unless the service pro-
vider informs consumers of its existence.97 In the TAC case the Court 
held that ‘for a public programme to meet the constitutional require-
ments of reasonableness, its contents must be made known appropri-
ately.’98 Lukhanji and Amahlati should ensure that infrastructural de-
ficiencies, financial and other constraints are eliminated in order to 
make this water available to all. 
On a positive note however, in addition to the free basic water, 
Lukhanji has adopted a pro-poor people policy, which allows indigent 
persons to enjoy free water in excess of the 6 kilolitres.99 In addition 
to this policy, a policy of rebates has been adopted. This allows 
households that have an income of between R1,100 and R1,400 to 
qualify for a rebate of R65 per month on municipal rates.100 But like 
the free basic water policy, the community voices indicate ignorance 
of existence of this policy.101 As already indicated above, the munici-
palities have a duty to publicise the policies that facilitate the enjoy-
ment of the right to water.  
 
 
                                                 
95  Booysen 2004: 53, quoting Information sheet of Amathole District Municipality 
2004: 5. 
96  Booysen 2004. 
97  Para 26. 
98  TAC case  para 123. 
99  Booysen: 2004 52 & 49. 
100  Booysen 2004: 53. 
101  Booysen 2004: 62 – 63. 
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4.5 Debt collection, pre-paid meters and disconnections 
 
4.5.1 Debt collection and disconnections 
The municipal water debt is huge and increasing by the day. There is a 
general willingness to pay on the part of the consumers. Their prob-
lem, however, is the inability to pay, which is caused mainly by un-
employment.102 The inadequacy of the free basic water has forced 
households to use far above the allocated 6 kilolitres of free water, 
leaving them in debt. In Lukhanji, and in most parts of Amahlati, the 
municipalities do not ‘cut’ water but instead ‘cut’ electricity for water 
debts. This policy raises some issues of legality. Without prior agree-
ment between the municipality and the consumers, unless both water 
and electricity are supplied under the same contract, the policy may 
violate some principles of contract law. The policy, in addition, in-
vokes human rights questions. Unlike water, electricity is not an ex-
plicit right protected by the Constitution. It is however relevant to the 
enjoyment of a number of other rights. These include: the right to 
food, housing and health care. In the Grootboom case, the Court stated 
that ‘housing entails more that bricks and mortar. It requires available 
land, appropriate services such as the provision of water …’.103 
Though the Court did not mention electricity, the relevance of elec-
tricity in the enjoyment of the right to housing, and the other rights 
mentioned above cannot be doubted. By ‘cutting’ electricity therefore, 
the municipalities are indirectly interfering with some of the rights, 
‘cutting’ water is even worse. 
 
4.5.2 Water restrictors 
To manage the consumer debt the municipalities have introduced wa-
ter restrictors. These are devices that restrict the amount of water that 
goes through the consumer’s system for a set period of time. They are 
used to assist in minimising revenue losses resulting from water pilfer-
ing and unpaid use.104 On its face, this policy does not violate the 
Constitution since it allows consumers to access the free basic water. 
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But a critical look reveals that this system violates not only provisions 
of the Bill of Rights but of the Act as well. 
The devices are being installed in households that have been de-
faulting on their debts. This amounts to discrimination in terms of sec-
tion 9 of the Constitution. Though this provision does not list ‘eco-
nomic status’ as one of the grounds upon which discrimination is pro-
hibited, it may be argued that this is an analogous ground. In the 
Harksen105 judgment the Constitutional Court said that an analogous 
ground is one which is based on attributes or characteristics which 
have ‘the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as 
human beings, or affect them in a comparatively serious manner’.106 
There is no doubt that these restrictors perpetrate lack of access to wa-
ter for those who find the 6 kilolitres inadequate. This amounts to in-
fringement of their human dignity; they will not be able to meet their 
water needs such as hygiene and preparation of food. In this respect, 
they are affected in a serious manner as compared to their counterparts 
that are economically well-off. One of the contentious issues at the 
passing of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Dis-
crimination Act107 was whether ‘economic status’ should be included 
as one of the grounds of discrimination.108 In the end it was resolved 
that it be included as a directive principle acknowledging that there is 
overwhelming evidence about the importance of, impact on society 
and link to systematic disadvantage and discrimination of, among 
other things the ground of socio-economic status and HIV status.109 
The Constitutional Court has already declared HIV status an analo-
gous ground.110 It follows that socio-economic status is an analogous 
ground as well. 
From the perspective of the Act, using restrictors amounts to dis-
connection without notice, and without giving the consumer an oppor-
tunity to make representations as to his or her inability to pay. This 
violates section 4 of the Act as set out above.  
 
                                                 
105  Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA (CC). 
106  Para 46. 
107  Act No. 43 of 2000. 
108  De Vos 2004: 6. 
109  S 34(1). 
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4.5.3 Pre-paid meters – lessons from Kwazulu-Natal 
Describing the problem with pre-paid meters in Stutterheim, Ruiters 
says that: 
 
[p]repaid metering is a new political technology since individuals 
end up self-disconnecting: no billing and no meter reading is re-
quired, and domestic water consumption or lack thereof becomes 
statistically invisible. Prepayment is seen as an alternative to mu-
nicipal disconnection to when ‘customers’ cannot afford to pay 
accounts ... self-disconnection is invisible and masks the extent to 
which people go without water supply. These transactions are not 
in the public domain and can be blamed on the individual sover-
eign consumer.111 
 
At the time of introducing pre-paid meters in Madlebe in Kwazulu-
Natal, it was argued that this was necessary for a sustainable service 
delivery system. It was also argued that the system would also save 
the costs of monitoring and reading meters.112 A few years after com-
pletion of the project of installation, there was a severe cholera out-
break claiming a number of lives. The Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry (DWAF) and the uMthlathuze Water Board (MWB) pro-
ject, the implementers of the project, officially disassociated the chol-
era outbreak from pre-paid meters.113 But community-based research 
by Deedat and Cottle argues the contrary. Their research discloses the 
fact that the introduction of these meters in a place that previously had 
communal stand pipes with free water prevented a sizeable number of 
residents from accessing water. Even for those who could afford, sup-
ply was not always guaranteed. This was because of persistent break-
downs associated to the sophisticated nature of the pre-paid water 
technology.114  A breakdown of the meters in the days preceding the 
cholera out-break forced people to resort to unsafe sources for wa-
ter.115 The failure of the pre-paid meters in Madlebe had huge finan-
cial implications as reported by Deedat and Cottle. The maintenance 
                                                 
111  Ruiters 2002: 53. 
112  Deedat & Cottle 2002: 87. 
113  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 2000: 82.  
114  Deedat & Cottle 2002: 89 – 90. 
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of the meters was at a high cost and their eventual removal meant a 
loss of R3000, the cost of every meter.116 In addition, a lot of money 
was spent on containing the cholera outbreak and the treatment of vic-
tims.   
Based on their experience with reconnections and disconnections, 
most residents in the cases-study are in favour of pre-paid meters be-
cause they allow them to use services as far as they can afford.117  On 
the question of whether or not the self-disconnection would not deny 
them access to water, there was indication that the water would be 
sourced from neighbours.118 The experience of the people of Madlebe 
indicates that this was not a sustainable alternative: neighbours could 
not give out water for a long-time.119 The installation of pre-paid me-
ters comes at a huge cost to the consumer. The R800 installation fee is 
beyond the reach of most consumers, especially the unemployed. The 
poor, those who could not afford to maintain the meters, were margin-
alised and denied their constitutional right of access to sufficient wa-
ter. Additionally, just like the water restrictors, these meters violate 
section 4 of the Act. They allow the consumer, who is unable to pay, 
to be disconnected without notice and without chance to make repre-
sentations as to his or her inability to pay.  It is because of these rea-
sons that devices similar to pre-paid meters were abolished in the 





The experiences of Lukhanji and Amahlati disclose a dilemma faced 
by municipalities as they outsource the provision of public services. 
The municipalities are caught between the need to ensure enjoyment 
of socio-economic rights such as access to water, and the need to en-
sure cost recovery from consumers struck by poverty caused mostly 
by unemployment. This has forced the municipalities to adopt new 
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policies to manage consumer debts. The policy, which is likely to im-
pact more on enjoyment of the right of access to water is the introduc-
tion of pre-paid water meters and the water restrictors. These gadgets 
allow consumers to be disconnected without being given chance to 
make representations as to their inability to pay. The pre-paid meters 
other than enable the consumers to manage their debt have disastrous 
effects in terms of reduced access to water by the poor.  
Even though the municipalities’ compliance with the obligation to 
provide free basic water, and their adoption of indigent people’s poli-
cies are commendable their full implementation has not been 
achieved. This is because of the prevalent ignorance of their existence 
amongst the consumers caused by the lack of dissemination of infor-
mation. The provision of 6 kilolitres of water to all households as the 
minimum basic water without considering the size of the household 
too needs to be examined. If this is not done, it may be argued that the 
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This paper is an extract from a research paper commissioned by the 
Community Law Centre and funded by the Dutch funding agency 
ICCO. The full research paper analyses the policy and legislative out-
sourcing framework; describes the general features of current out-
sourcing contracts, looks at case studies to determine the practical 
relevance of contract provisions and gives a brief overview of interna-
tional trends in municipal outsourcing, specifically with reference to 
contract renegotiation. This extract deals only with the description of 
current contract provisions and has been amended to suit current pub-
lication requirements. 
 
Certain factors tend to drive outsourcing initiatives (“drivers”) while 
others constitute a danger associated with this form of service delivery 
mechanism (“dangers”). 
 
Typical “drivers” include: 
• Capital investment 
• Efficiency  
• Skills transfer  
• Risk transfer  
• Value for money 
 
Typical “dangers” include: 
• Loss of accountability 
• Lack of public buy-in 
• Consumer protection 
• Inappropriate risk allocation 
                                                
♠  Attorney at Sonnenberg Hoffmann Galombik, Cape Town. 




• Asset protection  
 
It is within this context that a range of current South African outsourc-
ing contracts have been analysed to assess to what extent they trans-
late the drivers into binding contract terms and how effectively they 
mitigate or avoid the typical dangers associated with outsourcing. The 
parameters of this paper do not allow for an authoritative analysis of 





The contracts analysed for this paper include: 
 
• two long-term water service contract between rural municipali-
ties and a private company; 
• two long-term water concession contracts between an urban 
and rural municipality and private companies; 
• one solid waste contract between a municipal entity and met-
ropolitan municipality; 
• one electricity services contract between a city and a municipal 
entity; 
• one water services contract between an urban municipality and 
municipal entity; 
• four water services contracts between municipalities (three ru-
ral, one city) and water boards; and 
• four solid waste services contracts between metropolitan mu-
nicipalities and Community Based Organisations (CBOs). 
 
2.1 General Features 
 
On an initial reading, one is struck by the inaccessibility and sheer 
length of many of these contracts which, with annexures, can reach 
anything up to 600 pages. Excessively long sentences are often used 
and the language is not reader friendly. The clause below is an exam-
WATER DELIVERY: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE? 
  
89 
ple both of the style and inaccessible formulation of some contract 
provisions: 
 
“In the event that any of the existing assets reflected in the 
schedules to the lease agreements cannot be located despite 
diligent search by the CONCESSIONAIRE or in the event that 
the CONCESSIONAIRE cannot confirm the existence of any 
such existing asset in the course and scope of the inventory re-
ferred to in 17.1 and the CONCESSIONAIRE notifies the 
COUNCIL of such fact and that such existing assets are re-
quired by the CONCESSIONAIRE to enable it to operate the 
works and/or fulfil its other obligations under this contract the 
CONCESSIONAIRE shall be entitled to purchase a similar as-
set on an arms length basis at its own cost and recover the cost 
associated with the purchase of the asset from the COUNCIL 
by off-setting same against and deducting same from the rent-
als due to the COUNCIL in terms of the lease agreements, pro-
vided that, should such cost exceed the amount of the rentals 
due under the lease agreements, the COUNCIL shall refund 
such excess to the CONCESSIONAIRE within 30(thirty) days 
of the date on which the CONCESSIONAIRE purchased such 
asset.”  
 
In many contracts it is difficult to understand the rationale behind the 
contract. The introductory sections of the contracts are usually widely 
worded with lofty ideals and offer little insight into the true reasons 
behind the outsourcing initiative. 
 The complexity and length of these contracts could impact on pub-
lic participation and transparency objectives. A member of the public 
wanting to comment on a proposed service delivery agreement would 
find it a difficult task just to understand the contract, let alone formu-
late meaningful comment. Complex contracts could also pose a threat 
to contract monitoring. Regardless of what structures are set up to 
monitor a contract, if the people doing the monitoring do not have the 
essential provisions of the contract at their fingertips they may find it 
difficult to fulfil their obligations effectively. 
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3. CONTRACTS AND “DRIVERS & DANGERS” 
 
3.1 Capital Investment 
 
The prospect of access to outside capital to fund an infrastructure pro-
ject can be a significant driver for an outsourcing strategy. There is a 
well documented infrastructure backlog in South Africa, which public 
sector resources alone are incapable of meeting. The introduction of 
private capital to meet this backlog could, in theory at least, offer a 
solution to the problem. 
Concession or lease contracts are the typical mechanisms used for 
these projects. However, these long-term contracts are notoriously 
complex and pose a host of risks, including a loss of accountability 
and risks of monopoly pricing.1 Currently, however, the majority of 
municipal outsourcing contracts in South Africa are for service provi-
sion only. Two of the sample contracts involving capital investment 
(water concession contracts) were renegotiated a few years after being 
entered into and the capital infrastructure projects temporarily sus-
pended or reduced as a result of financial problems on the part of the 
private companies involved. These issues and associated case studies 





The theory behind outsourcing offering efficiency benefits is that the 
private sector, because it is not constrained by bureaucratic red-tape, 
can manage a service with more innovation and flexibility thus lead-
ing to greater efficiency. 
Whether the private sector is indeed inherently more efficient than 
the public sector remains the subject of debate. As a recent report sug-
gests, “much of the case for PPPs rests on the relative efficiency of the 
private sector. While there is an extensive literature on this subject, 
the theory is ambiguous and the empirical evidence is mixed.”2  
                                                
1  Department of Provincial and Local Government 1998: 2.2.6. 
2  IMF 2004: 25. 
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3.2.2 Contracts on Efficiency 
Efficiency is a difficult concept to tie down in a contract. The pro-
curement process should at least ensure that the contractor has the 
necessary skills and expertise to perform the contract. And the con-
tract will of course oblige the contractor to perform the service to par-
ticular standards. The municipality will have to ensure that the con-
tract contains clear performance targets, penalties for non-
performance and possibly incentives for excellent service. This will 
enable the municipality to objectively judge the contractor’s effi-
ciency. This again highlights the importance of effective monitoring 
and the need to set clear contract outputs, something which, as seen 
below, the contracts do not make adequate provision for. 
Only one sample contract, a water services contract with a mu-
nicipal entity, provides for a benchmarking study to take place at the 
option of the municipality. This is designed to enable the municipality 
to compare the service provider’s cost structures and tariffs with simi-
lar municipalities and so assess value for money and relative effi-
ciency of the service provider. This contract also contains detailed 
performance indicators, making it comparatively sophisticated in its 
treatment of “efficiency” and setting it apart from the other sample 
contracts. 
 
3.3 Skills Transfer 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
A lack of skills and capacity is a central challenge facing municipal 
service delivery in South Africa. Outsourcing offers the potential of 
skills transfer from the service provider to an under-capacitated mu-
nicipality, thus empowering the municipality to fulfil its obligations 
without the need for external help. However, a distinction must be 
made between an external service provider (potentially) having supe-
rior skills and the actual transfer of those skills. If the municipality 
does not actively seek skills transfer then it risks being locked into us-
ing that, or other, external providers indefinitely. 
A contract with an under-capacitated municipality should there-
fore provide a clear programme mapping out how skills transfer will 
take place, by whom and by when and identifying who will be trained 
and how the effectiveness of skills transfer will be tested. 
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3.3.2 Contracts and Skills Transfer 
Surprisingly, most of the sample contracts contain no skills transfer 
provisions. Only two contracts deal with this issue and oblige the ser-
vice provider to conduct training and mentorship campaigns and pro-
grammes to build capacity and transfer skills. However, the provisions 
lack any real detail. For example, no person or structure is made re-
sponsible for the training, no timelines are set for when the training 
will take place, how often and in what manner, no indication is given 
of the nature of skills required and no method is set for determining 
the success of the training. 
 
3.4 Risk Transfer 
 
3.4.1 Introduction 
There are a wide range of risk categories applicable to outsourcing.  
These may include construction risk, financial risk, demand risk, op-
erational risk, political risk and risks associated with change of law 
and vis major. The identification, costing and allocation of risks can 
be a complex exercise but is critical to ensure an effective and sustain-
able contract. Inappropriate risk transfer could place the municipality 
under financial pressure and impact directly on value for money and 
affordability. 
Usually, the more risk a contractor is forced to take on, the more 
compensation it will demand, either in the form of more money or 
greater autonomy.  Risk transfer is therefore not simply about the mu-
nicipality trying to push as much risk the contractor’s way as possible; 
it is about finding the right balance, which may differ in each case, 
between the cost of risk and where it is most appropriately placed. 
The sample contracts usually contain a general provision stating 
that the service provider provides the services entirely at its own risk.  
This is the “default” risk position but the contracts go on to detail all 
the circumstances which reverse or limit this general transfer of risk.  
This can quite significantly water down the actual risk transferred to 
the service provider. This process can take a number of forms, includ-
ing by: 
• allowing the service provider to change its business or operat-
ing plan; 
• providing for a review of the service provider’s base charge; or 
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• forcing a review of tariffs. 
 
3.4.2 Amendment of Business Plan 
Many contracts allow the service provider to amend its annual busi-
ness plan on the occurrence of certain risk events (or at least to request 
an amendment). This enables the service provider to continually adjust 
(and reduce) its service obligations to accommodate any difficulties 
which arise during the contract term. Examples of factors in the sam-
ple contracts, which justify amending a business plan include: 
• “financial constraints” of the service provider; 
• legislative amendments; 
• unforeseen circumstances;  
• damage to the system; 
• adverse governmental action; and  
• changes to credit control or tariff policies. 
 
There are two problems with this approach. Firstly, the risk events 
which justify a request for an amendment to a business plan are often 
so widely or vaguely worded that they include any conceivable event.  
The protection offered by these provisions is powerful and significant.  
It would be preferable to limit the service provider’s right to amend its 
business plan to a few clearly defined events and not widely worded 
matters such as “unforeseen events”, which are better dealt with under 
vis major provisions. 
The second problem with this approach is that many contracts do 
not allow the municipality discretion whether to approve an amend-
ment to a business plan or not. Instead, if the parties cannot agree to 
an appropriate amendment after one of the risk events has occurred, 
dispute resolution mechanisms kick in. This takes the matter out of the 
municipality’s hands. The same method is used in contracts which al-
low for a revision of base charges to take into account changing cir-
cumstances.  
 
3.4.3 Amendment of Service Provider Charge 
In other contracts, the service provider’s base charge is similarly ca-
pable of being adjusted to protect the service provider against chang-
ing circumstances. National Treasury specifically warns against allow-
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ing for payment review during the contract term due to unforeseen 
circumstances as this could have a negative impact on both value for 
money and affordability.3 
 
An example of such a provision can be found in a water concession 
contract which allows the base charge to be modified, inter alia, on 
the occurrence of “any event which actually or will prospectively af-
fect” the company’s revenues, costs or general economic position. 
This catch-all phrase does not even require the “event” to be un-
foreseeable. However, the municipality is entitled to reject a claim for 
an increase if the need arises from a difference between actual and 
projected service demand, low consumer payment levels or inefficien-
cies on the part of the company. On the face of it then, the company is 
taking on the “demand risk” and “consumer payment risk”. These are 
significant risks in any outsourcing contract. But this is not the full 
picture. The company is offered direct relief in the form of a reduction 
of capital programme obligations if actual water demand differs from 
that projected or if consumer payments differ from the projections. 
 
3.4.4 Conditional Service Obligations 
The sample contracts offer additional protection to service providers 
by making service provision “subject to” the existence of certain pre-
existing conditions. The service provider is commonly relieved of pro-
viding the service to particular standards (of efficiency and/or fair-
ness) if there is a problem with resource availability (e.g. availability 
of raw water) or subject to the duty of consumers to pay reasonable 
charges, in emergency situations or because of problems caused by the 
nature topography and zoning of land. 
 
3.4.5 Tariff Amendment 
Another method of protecting the service provider against a host of 
risks is by way of review and amendment of tariffs. Some of the 
“events” in the sample contracts which justify a request for tariff 
amendment include: 
• increased bulk water costs; 
• material adverse governmental action/legislative changes; 
                                                
3  National Treasury 2004: 149. 
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• emergency situation; 
• “any event” (whether foreseen or not) beyond the control of 
the company which affects operating costs; 
• unforeseen population settlement patterns; 
• unforeseen circumstances; and 
• “any event, occurrence, circumstance or condition” which af-
fects the operation, maintenance and recovery of income costs 
of the company. 
 
Many contracts purport to fetter the municipality’s tariff setting pow-
ers. For example, one contract (with a water board) states that the mu-
nicipality “agrees to an extraordinary review of and adjustment of tar-
iffs…” on the occurrence of any of the events above. This reads as a 
positive obligation to amend the tariffs. Other contracts provide that 
“in addition” to other factors the municipality takes into account when 
setting tariffs, it “shall base” the tariffs on the service provider’s busi-
ness plan and budget. 
 In another contract, with a private company, it is specifically pro-
vided that tariffs cannot be changed to offset deficits caused by “en-
trepreneurial risks”. However, the service provider can request an ex-
traordinary review of tariffs if components become more expensive or 
for “any event” which affects operating costs. This contract also pro-
vides that new factors can only be introduced into the tariff determina-
tion formula “if both parties agree”. 
 
3.4.6 Performance Guarantees 
A few contracts oblige the service provider to furnish a performance 
guarantee to protect against the risk of breach. The performance guar-
antee can only be called upon if the service provider commits a 
breach. Other risk events, such as vis major and change in law, do not 
involve breach and so the performance guarantee would not be rele-
vant. 
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3.4.7 Vis Major 
National Treasury makes detailed recommendations on the treatment 
of vis major. It suggests a distinction be made between different cate-
gories of vis major events, with the service provider taking on far 
more risk than is currently reflected in the sample contracts. For ex-
ample, it is recommended that vis major events be restricted to events 
likely to have a material adverse effect on a party and which are unin-
surable.4 This would include war, civil war, terrorism and nuclear, 
chemical or biological contamination. Because these risks are such 
unusual events, National Treasury recommends they be shared by the 
parties. 
Then there are events beyond the service provider’s control but for 
which it should bear the financial risk.5 These are “relief events” and 
would include fire, flood, earthquake, strike, lockout, accident at the 
works and so on (events that last a finite time). All the service pro-
vider should hope for under a “relief event” is a temporary relief of 
service obligations. In other words, relief from the right the municipal-
ity would otherwise have had to terminate the contract or claim dam-
ages for non-performance. The service provider should have no right 
to compensation for losses suffered as a result of the event, not even 
an extension of the contract term. This is a significantly different ap-
proach to that found in the sample contracts, which are far more fa-
vourable to the service provider. 
None of the sample contracts make a distinction between different 
categories of vis major event and tend to include far more under this 
definition than one would typically expect, for example operational 
risks. They almost invariably allow for a suspension of the service 
provider’s (and municipality’s) duties in so far as they are unable to 
perform and allow for termination if the vis major event continues be-
yond a specified period or for an extension of the contract period 
equal to the duration of the event. 
Some contracts allow the service provider to claim financial com-
pensation from the municipality for the effects of the vis major event.  
In two contracts with private companies the municipality is even 
obliged to continue paying the company’s fees and financial damages, 
                                                
4  National Treasury 2004: 201. 
5  National Treasury 2004: 186. 
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including (unusually) consequential damages if the event was uninsur-
able. 
 
3.4.8 Material Adverse Governmental Action 
Most of the sample contracts contain provisions regarding the risk of 
“material adverse governmental action” (or similar wording). This is 
the risk of, for example, a change in legislation, which materially af-
fects the contract. 
The cost of complying with current or foreseeable law should be 
built into the service provider’s price. But who should bear the risk of 
unforeseen government conduct? There is no reason why a service 
provider should be in better position in an outsourcing contract than 
its counterparts in non-municipal business. The only exception is if 
the adverse government conduct is not of general application and in-
stead specifically targets the service provider or municipal outsourc-
ing. The risk of government conduct having a general effect, which 
was not foreseen, should therefore be borne by the service provider.  
Conduct that discriminates against the service provider or municipal 
outsourcing in particular should be borne by the municipality.  
The sample contracts, however, generally offer the service pro-
vider wide protection against this risk. They, almost without excep-
tion, make no distinction between laws of general and limited applica-
tion.  In one contract, with a private company, the municipality not 
only bears all risk of adverse governmental conduct but is also under a 
duty to place the company in the same position it was before the ad-
verse conduct occurred. If it does not the company has a right to can-
cel the contract. 
 If the municipality bears the risk of adverse governmental action, 
the service provider should at least be obliged to mitigate the effect of 
the government conduct. This concept is generally not reflected in the 
sample contracts. Governmental conduct is not necessarily adverse. 
National Treasury suggests that unforeseeable government conduct 
which economically benefits the service provider should entitle the 
municipality to a share in the value of the benefit. This concept was 
not evident in any of the sample contracts. 
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3.5 Value for Money 
 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Value for money is a key driver of outsourcing; the promise of an ex-
ternal service provider often being to provide both a better and 
cheaper service. Value for money cannot be judged solely on financial 
terms. It is as much a question of the quality and value of the outputs 
as it is the cost of the inputs and can therefore become a relatively 
complex concept. The process of competitively selecting a service 
provider should ensure the most cost effective of available providers is 
chosen, thus maximising the benefit to the municipality and contribut-
ing to value for money. 
 
3.5.2 Financial Benefit 
Although value for money is not solely a financial issue, South Afri-
can legislation does require the existence of “significant financial 
benefit” before such a contract may be entered into.6 Without insight 
into the financial structure of each contract it is not possible to deter-
mine whether a contract in fact offers such financial benefit. However, 
if one assumes that at the time of entering into the contract the mu-
nicipality expected some financial benefit – this expectation could be 
threatened if the contract, for example, does not allocate risk effec-
tively (leading to unexpected future expenses or high risk mitigation 
costs) or leaves aspects of the contract for future determination by the 
parties and these aspects have significant financial consequences. 
 
3.5.3 Measurable Outputs 
A contract must contain clear and measurable outputs to enable the 
municipality to conduct ongoing assessments on whether it is getting 
what it expects out of the contract, including its expectations on value 
for money. 
Outsourcing contracts are usually for relatively long periods of 
time.  During the contract period circumstances may, and usually do, 
change. The effect may be a slow adjustment over time of service tar-
gets or other outputs to take into account the changing service envi-
                                                
6  S 33 Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (this applies only to con-
tracts of more that 3 years duration). 
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ronment. If the municipality is unable to monitor and assess the finan-
cial impact of these variations it will be unable to ensure that value for 
money continues to be achieved. It is therefore critical for the service 
provider’s record keeping and reporting obligations to be tied down in 
detail in the contract and for the municipality’s monitoring obligations 
to be treated likewise. 
 
3.5.4 Contracts and value for money 
The conclusions reached under “risk transfer” show that value for 
money could be threatened by inadequate and unclear risk allocation 
provisions. The “accountability” section below concludes that moni-
toring provisions in the contracts are not always adequate. This could 





A significant danger associated with outsourcing is the risk of a loss of 
accountability. This is a risk particularly associated with long term 
contracts such as lease and concession contracts.7 
An effective way for a municipality to ensure accountability is by 
diligently monitoring contract compliance and performance. Monitor-
ing can only be effective if the contract requires comprehensive record 
keeping, regular reporting and clear and measurable outputs. This is 
also crucial to enable the municipality to impose penalties for poor 
performance (or to reward excellent performance). Legislation in 
South Africa places positive obligations on the municipality to per-
form monitoring and regulatory duties effectively. These include pro-
visions obliging the municipality to ensure it has sufficient capacity to 
ensure effective monitoring.8  
Accountability could also be threatened if the service provider is 
able to exercise undue influence over the municipality’s legislative, 
strategy and policy-making powers. This risk will vary depending on 
the nature of the entity.  It would be most dangerous when contracting 
                                                
7  Department of Provincial and Local Government 1998: 2.2.6. 
8  S 116 Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. 
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with a private company and least so with a municipal entity.9 The con-
tract, particularly a contract with a private entity, should therefore 
provide a clear boundary between the parties’ “authority” and “pro-
vider” roles respectively and should ensure that the municipality can 
perform its legislative functions unfettered and in the best interests of 
its community. 
 
3.6.2 Contracts and Monitoring 
The sample contracts vary widely in their treatment of monitoring.  
Some merely pay lip-service to monitoring obligations.  Some exam-
ples of typical monitoring provisions are set out below. 
 
Long Term Water Concessions  
Despite the large scale and long term nature of these contracts, in 
these contracts no liaison person is appointed, no monitoring office is 
set up and (with limited exceptions) no obligations are set on reporting 
requirements. 
The contracts require record keeping on a continuous basis but the 
municipality’s role is a passive one; it being entitled to inspect the in-
formation at its discretion. The contracts generally do not detail who 
should prepare what reports, in what format, by when and where they 
should be submitted. 
 
Contracts with Water Boards on Monitoring 
Most of these contracts set up a monitoring office and provide detailed 
lists of what this office must monitor. The service provider is obliged 
to co-operate with this office and provide the requisite information. 
The service provider is typically obliged to provide a host of clearly 
described monthly reports (e.g. customer complaints, volume of water 
sold), quarterly reports (e.g. summary of repairs and maintenance) and 
annual reports (e.g. business plan, financial statements). 
Some contracts also establish a co-ordinating committee for shar-
ing of information and ensuring contract implementation. The com-
mittee is made up of representatives from both the municipality and 
service provider and is obliged to meet at defined periods. Only one 
                                                
9  It could be argued that it is beneficial for a municipal entity to participate in 
strategy and planning sessions. 
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contract obliges the service provider to pay a monitoring and compli-
ance fee. 
None of the contracts contain pre-determined levels or standards 
against which to measure performance and there is no contractual sys-
tem of penalties for non-performance or poor performance. Service 
levels or performance targets would be included in the service pro-
vider’s annual “business” or “operating” plan but the contracts do not 
specify at what level of detail these service levels and targets should 
be set by the service provider. Because of this contract configuration 
(namely specific service obligations being devised and approved an-
nually as annexures to the contract instead of in the body of the con-
tract) there is a risk that the service levels are described in too general-
ized a manner for effective performance monitoring to take place. 
 
Municipal Entities on Monitoring 
More comprehensive monitoring provisions are found in two contracts 
with municipal entities (in the water and solid waste sectors). A moni-
toring office is established with a list of clearly defined functions and 
the service provider must pay a monthly monitoring fee.10 
 
One contract contains a detailed schedule of key performance indica-
tors separated into key performance areas, key performance indicators 
and annual performance indicators. It also specifically obliges the ser-
vice provider to devise a water service delivery plan containing “de-
tailed and measurable” performance indicators. The service provider 
must compile an annual report and is specifically obliged to compare 
its performance during that year with its performance in the previous 
year. 
 
CBOs on Monitoring 
CBO contracts are quite different to the other service delivery agree-
ments. The municipality retains a tight control on what happens in the 
contract and leaves little to the contractor’s own entrepreneurial initia-
tive. This, however, makes it easier for the municipality to monitor 
performance. The CBO contracts all allow for monthly payments to 
                                                
10  However, the contracts do not specify who would sit in the monitoring office 
and what its relationship to, or within, the municipality would be. 
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the contractor with payments fluctuating according to the actual work 
completed. This means that each month the municipality has to satisfy 
itself that the work has in fact been performed. 
 
Contracts and Legislative Functions 
Some contracts allow the service provider to participate in the policy 
and strategy deliberations of a municipality. This was seen to some 
extent under the risk analysis above, with some contracts purporting to 
grant the service provider influence over the municipality’s tariff set-
ting powers. 
Certain contracts skate very close to purporting to grant legislative 
power to the service provider. For example, two water contracts with 
private companies state that any amendment to service by-laws will 
first be negotiated “and agreed” between the parties. Another contract, 
in the electricity sector, provides that the municipality will adopt by-
laws “in consultation with” the municipal entity. 
Service provider input can be positive where the municipality has 
a capacity or skills deficit and the service provider is able to provide 
practical assistance. One contract was open about this intention, al-
lowing the municipality to benefit from the skills and expertise of the 
public sector provider (a water board). However it is a different story 
if the service provider is a private company and, as a general rule, any 
encroachment on a municipality’s independence and autonomy poses 
a threat to accountability. 
Finally, in a startling example of a municipality divesting itself of 
accountability, a concession contract provides that any reduction in 
tariffs which may be necessary to support indigent consumers will re-
quire the prior written approval of the company’s financiers. 
 
3.6.3 Contracts and Decision-making 
Some contracts divest the municipality of the power to make decisions 
on important contractual issues and instead refer them to “independ-
ent” panels. As was seen under the risk transfer analysis above, many 
important decisions (such as approving significant amendments to a 
business plan) are not left to the discretion of the municipality and are 
instead decided by structures with no political accountability. This 
weakens a municipality’s independence and could threaten account-
ability. 
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Contractual decisions and approvals should remain within the munici-
pality’s discretion with dispute resolution being reserved only for con-
tractual disputes. 
 
3.7 Public buy-in 
 
3.7.1 Introduction 
Municipal policy and legislation places a strong emphasis on the im-
portance of public participation and transparency in an outsourcing 
process and render the service delivery contract a public document.11 
Contracts should therefore contain a confidentiality clause (if at 
all) which is drafted as restrictively as possible and limits “confiden-
tial” matters to those which, if made public, would lead to actual 
prejudice to either of the parties. 
Public participation does not end with the signing of the service 
delivery contract. The national policy correctly notes that if a subse-
quent amendment to a contract materially alters the contract, the 
whole purpose of competition may be negated.12 The legislation rec-
ognises this principle and ensures that the municipality is obliged to 
conduct a public participation process if a material amendment to a 
service contract is contemplated.13 
 
3.7.2 Contracts and Confidentiality 
Most of the sample contracts, with the exception of the CBO con-
tracts, contain a confidentiality clause. This is usually widely worded 
and applies even after contract termination. The confidentiality 
clauses do not clearly define what constitutes confidential informa-
tion. One concession contract goes so far as to say “anything” arising 
from the contract must be regarded as confidential. Another conces-
sion contract deems any information acquired “pursuant to the imple-
mentation of this contract” as confidential and prohibits either party 
from disclosing the contents of the contract without the other’s written 
consent. 
                                                
11  S 80(2) and s 84 Systems Act 32 of 2000 and s 33 Municipal Finance Manage-
ment Act 56 of 2003. 
12  Department of Provincial and Local Government 2000: 4.11. 
13  S 77 Systems Act 32 of 2000 and s 116(3) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
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The test for confidential information should be whether disclosure 
would cause prejudice to the legal or commercial interests of the 
party. This principle-based approach is not evident in the contracts 
and the issue is left vague. 
 
3.7.3 Contracts and Amendments 
Contract amendment is of particular importance when it comes to the 
creation of new service areas. There is a risk of the incumbent pro-
vider being in an unfairly advantageous position to take over the new 
service area. Most sample contracts allow for a negotiation process 
before extension of either the service area or scope of services. The 
incumbent service provider is thus given an opportunity to amend the 
scope of its contract quite significantly without a public process. In 
some contracts the service provider is given a right of first refusal but 
in others the municipality ultimately decides whether the service pro-
vider may extend its scope of services. 
In two long term contracts with private companies the municipal-
ity is given a wide power to increase the scope of the contract simply 
by agreement with the company.14 Similarly one of the CBO contracts 
allows the municipality, entirely at its discretion, to “increase”, “de-
crease” or “change the method” of the service. The contract does not 
require agreement between the parties and any additional fees are de-
termined by the municipality “after consultation” with the contractor.  
This puts the municipality in a markedly more powerful position than 
the contractor and also allows the municipality to significantly amend 
the scope of the contract without following a competitive process. 
 
3.8 Consumer Protection 
 
The risk of monopoly pricing and “cherry picking” high income users 
to the detriment of the poor are specifically identified as risks in con-
cession and lease contracts.15 Policy and legislation emphasise the im-
portance of ensuring the service remains affordable if outsourced.  
                                                
14  Some significant examples include the parties agreeing that the company will 
do meter reading, revenue collection, disconnections, fix pipelines or do major 
repair works. 
15  Department of Provincial and Local Government 1998: 2.2.6. 
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Most contracts do acknowledge the need to supply a basic service and 
oblige the service provider to give priority to a basic supply. 
In theory, the factors a municipality is legislatively obliged to con-
sider when adopting its tariff policy16 and its power to set its own 
credit control and indigent policies should limit the risk of unfair 
treatment of consumers. Although the municipality will always retain 
sole authority to set tariffs it is clear that an outsourcing contract can 
impact on this discretion.  From the risk transfer analysis above, it is 
apparent that some contracts purport to grant the service provider in-
fluence over tariff setting. But, if tariffs are liable to being hiked to 
account for contractual difficulties or future unknown risks, then not 
only tariff affordability but also the overall value for money which the 
contract initially offered, may be weakened. 
Most sample contracts allow the service provider (if performing 
this function) to disconnect the service for non-payment, but make this 
subject to the municipality’s credit control policy or by-law. In those 
contracts which set out a procedure for disconnection, no provision is 
made for the consumer to make representations prior to cut-off. This is 
despite the fact that, in the water sector at least, this is a legal require-
ment.17 In one concession contract, no right to make representations is 
granted to the ordinary consumer, although such a right is given to ho-




A municipality is legally obliged, when entering into a service deliv-
ery agreement, to ensure “continuity” and uninterrupted service deliv-
ery.18 The legislation does not, however, contain detailed provisions 
on how to limit this risk. 
Most contracts have detailed handover provisions and emphasise 
the importance of ensuring continuity. One water services contract 
with a municipal entity acknowledges that termination of the contract 
is a “process” and not an “event”. This is a useful basis on which to 
approach this issue. Another contract, also with a municipal entity but 
                                                
16  S 74 Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
17  S 4 Water Services Act 108 of 1997. 
18  S 81 Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
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in the electricity sector, specifically obliges the service provider to 
continue rendering the service despite termination of the agreement.  
This is to give the municipality time to make alternative arrangements 
and thus avoid service interruption. 
Two of the contracts with water boards, however, require the ser-
vice provider to draft a “transfer plan” only a few months before the 
contract expires. Given the complexity of handover arrangements this 
seems insufficient time, especially as the draft plan would still need to 
be approved by the municipality. 
 
3.10 Asset protection 
 
If municipal service assets are transferred to the service provider, 
there is a risk that the assets will not be adequately repaired or main-
tained. An external provider may perform the minimum short-term 
maintenance and repair work to see the assets through to the end of 
the contract term, leaving the municipality with a nasty surprise when 
it ultimately regains possession. Effective monitoring of asset repair 
and maintenance is thus critical, especially when the contract is near-
ing an end. 
The need to protect assets is reflected in a variety of legislative 
provisions, including a duty on the municipality to take over the assets 
at the expiry of the contract,19 a prohibition on prejudicing the use of a 
basic service asset if that asset has been used as security20 and a spe-
cific obligation to protect assets in the water sector.21 Legislation also 
specifically prohibits a municipality from transferring ownership of 
any infrastructure necessary to provide a basic minimum service.22 
In a long term contract it is prudent to oblige the service provider 
to furnish a maintenance bond or to provide for a maintenance reserve 
or the withholding of later payments to build up some protection for 
the municipality on hand over. The sample contracts generally have 
detailed provisions on asset protection, insurance, maintenance and 
repair and the creation of asset registers. They typically prohibit the 
service provider from disposing of the core assets. However, only one 
                                                
19  S 81 Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
20  S 48 Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. 
21  Regulation 11 Water Services Provider Contract Regulations August 2001. 
22  S 14 Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. 
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contract (a long term water concession) requires the provision of a 
maintenance bond close to the end of the contract period. 
 
3.11 Water Services Act 
 
The Water Services Act requires that a service delivery agreement 
contain an incentive for efficient and effective performance.23 While 
some of the contracts have penalties for poor performance, none in the 
water sector provide incentives for good performance. The legislation 
also prohibits a contract from extending beyond 30 years.24 However, 






4.1 Public Participation 
 
It is important for an outsourcing initiative to be transparent and to 
encourage public participation. This paper reveals that current out-
sourcing contracts are difficult to understand. This can, to a large ex-
tent, be attributed to poor drafting but the fact is that the contracts are 
often inherently complex documents. Possible approaches to this 
problem include: 
• the preparation of a contract synopsis, written in plain lan-
guage and summarising the rights and obligations of the par-
ties and what they each expect to gain out of the contract; and 
• fleshing out the introductory (non-binding) section of the con-
tract to give a fuller story of the background to the contract. 
 
                                                
23  Regulation 12 Water Services Provider Contract Regulations August 2001. 
24  Regulation 9 Water Services Provider Contract Regulations August 2001. 
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4.2 Risk Transfer 
 
The tendency found in the sample contracts to cushion the service 
provider from certain risks could threaten value for money, account-
ability and affordability. The unclear allocation of risk makes it diffi-
cult to determine where a particular risk actually lies. Municipalities 
should consider treating risk more scientifically and conducting a 
thorough process of identifying, costing and then, in clear contract 




The monitoring provisions in the sample contracts are capable of sig-
nificant improvement. Contracts with public sector providers and mu-
nicipal entities are more detailed than contracts of a long-term nature 
with the private sector. Clearly, if anything, this should be the other 
way round. Given the impact that poor monitoring can have on a host 
of other outsourcing objectives, it is critical that municipalities get this 
aspect right. 
 
4.4 Skills Transfer 
 
Skills transfer, despite its importance in municipal service delivery, 
plays a minor role in the formulation of current outsourcing contracts.  
Failure to adequately transfer skills could render the municipality vul-
nerable to being “locked-in” to using only external service providers 
and not having a real choice at the completion of a contract. This is 
exacerbated the longer a contract endures. For essential services par-
ticularly it is highly undesirable for a municipality to be in a position 
where it becomes incapable of performing the service itself. This as-
pect should thus be treated more scientifically in municipal outsourc-
ing contracts. 





Department of Provincial and Local Government (1998) White Paper on Lo-
cal Government 
Department of Provincial and Local Government (2000) White Paper on 
Municipal Services Partnerships 
IMF (2004) Public-Private Partnerships Prepared by Fiscal Affairs Depart-
ment in consultation with other departments, the World Bank and the In-
ter-American Development Bank (approved by Ter-Minassian, T. March 
2004) 
National Treasury (2004) Standardised Public-Private Partnership Provi-
sions Practice Note Number 01 of 2004,  First Issue: 11 March 2004 (is-





Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 
Water Services Act 108 of 1997 




V  Some for all forever? A policy analysis of the es-







1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This paper examines the gaps between the policy and the implementa-
tion of a set of new water management arrangements for the city of 
Johannesburg over the last five years. These arrangements, often 
loosely and imprecisely referred to as ‘privatisation’, must be placed 
in the broader context of the trans-national expansion of a new type of 
Multinational Corporation, specialised in the construction, operation 
and maintenance of urban services. At the same time, they must be 
placed against the background of a generalised global policy shift en-
tailing the sanctioning of a greater role of the private sector in service 
delivery (albeit with the precise mix of state and market differing from 
one country to another). Against this background the concrete experi-
ences of individual cities provide important material that can be util-
ised to reflect on the policy assumptions embedded in the various 
‘models’ of privatisation, which include: concessions, joint ventures, 
and management contracts to mention a few.  
In the case of Johannesburg, major issues permeated the policy 
debate in relation to equity (inequalities in access to water supply and 
sanitation in the city), efficiency (a bureaucratic, unresponsive and 
bankrupt service delivery institution) and sustainability (the city draws 
water from a complex mix of water transfer schemes extending 400km 
into the hinterland). Sparked by a city-wide crisis in 1997, the city’s 
transformation programme (iGoli 2002) resulted in the establishment 
of a partnership programme or co-production of water services be-
tween the local state, an independent utility, and a private consortium, 
bound together by a series of contracts and monitoring arrangements. 
Through these means it was hoped that a ring-fenced private entity 
                                                 
♠  Phd. student, Radboud University. 
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could leverage private development capital on the open market, in-
crease the efficiency of service delivery, and assist the government in 
achieving its electoral promise of achieving universal access to water 
supply and sanitation.  
Muddling with organograms, however, is a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition for institutional change. The end result of Johannes-
burg’s new water arrangements is much more the result of a highly 
political process of interactions between government, the new utility 
and actors in civil society than it is the result of technocratic system-
tweaking. This paper looks at the original policy goals from the point 
of view of the actual events that took place and evaluates these from 
the point of view of the professed advantages of ‘privatising’ water 
services. 
The paper has two parts. In part one, the scene is set by asking a 
number of important preliminary questions – what is privatisation ex-
actly, what is the current position of South African law on the privati-
sation of water management, what is the current global trend on the 
privatisation of water services, and what were the challenges facing 
the city of Johannesburg when its leaders decided to embark on the 
new journey in water management?  In part two, the story is told of 
the transformation of Johannesburg’s water management institutions, 
with particular emphasis on the gap between the policy outcomes that 
emerged and the original goals that had been set by initiating the 
transformation.    
 
 
2. SETTING THE SCENE 
 
2.1  Unpacking the concept of privatisation 
 
To tackle the first question, then, is to enter the debate on privatisation 
by defining the term itself. Unfortunately, the term has become heav-
ily loaded in a political sense and it has been used to describe such a 
wide variety of situations that it is no longer quite clear what the term 
means. Privatisation can for example be used in a positive sense, 
which is, the pursuit of greater efficiency of production of goods and 
services. It can also be used in a negative sense, for instance, as the 
abdication of authority by government and the ‘sellout’ of publicly 
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held goods. Also, it can either refer to the transfer of ownership of in-
frastructure or to the retention of ownership but the transfer of opera-
tional control to another party.  
Given this diversity of interpretations, defining the term is best 
done in a negative sense, which is by describing what privatisation is 
not. The Oxford dictionary does this by describing privatisation as 
‘denationalisation’, or the relinquishing of state control.  
This leaves open both the question to what degree control is relin-
quished, as well as the question what aspects of control are relin-
quished. It is also noteworthy that by referring to ‘control’ one side-
steps the issue of ‘ownership’ as an element of privatisation. Clearly, 
two scenarios are possible in which control over water infrastructure 
is in private hands and the ownership of the infrastructure is public in 
the one case and private in the other.   
These two scenarios involve very different sets of institutional re-
lationships between the state and the private sector, and yet they are 
both privatisation by virtue of the transfer of control from the state to 
the private sector. Clearly, the defining term here is ‘control’. While 
ownership of an asset is a means to exert control it does not in itself 
guarantee it. Therefore, with regard to privatisation, it would be logi-
cal to conclude that the issue of ownership is only important insofar as 
it affects control.   
‘Privatisation’, then, is a broad term, interchangeable with the 
concept of denationalisation. It is a domain, or a basket, denoting 
commonality in respect of reduced state control, but equally and as 
importantly containing diversity. Within the basket of privatisation or 
denationalisation initiatives that can be observed around the world, 
there are a wide range of different institutional arrangements for the 
division of tasks between the public and the private sector. We can 
proceed to define privatisation as follows: The term ‘privatisation’ 
denotes a wide range of methods by which previously public goods 
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Privatisation covers a spectrum: 
 
• The extreme case in which both ownership and control of 
public goods is transferred to the private sector; 
• Long term transfer of control (concession): ownership 
remains in public hands but control is transferred for a 
long period, typically thirty years; 
• Short term transfer of control (management contract): 
ownership remains in public hands and control is trans-
ferred for a limited period; 
• Both ownership and control remain in public hands but 
private sector elements (performance bonuses and ‘incen-
tivisation’) are introduced into the operation of a govern-
ment department. 
 
Two final points need to be made on the concept from a practical 
point of view.  First, it should be noted that in the great majority of 
cases, ownership of infrastructure remains in public hands. In practice, 
it is rare for the ownership to be transferred to the private sector. This 
is important, because all too often privatisation is equated by the anti-
globalisation movement with a ‘sellout’ by government, which in 
technical terms it is usually not. Second, by focussing the debate on 
‘privatisation’, an important issue is often forgotten, namely that in the 
provision of services it is possible for the state to enter into a partner-
ship with other kinds of civil society organisations that may or may 
not operate for profit. In South Africa, Rand Water Board, a non-profit 
entity, supplies bulk water to some 20 million consumers. It has 
enormous human resource capacity, know-how, capital, and is well 
versed in interactions with local governments. Why then should a ter-
minological manoeuvre exclude the examination of partnerships be-
tween the state and these kinds of organisations? For that matter 
Mvula Trust, a similarly non-profit organisation, has a long and suc-
cessful history of partnering with rural communities in the construc-
tion, operation and maintenance of domestic water supply schemes. 
Similarly, focussing the debate on ‘privatisation’ excludes the exami-
nation of other forms of partnership that may deliver results in very 
different and instructive ways.  I would submit the idea that concen-
trating the debate on Ostrom’s concept of co-production is a more ap-
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propriate manner of examining privatisation (and other ways of pro-
ducing public goods). Ostrom defines co-production thus: ‘Co-
production is a process through which inputs from individuals who are 
not ‘in’ the same organisation are transformed into goods and ser-
vices’.1 
 
The joint production of public goods by the state together with organi-
sations in civil society does not necessarily mean that the latter institu-
tions operate on a for-profit basis. ‘Privatisation’ is a special case 
within this group of institutional set-ups. It is worth examining on its 
own, but doing so should not occlude the fact that there are other 
forms of partnership that are equally worth examining.    
 
2.2  Privatisation in South African law 
 
Raising the issue of privatisation in the South African context needs to 
be done with a particular amount of care, as there are multiple and 
contradictory legal processes emerging from a number of government 
departments. On the one hand the water law review process initiated 
by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) in 1996 
culminated in the promulgation of the National Water Act of 1998 
(Water Act).2  This Act effectively nationalised the South African 
fresh water bulk, which had historically been largely privately con-
trolled.3  
On the other hand, the Department of Provincial and Local Gov-
ernment initiated the development and promulgation of the Municipal 
Systems Act of 2000,4 which enabled Municipalities to enter into 
partnerships with external ‘Water Services Providers’ for the provi-
sion of domestic (and industrial) water supply and sanitation.5 This 
ushered the ‘privatisation’ period into local water management in the 
                                                 
1  Ostrom Elinor Ostrom (1996): Crossing the great divide: co production, syn-
ergy, and development. Article published in World Development vol. 24 no. 6 
of 1996.  
2  Act 36 of 1998. 
3  Schmitz 1999, Vos 1972, Rabie 1989.  
4  Act 32 of 2000.  
5  Schmitz 1999, Vos 1972, Rabie 1989. 
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country. Given these two apparently contradictory processes, what can 
be said about the current status of water management? 
Firstly, it should be noted that as stated above, South African wa-
ter has been nationalised, not privatised. Historically the riparian doc-
trine enshrined private control over water in South Africa. In 1814 the 
British took formal possession of the Cape colony, and from this point 
onwards British and American law began to creep into the Roman-
Dutch system that had prevailed until then. A tremendously important 
court case was heard in 1850 (Retief versus Louw)6 in which the judge 
pronounced that water was common to all riparian owners and, fol-
lowing the American example, should be shared proportionally 
amongst all the landowners along the stream. This decision introduced 
riparian law into South Africa and effectively ‘privatised’ South Afri-
can water.7  However, as I have argued elsewhere8, this situation of 
private rural control over water resources was untenable in the context 
of increasing water scarcity and ongoing urban development, and the 
subsequent history of water law was in fact in the direction of increas-
ing national control. This history was subdivided (roughly) into three 
phases marked each by the promulgation of a new water Act – the 
1918 Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act, the 19569 Water Act 
and the 1998 Water Act. Each time the new epoch of water law repre-
sented an overhauled view of the role of water in the economy, and 
the economy shifted from the dominance of agriculture through that of 
mining to that of the urban-industrial conglomerates. Each time a 
completely new framework was required to match the new economic 
reality. And through time the process chipped away at private control 
until finally in 1998 ownership of water was vested in the symbolic 
hands of the state president. ‘Partisan’ legislation which favoured the 
allocation of a scarce resource to white agriculture or white commer-
cial interests has made way for a more open ended system via catch-
ment management in which centralist and technocratic allocation 
mechanisms have made way for democratic settlements amongst 
stakeholders. This process ran roughly as follows:  
                                                 
6  See Schmitz 1999, Vos 1972 
7  See for instance Vos 1978; Rabie 1989. 
8  Act 54 of 1956. 
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• From 1652 to 1815 water was res omnium publicae or 
common property under Roman Dutch law as introduced 
by the dutch settlers; 
• After Retief versus Louw, in the period from 1815 to 1998, 
riparian law held sway; 
• The judge declared that water should be shared propor-
tionally amongst the landowners along a stream; 
• This legal process was formalised after Union with the 
promulgation of the Irrigation and Conservation of Waters 
Act of 1912; 
• As the name of the Act suggests, irrigation farming had a 
particularly high status within the group of stakeholders 
wishing to gain access to the resource;  
• By 1956 urban development and the growth of the mining 
industry forced national intervention to wrest some of the 
control out of irrigators hands and provide burgeoning 
municipalities with rights vis-à-vis the needs of their in-
dustries and residents.  
• The 1956 Water Act achieved a greater balance between 
diverse white commercial interests; 
• From 1956 onward growing social inequalities required 
national intervention in access to water for basic human 
needs; apartheid relocated millions of South Africans to 
arid areas with very sparse water supplies; 
• The increasing scarcity of water led to escalating conflicts 
between stakeholders and required collective rather than 
centralist planning (Catchment Management Agencies); 
• In 1998 water was effectively nationalised through the 
1998 Water Act.  
 
Overall, then, the historical trend in South African water law has been 
in the direction of increasing state control over water, resulting ulti-
mately in its nationalisation rather than its privatisation. Why, then, is 
there such an active debate about the privatisation of South Africa’s 
water services? 
The answer to this question would seem to lie in the fragmentary 
nature of the state. Interventions of one state department may be in the 
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opposite direction to the interventions of another. Thus while one 
government department may be engaged in maximising state control 
over water resources, another may be engaged in increasing private 
control. And in fact, this is what has happened in South Africa. While 
the Water Resource Management Division of DWAF was developing 
the 1998 Water Act, the Water Services Division of the same depart-
ment was developing the Water Services Act of 1997.10 The latter Act 
made a distinction between ‘water services authorities’ and ‘water 
service providers’, paving the way for public-private partnerships in 
municipal water supply and sanitation management.  The deep crisis 
in the finances of most of South Africa’s municipalities had raised the 
question of how the rollout of new water supply infrastructure was 
going to be financed, given that access to water is a constitutionally 
guaranteed right. It was hoped that through public-private partnerships 
government might leverage private capital for development purposes, 
increase the efficiency of service delivery, and relieve local govern-
ment of some budgetary stress.  These ideas were not new; rather, they 
are part and parcel of a global process which might be termed the 
‘globalisation of local government’.  What is this new policy think-
ing? 
 
2.3  The globalisation of local government 
 
The transformation of Johannesburg is in many ways linked to the 
trans-national expansion of a new type of Multinational Corporation, 
specialised in the construction, operation and maintenance of urban 
services. Thus, for instance, this new-era multinational could special-
ise in areas such as urban refuse removal, electricity distribution, 
transport, water supply, water purification, or it could provide combi-
nations of such services in combined packages. The genesis of the 
new urban services multinational is rooted in events in Europe and the 
United States in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, and has different 
specific origins in the various countries. A common theme amongst 
them is a shift in the approach of local government in the provision of 
service relative to the past. In all cases, the shift has been towards the 
sanctioning of a greater role of the private sector in service delivery, 
                                                 
10  Act 108 of 1997. 
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but the precise mix of state and market has differed from country to 
country. Both in the United States and in Great Britain, co-production 
initiatives were linked to the desire to cut back on public expenditure, 
as well as to the desire to ‘free’ or ‘create space’ for the market and 
increase the overall efficiency of service provision. In both countries, 
also, co-production was seen as a means to combat urban decay and 
the idea thus had a specifically urban bent.11  
In some cases, the model followed was for local government to 
withdraw and to sell or contract out various aspects of service provi-
sion to the private sector. In great Britain, for instance, state-owned 
infrastructural assets were subdivided and sold to the private sector.  
In France, local government remained the owner of the water supply 
infrastructure, but the operation and maintenance of systems was 
transferred to the private sector under a series of concessions. In other 
cases, rather than the state pulling back and allowing a greater role for 
the private sector, local government itself was restructured and re-
modelled along principles normally associated with the private sector. 
Thus in the Netherlands and Germany, local government introduced 
incentives for cost-cutting and efficiency gains, without relinquishing 
government authority over service delivery.  
This shift in the approach of western local government is currently 
having a major effect upon the provision of urban service around the 
world. In many middle and lower income countries, local government 
transformation is being driven on the one hand by a weak financial 
position and on the other hand by outdated and inadequate infrastruc-
ture. Rural-urban migration and population growth has placed pres-
sure on urban infrastructure, and decision makers in many municipali-
ties are faced with difficult choices with regard to the trade offs be-
tween extending service provision to the un-served as against mainte-
nance of the existing infrastructure. This takes place against the back-
ground of stressed municipal budgets and many competing and urgent 
needs. Co-production arrangements are often considered against the 
background of the prospect of enticing investment from foreign com-
panies in infrastructure development, and of leveraging private sector 
capital for social and economic development. 
                                                 
11  See Weaver & Manning 1991.  
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On the other hand, transformation is being driven by foreign corpora-
tions based in a number of western countries, assisted in some cases 
by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. Historically, be-
cause of the rollback of the state in urban services provision in the 
United States, Great Britain, France and Spain, new markets were cre-
ated in Europe and America that enabled the genesis and expansion of 
private companies with expertise in amongst other things urban water 
supply and sanitation  provision. These companies expanded within 
the borders of the nation states in which they came into existence 
through a variety of mechanisms. These situations, though different in 
approach, all had the same overall effect, creating space for the emer-
gence of specialised firms that could tender for contracts in different 
geographical areas.  
Next, the drive for increased profits led to a gradual increase in the 
scale of the activities of the more successful companies. Having 
reached the upper limits of the growth capacity within their respective 
countries (for instance water is now 75 percent privatised in France), 
they subsequently began to expand across national borders, creating a 
series of new multinational companies specialised in urban services 
provision. Thus, again taking examples from the water sector, the 
CEO of Britain’s Thames Water is currently aiming to source one 
third of the company’s revenue from outside Great Britain.12 These 
companies are currently estimated to earn an annual US $ 400 billion 
in revenues from sales. The world’s leading company, Suez (previ-
ously Suez Lyonnaise), based in Paris, accounted for US $ 39 billion 
in 1999.13 At the current level, the world private water industry is 40 
percent of the size of the world oil industry and 30 percent larger than 
the world pharmaceutical industry. Leveraging some of the capital 
generated by such companies for urban development purposes is an 
enticing prospect for many urban planners.  So too is South Africa, 
where many municipalities were facing dire financial problems, and 
where the new political elite had been elected into power under the 
umbrella of a programme promising to vastly expand and upgrade 
service provision to the poorer section of the community. 
 
                                                 
12  See The Economist, 25/03/2000.  
13  Ibid. 
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3.   TRANSFORMING JOHANNESBURG’S WATER MANAGEMENT 
 
3.1  The restructuring of services in the city 
 
Since 1997, there has been an ongoing debate about the overall gov-
ernance structure of the city of Johannesburg which eventually led to a 
fundamental restructuring of the institutions that manage services in 
the city. This of course includes water services: water services are a 
politically important but institutionally relatively small part of the 
overall transformation of the city. The city’s transformation pro-
gramme has resulted in the establishment of a partnership programme 
or co-production of water services between the local state, an inde-
pendent utility, and a private consortium, bound together by a series of 
contracts and monitoring arrangements. The most important rationale 
that the administration of the city had for embarking upon an institu-
tional restructuring was the unfolding of a financial crisis. This crisis   
was beginning to paralyse the key functions of the administration at a 
time when political promises had been made to extend and upgrade 
services. This financial crisis, then, was the direct cause of a transfor-
mation programme that included the creation of an independent water 
utility and the farming out of the management of this utility to a pri-
vate consortium.14 
In 1997 Johannesburg’s income had been reduced by R 2,1 billion 
in arrears owed to the city , spending was restrained by a budget defi-
cit of R 300 million, and the city had an overdraft of R 405 million.15 
The city had developed large backlogs in the rollout of new infrastruc-
ture, and had for the last year not maintained existing facilities. When 
a team of consultants was called in to analyse the situation, they de-
clared that the unification of Johannesburg in 1995 had resulted in a 
bloated and inefficient administration.16 The city put forward a plan, 
known as iGoli 2002, which envisaged the abolition of the four local 
councils, the rationalisation of the city’s management team, the cut-
                                                 
14  Fihla 2001. 
15  Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 2000. 
16  The 1995 local elections integrated the eleven separate administrations created 
by apartheid into one, but this was divided into four metropolitan sub-structures 
which were presided over by a central council. It was this layering of councils 
that led to proposals for a ‘unicity’ under one mayor.    
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ting back of the scope of management to policy formulation, the regu-
lation of contracts and the monitoring of service delivery. Each line 
function was to be ring-fenced in financial terms, meaning that the 
responsibility for financial control lay not with the central finance de-
partment but within each department itself. 
A key element in the new ring-fencing programme was the crea-
tion of ten independent service provider companies, legally structured 
into either utilities, agencies or corporatised entities (UAC’s). These 
entities, which had previously been departments within the municipal-
ity and had featured on the municipal budget, would be transformed 
into business enterprises and held at (financial) arms-length from the 
‘core’ policy work of the council and its support institutions. This par-
ticular element of the Igoli 2002 programme was particularly contro-
versial, as it went to the core of tensions within the ANC-SACP-
COSATU17 alliance in which the SACP and COSATU were feeling 
increasingly aliened from a body of government policy that was taking 
an increasingly pro-market stance. From October 1999 onwards, the 
iGoli 2002 plans led to growing tensions between the Johannesburg 
Council and organisations opposed to the privatisation of municipal 
services such as the South African Communist Party and the South 
African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU). SAMWU in particular 
embarked upon a programme of mass action in which it made vocal its 
opposition to iGoli 2002 in general and in which it used each concrete 
step taken by the council in the direction of restructuring as an oppor-
tunity to organise strikes and protest marches.18 iGoli was particularly 
threatening to SAMWU, as it was not yet clear at the time how many 
of the city’s workers would retain their jobs as municipal workers af-
ter transformation, and SAMWU stood to lose a large number of 
members. 
Three of the restructured entities were to become utilities, operat-
ing in a monopoly market and raising their own revenue. These were 
the utilities for water, electricity and waste management. They were to 
operate under license from Council and would be run by a board of 
directors appointed by Council. Legally the utilities were to exist as 
                                                 
17  African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and the Con-
gress of South African Trade Unions alliance. 
18  Hlubi 2003. 
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‘Municipal Business Enterprises’, an institutional concept which re-
fers to a private company (legally registered as a company and operat-
ing on profit principles) operating under contract to the municipality. 
By separating the financial statements of the utility from those of the 
Municipality, it was hoped that loans for capital development could be 
raised in markets to which the Municipality could under normal cir-
cumstances not gain access. In addition, some of the profits generated 
by the restructuring of the utilities into private companies would ac-
crue to the Municipality through company dividends, as the munici-
pality was to be the monopoly shareholder in the companies. Cru-
cially, however, as will be seen later, the municipality was thereby 
also divesting itself of the responsibility for institutions which were 
also its key source of income.  
Several mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that the Mu-
nicipality retains its influence over the utility. The first, as mentioned 
earlier, is the fact that the city is the sole shareholder of the utility. 
Secondly, the city appoints the governing board of the utility. Third, 
each utility operates under a service contract which stipulates service 
targets that are in line with overall Municipal policy on the provision 
of water, electricity and waste removal. These targets include such 
items as the rollout of new services or the improvement of existing 
services to previously disadvantaged communities, and broad policy 
parameters with regard to the setting of tariffs.19  Fourth, the city es-
tablished a Contract Management Unit tasked with monitoring the ad-
herence of each utility to terms of the agreement in the service con-
tract. 
 
3.2 Winning the tender  
 
The new water services utility was named Johannesburg Water (JW), 
a legal person registered on 21 November 2000 and a consolidated 
organisation created by the merger of the water departments of the 
five municipalities that constituted Greater Johannesburg between 
1995 and 2000. Its staff complement is some 2600 persons, its client 
base is essentially the population of Johannesburg, estimated at some 
                                                 
19  For example, a stepped tariff that increases the cost with the volume used, 
thereby subsidising small scale (read ‘poor’) users.  
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3 million people, and its annual turnover is R 1.9 billion. The formal 
launch of the utility took place on 22 February 2001, by which time a 
management contract had been signed with the Johannesburg Water 
Management Company (JOWAM), the consortium that won the Mu-
nicipal tender to implement the council’s plans.  
The tender provided for a twelve-person team from the winning 
consortium to join the workers employed by Johannesburg Water and 
drive the transformation into an efficient and market-oriented utility. 
This twelve-person team became the executive of the newly created 
utility, and in terms of the contract between the utility and the execu-
tive, each member of the executive had his or her own separate con-
tract which could be anything up to five years in duration. Towards 
the end of this person’s period of service in the utility, recruitment and 
mentorship would take place such that by the end of the five year con-
tract all senior executives of the company had been replaced by local 
counterparts. In many other towns and cities throughout the world a 
concession of long (usually thirty years) duration is given to the con-
tracted party in order to leverage multinational capital and apply it to-
wards the improvement and expansion of services. In Johannesburg’s 
case, this was not felt to be necessary because at a water wastage level 
of 30 percent for the city as a whole, any investments in the efficiency 
of the system would rapidly repay themselves through the potentially 
massive reduction in company overheads of the same 30 percent. At 
the level of policy expectations, it was hoped that surpluses generated 
through these efficiency gains would register as dividends to Council 
at the end of each financial year, which Council could largely reinvest 
in the further expansion and improvement of water services but which 
could also be drawn on by Council to spend on other line items on the 
Council budget. However, such an improvement in efficiency would 
require a rapid transformation in the management approach of the 
company, and hence the tender put out was for a five year contract to 
a management team with the necessary expertise to turn around the 
company in a short space of time. In short, the main intention of 
bringing in these companies was to bring in management expertise 
rather than investment, and that the application of this expertise would 
improve services while generating revenue for Council.   
The winning consortium consisted of the British multinational 
Northumbrian with 51 percent shares, the French multinational Suez 
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Lyonnaise with 20 percent  shares, and the South African Water Sup-
ply and Sanitation South Africa / Group Five with the remaining 29 
percent. Their international competitors were the French company 
Vivendi and the British company Thames Water. Thames Water had 
bid at an incentive of 5 percent, which was the municipal maximum, 
Vivendi had bid at an incentive of 1,25 percent and the winning 
JOWAM had bid at an incredible incentive of 0,18 percent. According 
to Kenny Fihla, the contract was awarded to JOWAM on the basis of 
two considerations. The first was the reputation of Northumbrian in 
their rapid response mechanisms for client service - an important as-
pect of the public face of the municipality. The bottom line for the 
Council, however, was the price at which JOWAM offered itself:  
 
The second thing is that they came in, in our view not to make 
money – we think they were desperate to get a foothold in South 
Africa because they had lost the Durban bid by far…despite being 
highly reputable, despite having all these skills and so on – in fact 
they are the second biggest international water company – they 
were by far the cheapest20                        
 
Northumbrian and Suez Lyonnaise thus obtained their much wanted 
foothold on South African soil, and they did so in a very important 
area in water turnover terms. With a population of 3 million people, 
Johannesburg is the largest city in South Africa, consuming 1600 
megalitres of water per day, and representing a potential annual turn-
over for the contractor of R 1.9 billion. 
 
3.3  Regulating the utility   
 
Having identified a suitable candidate with whom to enter into part-
nership, it remained for the municipality to bed down a structured pat-
tern of interaction that was to give effect to the public-private partner-
ship. Both the regulating and the regulated party needed to come to 
grips with the channels of communication that had been opened and 
the central subject matter of the discourse emerging between the par-
ties. One official described it as follows:  
 
                                                 
20  Fihla 2001. 
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Once the board was established a business plan was formulated 
[on an annual basis, T.S.] The Contract Management Unit [of the 
city, T.S.] had to come to grips with understanding business plans, 
for which it shares formal responsibility with Council and our 
portfolio committee. We meet with Jo’burg Water in the following 
manner: on a monthly basis we have a Municipal Entities Portfolio 
Committee which is chaired by an ANC Councillor and is made 
up of the other political parties. It makes recommendations which 
are put forward for approval to the mayoral committee. Once a 
month JW has to be present, and issues and report are presented 
around critical areas of service delivery and regulatory issues. We 
develop a whole range of compliance and client issues – we deal 
with tariffs, we deal with service delivery, and we deal with all the 
regulatory legislative parameters set by the national department. In 
the business plan are key performance areas, which are developed 
into key performance indicators with measurement tools. And 
baseline indicators, followed by the targets to be achieved. Our 
monitoring and evaluation now is in relation to those things. In 
addition to those things there are legislative parameters that set 
minimum standards of delivery that must be adhered to for water 
and sanitation21. 
 
A double contract structure was created to give effect to both the short 
and the long term goals of the utility. One contract is between the util-
ity and the city (Johannesburg Metro-Johannesburg Water), which is a 
twenty five year contract along the lines of a classical concession. The 
aim of this contract is to create the room for manoeuvre necessary for 
the utility to recoup the costs incurred in large scale infrastructure in-
vestments and make profits over the long term despite these costs. The 
second contract runs between the utility and its so-called ‘manage-
ment operator’ (Johannesburg Water-JOWAM), or the elite guard 
drawn from the winning consortium who are to transform the ethos 
and business practices of the organisation driven by incentives in the 
form of individual performance bonuses on termination of contract. 
This second contract is then just a management service, involving the 
(re)deployment of human resources rather than capital. The manage-
ment team thus established forms the executive of the utility for the 
five years of the contract and empowers the workers and draws inter-
national expertise into the project.22 The executive of JW is sourced 
                                                 
21  Jameel 2003.  
22  Lautre 2002. 
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from JOWAM and counted fifteen people at inception each with dif-
ferent lengths of contract but up to a maximum of five years, which 
signals the end of the management contract with the consortium. The 
team was approximately half South African and half expatriate.     
Johannesburg Water was thus created as an independent entity op-
erating under contract to the city of Johannesburg. Once the core ad-
ministrative centre of the city had cut itself off from the service deliv-
ery entities it had created, however, the question was how these enti-
ties would be brought back under some form of de facto control by the 
city. For this purpose two ‘docking units’ were created: the Contract 
Management Unit (CMU) and the Shared Services Centre (SSC). 
These docking units were created in a rather ad hoc fashion and their 
emergence created uproar within the upper echelons of the embryonic 
service delivery units. The units had been promised both implementa-
tion autonomy within the limits of their service delivery agreements 
and ring-fenced finances. These now seemed threatened by the emer-
gence of a series of oversight institutions. These units were to provide 
support functions to the city’s CEO, or its head of admin, in liaising 
with the service providers and ensuring certain commonalities such as 
common billing of residents, about which more will be stated below. 
 
3.3.1  The Contract Management Unit 
The CMU was rapidly established within the administration of the 
city.  Its key task was to translate the policy objectives of the munici-
pal government into a series of performance indicators and service 
targets for the newly independent institutions with which the city had 
entered into contracts. Thus the ‘efficiency gains’ of a lean and mean 
city immediately led to the creation of new administrative structures to 
monitor and regulate service delivery which, it was originally hoped, 
would function autonomously and relieve some of the pressures on the 
administration. But the CMU itself was not yet clear about its own 
identity: 
 
When we established all these companies, which was in the year 
2000-2001 ..[…].. someone said hey how are we going to oversee 
the performance of these entities so it was a bit late in the day that 
they realised that we need to establish a contract management 
unit..[…]..and it was established with a very rudimentary structure 
and functionality – when I say rudimentary functionality I mean 
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that suddenly two or three people had to grasp what the role of this 
unit was all about, so what they did was they absorbed anything 
and everything that had to do with these companies into the unit 23. 
 
The atmosphere of haste surrounding the functions of the CMU con-
tinued for some time: on the one hand it was designed to perform an 
absolutely pivotal task in orchestrating much of the institutional re-
structuring that the city was to undergo.24 On the other hand precisely 
this pivotal role became a bottleneck in view of the multiplicity of 
tasks with which the unit was burdened. It was faced with the estab-
lishment of entities that could report to the city on milestones 
achieved while simultaneously forging ahead on implementation of 
service delivery amid the complexities of monitoring and data collec-
tion on a new, reliable and city-wide basis. Given the initially small 
team whose job it was to manage this process, workload was in excess 
of production capacity and priorities had to be made. In the end, it was 
the monitoring function that took the back seat as new relations were 
forged and the governing boards of the newly established entities were 
put in place. 
 
We spent at least eighty percent of our time doing shareholder is-
sues - the regulatory issues kicked in about eight months ago [i.e. 
Sept. 2002, T.S.] through the quarterly reports where we started to 
monitor service delivery issues pertaining to each utility. There 
were only four to five key specialists in the unit - it was a tiny unit 
which did not have the resources to go forward… […].. if you 
think about three to four people tasked with twelve companies to 
oversee for the total - the city’s budget is R 10 billion of which 
70% is under the control of this unit, so we oversee R 7 billion. 
Four to five specialised people (supported by administrative staff) 
were required to fulfil that mandate. So something had to give, and 
the thing that took a back seat was the compliance and regulatory 
side.25 
 
Thus, whereas the name ‘Contract Management Unit’ suggests a pri-
marily technical process, in actual fact the CMU found itself embark-
ing upon a range of institution building measures before it could begin 
                                                 
23  Govender 2003. 
24  That is, the transformation of the municipal units providing services to the city;    
25  Govender 2003. 
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to manage contracts. In building these institutions, the CMU found 
itself faced by a number of paradoxes:  
 
• The utility had to be ‘independent’ from and yet ‘responsive’ 
to council;  
• The financially ‘ring fenced’ utility had to enter into financial 
relations with the city; and 
• The CMU was both a shareholder keen to maximise the inde-
pendence of the utility and a manager laying down restrictive 
conditions under which the utility had to perform.  
  
The CMU’s director expressed the latter paradox as follows:  
 
We held two conflicting roles immediately - one was the share-
holder role and one was the compliance and regulatory role – so 
we were kind of what they call schizophrenic - we sat on the 
boards when it suited them and when they needed a shareholder 
we performed that role as the shareholder representative. And at 
the same time we were also asked to do the regulatory function, 
but over that twelve months we never got to do the monitoring of 
the regulatory and compliance element effectively – what we es-
sentially did for that twelve months was to spend our role on 
shareholder activities like corporate governance and financial sus-
tainability of the companies and overseeing the performance of the 
companies from an operational and financial point of view and so 
forth26. 
 
Again, given the stressed conditions under which the CMU had to 
work in its start-up period, it was necessary to prioritise issues, and the 
most pressing issue of institution building, or the shareholder side of 
the CMU identity, took centre stage. However, as the utility began to 
take form, the identity of the CMU as a monitor of contracts resur-
faced and the dual identity became manifest as a problem within the 
organisation. Rather than resolving the organisation’s dilemma, how-
ever, it was in fact split in two with each subsection retaining one of 
the organisation’s previous identities:  
 
  
                                                 
26  Govender 2003. 
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After twelve months this issue of the conflict emerged and we en-
gaged a team using USAID funding to help us unpack the roles, 
with the result that we have a shareholder strategic plan and a 
CMU strategic plan which says: we could not perform our moni-
toring as effectively as we would have liked to because we had to 
bed down systems within the unit around shareholder issues which 
was never done before in the history of municipalities in South Af-
rica or Africa for that matter. So we spent that time but in parallel 
to that process we were doing things in a very ad hoc manner, as 
the Council had requested data on monitoring service delivery and 
regulatory issues on tariffs and so forth we took them as they came 
along but we spent at least eighty percent of our time doing share-
holder issues - the regulatory issues kicked in about eight months 
ago through the quarterly reports where we started to monitor ser-
vice delivery issues pertaining to each utility..[..]…  These strate-
gic plans have now been approved, and Council has approved a 
split of the CMU into a shareholder unit and a contract manage-
ment unit – so we are now embarking on a monitoring and evalua-
tion programme for each of the entities, putting together key per-
formance indicators, key performance areas, and that is going to 
be the basis of overseeing the regulatory and compliance aspects 
together with the client issues around service delivery in the 
CMU.27 
 
All in all, the establishment of the CMU with its attendant practical 
problems in actually establishing a new set of institutional relations 
had the effect that in the first eighteen months of the utility’s exis-
tence, the CMU could not actually monitor service delivery on behalf 
of the city. There was a contractual agreement between the city and 
the utility that for the moment meant little in practice. But as institu-
tion building went ahead the CMU began to define the tasks that it 
was itself primarily tasked to do.  
 
3.3.2  The Shared Services Centre 
In a parallel process, the process of ring-fencing the finances of the 
UAC’s led to a series of dilemmas surrounding the control of munici-
pal income. By cutting its bond with the utilities, agencies and corpo-
rate entities, the city had effectively cut itself off from its main source 
of revenue; the sale of services to residents. Other than property taxes 
                                                 
27  Ibid.  
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and means tested income transfers from central government28 (the so-
called equitable share), local governments in South Africa only had 
the sale of services from which to finance ambitious infrastructure and 
service delivery programmes. In effect therefore, the creation of the 
UAC’s emptied the municipal coffers into the internal finances of the 
UAC’s with little more than a contract to steer the way in which they 
utilised these revenues.  Overnight, therefore, this created a problem 
of maintaining indirect control, which ostensibly was laid down in 
management contracts and service level agreements but which in fact 
created an immediate and urgent cash flow problem within the mu-
nicipality.  
On the one hand it was reasoned that the municipality remained 
sole shareholder of the water utility. As a result, it would be the sole 
beneficiary of the financial improvements that were the result of cut-
ting back on water losses and improving the rate collection system. On 
the other hand, the utility itself needed time to reorganise itself and it 
could be expected that it would take some time before JW began to 
make a significant profit. Therefore it could be reasonably expected 
that municipal income from the dividends of (amongst other entities) 
JW would take some time to materialise.  
The historical reality was that income from the water accounts was 
integrated into municipal accounts, and that revenue from water sales 
was utilised for purposes other than merely the operation and mainte-
nance costs of those institutions concerned with providing water ser-
vices in the city. An element of cross-subsidy to other organs within 
the municipality was a reality, even if the precise nature of this trans-
fer was not transparent. Cutting this source of income off therefore 
had the potential consequence that many non-water activities in the 
city would be threatened in their existence as the municipality would 
have to find short and long term solutions to the question where the 
substitute revenue was going to come from.  
In essence, therefore, the policy of ring - fencing was at odds with 
its short term consequences. The original intention had been to trans-
                                                 
28  The so-called ‘equitable share’ is a financial transfer from central government 
to local government that is dependent on the level of income a municipality has. 
It is by no means sufficient to replace income from sales of electricity or water. 
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fer the municipal water accounts to Johannesburg Water in batches of 
20 000: 
 
On the transfer of billing, in the original deal that we signed be-
tween Johannesburg Water and the City – the so-called Service 
Delivery Agreement - it was agreed that Johannesburg Water was 
to take over billing for water customers in an incremental manner, 
but that it would in fact take over the billing. That was to take 
eighteen months to two years, in data bases of which there are 
some sixty nine. We would take over one every three months, so 
that after a couple of years we were in control of our own reve-
nue29   
 
However, this plan entailed commencing the transfers at the bulk end 
by transferring the most voluminous commercial consumers first. 
Upon signing the Service Level Agreement (SLA), the transfer of da-
tabases did in fact commence. A total of fifteen thousand high-end 
customers were transferred to JW, representing 3 percent of the total 
of some 500 000 customers but because of the special status of the 
high-end consumers this 3 percent brought in about 33 percent of Jo-
hannesburg Water’s ultimate revenue from water sales.  However, this 
phased transfer of customers was brought to a halt by the city admini-
stration when it was realised what the consequences of continued 
transfer would be. At the same time that the ring-fenced entities were 
being established,  fence ‘cutters’ within the same administration were 
therefore ensuring that financial flows returned to the city or moved 
between one entity and another.  
A key landmark in this process was the establishment of the so-
called SSC, which was henceforth to handle the joint billing of all 
UAC’s in the city. This entity had not been envisaged in the original 
iGoli plan, and it was a stop-gap measure introduced to stem the flow 
of finances out of the municipal coffers. The chair of the municipal 
portfolio committee on water affairs describes the diluting of the ring-
fencing process as follows: 
 
Indeed, the intention was to ensure that these stand alone utilities 
are ring-fenced, that they are responsible for their customer base, 
they are responsible for the entire value chain, opening an account, 
                                                 
29  Still 2004. 
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providing a service, dealing, credit control, marketing, customer 
service, you name it.  But there are some technical issues which 
the city has to resolve first..[…].. But..[…]..in as much as we have 
the stand alone utilities, the issue of cross subsidisation in local 
government is a reality. For cleaning the streets for example, they 
are not charging any specific individual. For providing libraries, 
parks, the zoo and other public booths if you like which are com-
monly shared by the city of Johannesburg there must be some 
elements of cross-subsidisation because the truth is that it is Jo-
hannesburg Water and City Power which generate a surplus in 
their business. The rest really, they survive on the basis of subsi-
dies. Now the city cannot afford to say: we will only get a divi-
dend as a 100% shareholder of Johannesburg at the end of the fi-
nancial year. You can’t because we need to cross subsidise these 
services virtually on a month to month basis. Now what we have 
done is to ensure that the system is driven by a business plan 
which Johannesburg Water developed, and of course there is a 
Service Delivery Agreement between the city of Johannesburg and 
Johannesburg Water as a service provider, to say: these are the 
targets we are setting ourselves in terms of extending the infra-
structure, ensuring access, etc. etc. And then we will say: how 
much will it cost as water to achieve these targets, including oper-
ating expenses, the cap-ex, and all your running costs. Then the 
city guarantees those up front. But then the surplus goes back to 
the city as I have said, to pay for primary health care, libraries, 
parks, cemeteries, and everything else30 
 
The SSC was visualised as a unit which would handle all the billing of 
services provided to residents by the city. It is a centralised clearing 
house located within the municipal administration which handles cus-
tomer bills for key services such as water, electricity, refuse collection 
and so forth in an integrated manner. The great advantage of its exis-
tence from the point of view of the administration is that its revenue 
from service provision is unified and that there is therefore a single 
point of reference in as far as the city budget is concerned – a very 
important issue for a city struggling to balance its books. Revenue 
would thus remain under the control of the city, and the service pro-
viders such as the water utility would be paid for their services by the 
SSC.  
                                                 
30  Hlongwa 2003. 
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However, this was certainly not in line with the original iGoli vision 
of financially ring-fenced entities – on the contrary, it gave a new 
lease of life to a process of financial centralisation that had been tak-
ing place within the city for some time. In the immediate post-election 
period, after 1995, the city had been run by four metropolitan councils 
under the umbrella of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, 
which, paradoxically, had in fact been ring-fenced themselves. This 
created in each case ‘an administrative edifice that would be able to 
stand alone as a discrete entity’.31 In fact, the existence of multiple and 
independent administrative structures within the city was one of the 
key rationales for the iGoli 2000 plan which centralised the admini-
stration under one council partly in order to cut costs and remove inef-
ficiencies. 
The move to create a SSC dealt a serious blow to the relations that 
were being built up between the city and the ‘independent’ service 
providers: on the one hand entities such as the water utility were being 
given the freedom to run their organisations on a new set of principles 
and provided with the incentive to cut costs and begin to make a 
profit. On the other hand the financial means with which these entities 
were to carry out these improvements were kept out of their reach. 
The CEO of JW was incensed by the move, and it drew the attention 
of Johannesburg Water away from its core mission, replacing it by a 
struggle to regain the operating and development capital on which it 
had depended: 
 
We got the top customers, but we have not been able to take over 
more – we have had a big fight with the city on this but the long 
and the short of it is that they did not honour the agreement if you 
like – they kept the billing in the revenue unit of the city where 
there is a consolidated bill. All of that it is still being vigorously 
discussed because we would like to get control of more of our cus-
tomers - we don’t think it is an optimal solution for either our-
selves or the city - we think we can do better than them and we 
should get control over more of our customers so that it is under 
negotiation and we are not sure how things are going to turn out. 
The impact is that we feel we are getting less money – we feel we 
are losing more money as commercial billings that we would do 
ourselves. There are a lot of data problems to fix up – people who 
                                                 
31  City of Johannesburg 2001: 18. 
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are not on the data base, people who are getting incorrectly billed, 
people whose adjustments to their account are not going through, 
etc. – so what we would call commercial losses. The net result of 
that is that we feel we are losing money that we should be getting 
or that alternatively there is money to be got and that it will take a 
few years to fix this all up and it is being delayed. The net impact 
of less money is more pressure on the water tariffs for those peo-
ple who are paying and less money for rehabilitation of the net-
work32.     
 
Rather than becoming an independent for-profit entity, therefore, JW 
has become (or rather remains) an entity which needs to apply to the 
municipality for amongst other things the capital expenditures neces-





This paper has analysed a number of gaps between the policy and the 
implementation of a ‘privatisation’ project involving the restructuring 
of water services management in the city of Johannesburg. To do this, 
it has been first necessary to examine the concept of privatisation it-
self and to stress that the loose usage of the term has led to a situation 
in which it refers to a broad spectrum of different institutional ar-
rangements. What these usages do have in common is the idea that 
state control is relinquished to some degree. Also, in all but the most 
extreme practical cases the state does retain a significant amount of 
control over resource management but may partner with actors in civil 
society in the production of public goods. 
It was also deemed important to place the case of Johannesburg 
against the background of a global policy shift entailing the sanction-
ing of a greater role of the private sector in the production of public 
goods. This development has created the space necessary for the 
                                                 
32  till 2004. Govender puts it as follows: ‘We will have fights about us treading on 
their toes – they say we are trying to run their company – we are trying to un-
derstand the dynamics without interfering in their company too much – but the 
role of the city as a shareholder is such that if there are water bursts and when 
there are problems with sanitation the community comes to the mayor to com-
plain, they don’t go the JW’. 
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emergence of a number of multinational companies specialised in lo-
cal service delivery – or the ‘globalisation of local government’. For 
cities faced with dire financial constraints, the prospect of enticing a 
multinational or private consortium into long term investments in ur-
ban infrastructure is an attractive one.   
With regard to the ‘privatisation’ of Johannesburg’s water services 
it was argued that on many fronts, the historical trend is in fact in the 
direction of nationalisation, not privatisation. The evolution of South 
African water law shows a pattern of increasing state control over a 
scarce resource.  And while there are also policy tendencies sanction-
ing municipal service partnerships, in fact in Johannesburg the iGoli 
2002 plan has been frozen, Johannesburg Water has legal but not fi-
nancial autonomy, and ‘rationalisation has in fact led to the creation of 
new administrative structures such as the CMU and the SSC. The lo-
cal state has held back from its plan of farming out the management of 
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VI  Beyond the new South African water acts: inte-








1. INTRODUCTION: THE NEW WATER CONTEXT 
 
In international water circles, the 1998 South African National Water 
Act is praised as a model of progress. With its far-reaching provisions 
for minimum rights to drinking water, ensuring environmental flows 
and facilitating multi-stakeholder participation (MSP), it is obviously 
inspired by contemporary thinking on Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM). In tandem with IWRM, the South African 
government also seeks to promote social integration, remedying the 
racial rifts codified under apartheid. IWRM requires an integrated 
society1, but can legal and technical intervention do the trick on the 
ground? This article investigates a case study in rural South Africa 
focusing on an ambitious pipeline project bringing water to a dry area, 
combining irrigation and drink water issues. We shall first explain the 
rationale behind applying concepts such as IWRM and MSP in a wa-
ter-stressed environment, and how they are enshrined in institutional 
reform, especially that of building Water Users Associations in South 
                                                 
♣  Drs. B.W. Raven, PhD Researcher, Communication and Innovation Studies 
group, Wageningen University. The authors gratefully acknowledge the 
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 (www.nwb.nl), the Dutch Association of Water Boards (www.uvw.nl), 
Wageningen University (CEPIP-W) and the International Water Management 
Institute in Pretoria (www.iwmi.org). Dutch Partners for Water funded the 
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Catchment Management Project 
(MSP-ICM) at Wageningen University, in which context the present research 
took place. 
Drs. J. Warner, Project Coordinator Multi-stakeholder Platforms for Intergated 
Catchment Management, Irrigation and Water Engineering group, Wageningen 
University.  
1  Warner 2000. 
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Africa.2 After this we shall analyse the pipeline project. Investment in 
and improvement of the water infrastructure are a technical means to 
interlink the different uses and users. Pipelines can make entitlements 
to water rights and developmental aspirations real. But of course they 
also channel power, benefiting some rather than others. We shall indi-
cate how the project uncovered dormant tensions, often with a long 
history, showing up possibilities and pitfalls of integration in a deeply 
raven society. 
 
We will argue that it constitutes a rather great leap of faith to believe 
that the law can handle the many historic and contemporary conflicts 
between black and white, rich and poor amongst others.3 It reflects a 
belief in legal engineering that overlooks the need to address and fa-
cilitate conflict as an integral element of the process of change.4 
 
1.1 Water stress 
 
Agricultural scientists claim that to reduce hunger and poverty for a 
growing population the water supply, especially irrigation, must be 
increased by 15 to 20 percent in the coming 25 years. Environmental 
scientists state that water use needs to be reduced by 10 percent in the 
same period to protect rivers, lakes, and wetlands on which millions of 
people depend for their livelihoods and to cater for the growing de-
mands of cities and industries. Caught between equally desirable goals 
of productivity, equity, sustainability and stability, the different goals 
are not adding up thus creating water dilemmas.5 
Röling argues that the only way out of these conflicting goals in 
water resource management is bringing together multiple, and increas-
ingly interdependent stakeholders to negotiate and agree on collective 
action with respect to the sustainable water use and ecology. These 
processes of engaging different stakeholders in collective learning, 
problem solving and decision-making are often referred to as social 
                                                 
2  Raven 2003. 
3  Spiertz 2000. 
4  See for example Benda-Beckmann 1993 on concepts of social and legal engi-
neering. 
5  Röling 2002; Dialogue on Water, Food and Environment. 
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learning.6 The focus on stakeholder negotiation constitutes an alterna-
tive to two classical strategies in governance: on one side government 
and experts making decisions and solving our problems (political au-
thority), on the other side free market forces with minimal guidance of 
government (price mechanism). Failure at both ends of this spectrum 
of governance mechanisms has led to interest in more participatory 
forms of democratic government and self-organisation. We will 
briefly discuss IWRM and MSP as two interrelated concepts that are 
expected to lead the way.  
 
1.2 Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) 
 
Since the 1990s water is more and more being seen as an integrated 
ecological system. Following Mitchell,7 three levels of integrative 
water management can be distinguished. Firstly, a water system com-
prises components of groundwater, surface water, water quantity and 
quality. Each component may influence other components and there-
fore needs to be managed in an integrated way. A second level of in-
tegration addresses the interaction between water, land and the envi-
ronment, recognizing that changes in one field has consequences for 
the others. A third and even broader level is to approach integrated 
water management with reference to the interrelationships between 
water, water users and socio-economic developments in a certain re-
gion. Thus, IWRM is recognition of the complexity and dilemmas in 
water management. 
Despite broad acceptance of the IWRM concepts its actual imple-
mentation in practice is not a smooth and quick process but rather 
hesitant and unsystematic.8 Mitchell suggests that in the face of uncer-
tainty individuals are cautious and follow an incremental strategy in 
which they move forward slowly.  There is no blueprint to rely on and 
people need to adapt to the new circumstances.  
Integrated water management emphasizes on co-operation and co-
ordination because fragmentation and shared responsibilities are likely 
always to exist. Boundary realities at once become a barrier to and a 
                                                 
6  Woodhill & Röling 1998. 
7  Mitchell 1990: 1-21. 
8  Mitchell 1990. 
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rationale for integration.9 Kellow states rather than to stress the degree 
of fragmentation the adequacy of the coordinating mechanisms should 
be looked at, because that is the crucial test of institutional adequacy. 
He feels that the effectiveness of integrative management should be 
judged by judging the effectiveness of the coordinating mechanisms.10 
In the case study, therefore, we especially focus on the challenges of 
co-ordination across boundaries. 
 
1.3 Multi-Stakeholder Processes (MSP) 
 
To deal with water dilemmas presented and potentially intensified by 
IWRM, the growing divergence of stakes and the surfacing conflicts, 
IWRM philosophy proposes MSP. MSP is seen as a peaceful means to 
manage conflict and a means to create win-win situations11.  
In recent literature there seems to be considerable optimism about 
stakeholder participation and self-management to solve many of the 
problems of IWRM. Water users have more direct local information 
on the physical system and the system of rules governing its use. Less 
bureaucratic procedures are to be expected and stakeholders thought 
to be more motivated. Nevertheless, different nuances in this opti-
mism can be made especially concerning the dynamics of internal and 
external water politics of the different stakeholders. So far the existing 
literature has not provided a clear sense of benefits, costs and percep-
tion of farmers and different stakeholders in participating in Water 
                                                 
9  Eddison commented that the major management problems are always at 
boundaries (points and borders situated between states, levels of government, 
agencies, and department divisions). Definitive resolution of boundary prob-
lems is not possible because there are always several different and plausible ap-
proaches and every solution will have its weakness (Eddison, 1985:149). In 
many cases the call for integration and integrative management tends 
to lead to mergers and reorganizations (as happened with the Dutch Water 
Boards). For implementing integrated water management just reorganisation of 
(public) agencies is too simplistic. 
10  Kellow 1985: 188. 
11  Others are not so optimistic, seeing IWRM and MSP philosophy as a potential 
instrument to avoid politicisation (Wester & Warner 2002). They argue the 
terms suggest a non-existant neutrality and vagueness that renders it highly suit-
able for abuse by those in power. 
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Users Associations (WUAs).12 Ostrom argues that multi-stakeholder 
institutions do not function in a vacuum but are constituted and em-
bedded in a larger institutional framework (constitutional dimension, 
inter institutional relations). An institution has its own rules and prac-
tices of administration (governance and finance), and has a concrete 
impact (or lack of impact) on the ground.13 Several synthesis studies 
were carried out to identify design principles for success in (farmer) 
stakeholder participation in irrigation (Uphoff 1986, Vermillion 
1996). 
In various places across the globe the occurrence of multi- stake-
holder platforms (MSPs) is witnessed. Warner and Verhallen distin-
guish three main motivations for the emerging MSPs: 
 
• Improving of management capacity (a wider range of ideas, 
self-governance and self finance); 
• Accommodating different interests (social  learning, nego-
tiation, conflict prevention); and 
• Empowering disadvantaged people at the local level (de-
mocratisation of water management).14 
 
Institutional innovation in a complex social context is a process of 
meaningful change from divergence (conflict of interests) towards 
convergence (coordinated action). Institutional innovation in MSPs 
can be regarded as a process of renegotiating new institutional agree-
ments with a broad range of stakeholders involved. This is likely to 
bring conflict. We hold that there is unlikely to be meaningful change 
without conflict arising. A water conflict, however, is no isolated con-
flict: when conflict surfaces on one issue, other parallel or sometimes 
underlying conflicts may occur as well. Water conflicts are often trig-
gered by an intervention, urging stakeholders to deal with the new 
situation.  
Such conflicts may be clear at the outset, or emerge as intervention 
processes unfold. The task of process leadership is to ensure (within 
and outside stakeholder groups) that tensions are dealt with or, if pos-
                                                 
12  Meinzen-Dick 1996; Rhoades 1998. 
13  Ostrom 1992; see also Ostrom Gardner & Walker 1994. 
14  Warner & Verhallen 2004. 
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sible, turned into positive forces. Crucial in the process from diver-
gence to convergence is how stakeholders deal with conflict and fric-
tion, and how this process is facilitated.15  
 
1.4 IWRM in practice: the Lower Blyde River 
 
The concepts of IWRM and MSP are entrenched in modern water 
legislation and water policy. The underlying assumption often seems 
to be that negotiation processes between stakeholders can be imple-
mented with sufficient ‘legal engineering’ and institutional (re) de-
sign. This leads to the following question: How does the implementa-
tion of the concepts of IWRM and MSP work out in practice? 
To examine this question case study research has been done in the 
Lower Blyde River in South Africa, an arid country that depends 
heavily on water management (for example dams, pipelines and irriga-
tion schemes). South Africa’s new post-apartheid legislation highly 
advocates the principles of IWRM and MSP.16 The country is interna-
tionally heralded as an example of innovative water management. The 
Lower Blyde River case is especially interesting because the new 
policies are faced with a highly complex reality. The area is rich in 
contrast in an ecological, socio-economical or political sense. All con-
cerns of integrated water management are present in the area, and 
there are high stakes involved for all stakeholders. 
 
The establishment of an irrigation pipeline marks a crucial phase in 
the region of the Lower Blyde River and a connected project to estab-
lish 800 ha of black emerging farms in the white irrigation area. Im-
provement of the domestic water supply for the neighbouring black 
communities is an important issue in the area. The Municipality plans 
to link this irrigation pipeline with an extension pipeline for domestic 
water supply, thus highlighting the conflicting multiple needs. To re-
flect this diversity the existing Irrigation Board has recently been 
transformed into a Water Users Association. 
The case study is part of a recently concluded research project on 
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Catchment Management 
                                                 
15  Leeuwis 2004. 
16  Warner & Simpungwe 2003. 
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(MSP-ICM),17 run by Wageningen University in the Netherlands. The 
field study took place in the period from August until November 2003. 
In addition to a review of the literature, in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders and dialogues with experts were held. Two well-attended 




2.  THE SOUTH AFRICAN WATER ARENA 
 
2.1 Water scarcity 
 
South Africa is an arid (semi arid) country where the climate varies 
from desert and semi-desert in the west to sub-humid along the eastern 
coastal area. The country’s water resources are, in global terms, scarce 
and extremely limited. South Africa has an average rainfall for the 
country of about 450 mm per year, well below the world average of 
about 860 mm per year, and yet evaporation is comparatively high. 
Additionally, there is a strong seasonality of rainfall.19  
As a consequence of the topography and rainfall distribution, the 
natural availability of water across the country is very unevenly dis-
tributed. More than 60 percent of the rivers flow arising from only 20 
percent of the land area. There are no truly large or navigable rivers in 
South Africa. Groundwater therefore plays a pivotal role especially in 
rural water supplies in the country. To insure against this erratic water 
supply, large dams were constructed to enlarge water storage capacity. 
Currently the dams hold more than half of mean annual runoff for the 
country (total estimated annual runoff is 49 200 million m3 per year). 
Water use in South Africa is dominated by irrigation, which uses 
around 60 percent of all water used in the country. Domestic and ur-
ban use accounts for around 11 percent of water use, while mining and 
some large industries account for around 8 percent of use by reducing 
runoff into rivers and streams. In 2025 a serious deficit of water is 
                                                 
17  See for more information the website:  
www.waterforfoodandecosystems.nl/msp. 
18  Maruleng Municipality Hoedspruit, 30-10-2003 (on local stakeholder participa-
tion) and at IWMI Pretoria, 21-11-2003 (on the role of government). 
19  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 2002. 
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expected, while pollution of surface and groundwater is a growing 
problem.20  
 
2.2 Apartheid water legislation 
 
The governance of the water sector in South Africa reflects the politi-
cal changes in the society. Water management moved from the pre-
colonist collective realm to become a publicly regulated resource in 
terms of Dutch-Roman law. Under Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and 
the pressures for settler expansion and economic development, water 
management was captured as a private resource for a minority.21 
Much of South Africa’s past water legislation was largely oriented 
towards irrigated commercial agriculture. The central principle in the 
previous water law was a link between the right to use water and the 
ownership of land adjacent to that water (the riparian right principle). 
The 1956 Water Act consolidated the system of riparian rights result-
ing in commercial white land-owning farmers having essentially un-
constrained access to water. In commercial agriculture areas, the Irri-
gation Boards that administrated the allocation of water were serving 
the needs of these farmers. 
The rural black and coloured people simply did not have sufficient 
(financial) capacity to get access to the administration for establishing 
water rights while private black landownership was not allowed. The 
fact that black people were concentrated in homelands with marginal 
water resources and infrastructure, and with only informal or custom-
ary traditional land use rights contributed largely to the inequity.22 
Government dams were, and still are, located in areas of urbanisation 
and commercial estate farming, meaning that the rural population was 
forced de facto to turn to groundwater abstraction. Proper infrastruc-
ture to reach the groundwater resources in the former homelands was 
often lacking.23 
In commercial agriculture areas, the Irrigation Boards that adminis-
trated the allocation of water were serving the needs of the white 
                                                 
20  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 1997. 
21  Muller 2000. 
22  Ramazotti 1996. 
23  Jaspers 2001. 
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farmers. Under the apartheid governments a number of (more or less 
state-owned) irrigation schemes were built in the homelands. In the-
ory, rural black communities and smallholder irrigation schemes could 
benefit from the same conditions as the commercial farmers in white 
areas. However, the lack of proper infrastructure, of property rights 
regarding resources, and the subsistence nature of their productive 
activities strongly limited the potential for improvement and intensifi-
cation. Most black populations were not only deprived of access to 
water and land for irrigation purposes but also of adequate and clean 
water for domestic use.24 Many of the irrigation schemes in the former 
homelands collapsed in the transition time of the early 1990s. 
 
2.3  The new National Water Act 
 
In the late 1990s the dynamism of the ‘new South Africa’ has been 
reflected in two new Water Acts. For potable water supply issues a 
new Water Services Act (WSA) was established in 1997.25 On general 
water management the new National Water Act (NWA)26 replaced the 
old law in 1998. The purposes of the new Water Acts include: manag-
ing the nation’s water resources in manner that takes into account the 
basic human needs of present and future generations; promoting equi-
table access to water; redressing past racial and gender discrimination; 
facilitating social and economic development; and protecting aquatic 
and associated systems. 
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) is respon-
sible for the implementation of the new Water Acts. There is an exten-
sive decentralization and delegation process; water management to 
Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs)/ Water Users Associations 
(WUAs), and drinking water authority to newly formed municipali-
ties). Internally the DWAF is involved in a major reorganisation 
(downsizing, privatisation and redressing apartheid inequity). The 
South African public administration is in charge of water management 
at all levels. This has caused, among others, staff capacity problems. 
 
                                                 
24  Perret 2002: 283-300. 
25  Act No 108 of 1997. 
26  Act No 36 of 1998. 
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The three main innovations in the NWA are: 
1)  The replacement of riparian water rights by a system of licens-
ing water use;  
2)  The introduction of a reserve for basic human needs and ecol-
ogy;  
3)  The introduction of new water management institutions.  
These water management institutions include CMAs and WUAs.27 
CMAs are statutory bodies (chapter 4 NWA) governed by a Board, 
representing a broad stakeholder grouping together with experts. 
CMAs are the second tier under the national level. Still under debate 
is the question whether WUAs should become the third tier of water 
management in South Africa. Nineteen CMAs will be established in 
South Africa. CMAs can delegate powers to for example WUAs, in-
ternational water management bodies, catchment management com-
mittees, or water services institutions. The Lower Blyde WUA falls 
under the overarching Olifants CMA. 
 
2.3.1  Water Users Associations (WUA) 
A WUA is a statutory body established by the Minister under Section 
92 of the NWA. They are, in effect, co-operative associations enabling 
stakeholders within a community to pool their resources (money, hu-
man resources, and expertise) to carry out local water management 
activities. A WUA may be established for any form of water use as 
described in the NWA,28 as long as its objectives do not conflict with 
a CMA strategy for the area in which it operates. This is a significant 
change from the 1956 Act, which only provided for the establishment 
of institutions focused on irrigation. Thus, a WUA can be single-
purpose or multi-sector, dealing with a variety of water uses and is-
sues within its area of operation. It is for example possible for a WUA 
to function as a water supplier for domestic purposes in terms of the 
Water Services Act. 
Either the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry or local stake-
holders themselves may initiate the establishing process of a WUA.29 
The proposal must include a draft constitution. A WUA must also be 
                                                 
27  DWAF CMA and WUA guides 2000. 
28  Section 21. 
29  Section 91. 
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financially viable, and self financed. The WUA proposal needs to be 
evaluated and approved by the Minister. The WUA should recognise 
and encourage the active participation of the multiple users of water. 
Previously disadvantaged individuals and groups should become part 
of the management of these WUAs. The constitution must be clear 
about how racial and gender representation will be achieved. It cannot 
entrench vested interests, or allow any group to dominate another. 
The NWA states that existing Irrigation Boards be transformed into 
WUAs.30  There are almost 300 Irrigation Boards in South Africa with 
a majority in the Western Cape Province. The Irrigation Board institu-
tion links back to Dutch settlers/farmers and have been quite success-
ful31. The NWA was expected to trigger a quick transformation proc-
ess, but only a few WUAs have been established until now. The trans-
formation process turned out to be much more time consuming and 
incremental than anticipated. The participation processes were not 
always satisfactory according to DWAF. Stakeholders sometimes felt 
they had to participate for the sake of participation, had to participate 
on organisational structure instead on real issues. Stakeholders, espe-
cially the poor ones, are expected to invest considerable time and en-
ergy in the process.32 The Ministry of Water Affairs and Forestry itself 
has only limited staff available for this enormous transformation proc-
ess. Furthermore the WUA policies are still changing and under de-
bate, making the whole process rather precarious. This could easily 
lead to frustrations and bureaucracy.33 
 
 
                                                 
30  Section 98(1)(a). 
31  The Water Boards in The Netherlands are among the eldest democratic institu-
tions, dating back to the early middle ages. The Afrikaner farmers of Dutch de-
cent must have been familiar with the Water Board institutions. Some of the old 
Dutch water governance terminology can still be retraced in South Africa of to-
day (e.g. ‘Heemraden’). 
32  Koppen & Merrey 2002. 
33  Faysse 2003; Raven 2003; Water Resource Council 2003. 
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3.  STIMULANTS AND OBSTACLES IN REALISING IWRM 
 
3.1  The Lower Blyde River: setting the scene 
 
The Blyde River is unique in the region for its continuous flow and 
good water quality and is an important tributary for the Olifants River. 
The Olifants River is of poor water quality and during droughts there 
is lack of sufficient flow. The lower Olifants river basin therefore re-
lies strongly on Blyde water, both from a quantity and a quality per-
spective. The Blyde River Dam stabilises the flow of the Blyde River 
to some extent. (See Map 1 below).  
 






The Blyde river subcatchment lies partly on an escarpment. Because 
of the escarpment, distinct differences in climate are found in the re-
gion. The climate varies from cool and relatively high rainfall in the 
Highveld (South West), to sub-tropical arid in the Lowveld (North 
East). The Lower Blyde River is situated in the Lowveld. Rainfall 
conditions are not ideal for the development of crops and irrigation is 
necessary in this region to reduce the risk of water shortages. The 
Lower Blyde River area has a good climate to grow fruits and vegeta-
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(no frost). The region has therefore a strategic slot market in this spe-
cific period in South Africa.34 
 
Blyde river water is used for agricultural, industrial and domestic pur-
poses. At the lower Blyde there is a relatively small white commercial 
irrigated farm area (approx. 400 km2). Adjacent to this irrigation dis-
trict there are extensive black surrounding communities. Further 
downstream the Phalaborwa phosphorus Mines are an important 
stakeholder. The Blyde River Canyon (in the upper catchment) is the 
third largest canyon in the world and attracts around 900,000 tourists 
per year. The escarpment region of the Blyde and Sand catchment 
complex contains over 140 endemic species of plants and animals.35 
The booming sectors of (eco) tourism, game farms and nature conser-
vation in the wider region cause growing pressure on the Blyde River 
(Kruger National Park, Biosphere Kruger to Canyon). Finally, there is 
an important international dimension: the Olifants/Blyde River plays a 
key role in the volatile water management situation in Mozambique 
(Masinguri Dam).(See Map 2). 
 
                                                 
34  CSIR (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research) 1997. 
35  ROSA/IUCN (Regional Office for Southern Africa/International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources) 2001. 
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The irrigation area and these communities are both part of the Maru-
leng Municipality. The geographical boundaries of the municipality 
do not coincide with the Blyde sub-catchment boundaries. Maruleng 
Municipality has approx 140.000 inhabitants of which 90 percent be-
longs to black communities. In the former homeland system the black 
communities belonged to the homeland Lebowa (Pedi Tribe). The 
communities and settlements are mainly located in arid and dry areas. 
The socio- economic situation of the black communities is alarming.36 
Unemployment is high, at 80 percent, and basic infrastructure is some-
times lacking. The population in the black communities is growing 
very significantly. One of the respondents estimates that 50 percent of 
the population is aged under 15 and expects a doubled population in 5 
                                                 
36  United States Agency for International Development 2002. 
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years. Like everywhere in South Africa, the AIDS epidemic is a prob-
lem.37 Some employment can be found in the (eco) tourism industry 
(for example, in game farms) and in the mines (Phalaborwa), forestry 
and the government sector (teachers, nurses, and other government 
departments). Many younger men have left the village (and their fami-
lies) to find work in the cities or in the mines. Women often head rural 
households, as the one remaining parent.38 In recent years, the new 
government has been building houses, providing electricity, building 
schools and community halls in the last period.  
 
3.2 Irrigation and Domestic Water Use in the Apartheid Era 
 
Before the 1930s it was impossible to settle permanently in the Low-
veld because of the presence of tsetse flies and malaria causing mos-
quitoes. Black tribes and voortrekkers used the Lowveld mainly for 
hunting and cattle. Only after DDT killed the tsetse flies in the 
1930/40s permanent crop farming started in the area. The white farm-
ers in the area took water from the river according to the riparian right 
system and expanded their irrigation area through a system of earthen 
canals. The canals were dug by hand without government help. Ac-
cording to a respondent, the old voortrekker mentality is ‘a bit gov-
ernment-allergic’. 
In the 1950s and 60s under the apartheid governments the irrigation 
lands were proclaimed for the white Afrikaner farmers exclusively. At 
first, the farmers used the river and the canal system mainly for flood 
irrigation to grow vegetables. However, from the 1960s onwards for 
the first time water pressure was felt in the irrigation area. The build-
ing of the Blyde River Dam in 1974 marked a second irrigation phase. 
The Dam was built by the government mainly as a back up for the 
Phalaborwa Mines downstream. The farmers refused to pay for the 
Dam. The farmers regarded Blyde River water as free for them to use. 
This resulted in a relatively small dam (approx 50 million cubic me-
ters). In the same period the farmers started using individual dams and 
pumps on their farms. 
                                                 
37  Maruleng Municipality, Integrated development plan, 2003.  
38  Maruleng Municipality, Integrated development plan, 2003.  
BEYOND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN WATER ACTS 
 154 
One of the main tasks of the Irrigation Board (IB), which was created 
in 1952 (before that it was a River Board), was to provide water equity 
among the irrigation farmers. According to respondents, malfunction-
ing of the earthen canal system resulted in water fights among the 
farmers. The IB was hardly able to maintain its authority in these mat-
ters. It became clear to the farmers that proper distribution was the key 
issue. 
In the 1980s, more sophisticated irrigation techniques came in (like 
centre pivot, sprinklers and drip irrigation). Citrus and mango farming 
became profitable. The mid 1980s saw a real ‘mango boom’ taking 
off. In this period large scale ‘foreign-owned’ fruit companies started 
to establish themselves in the area.  
In the black communities of Mametja/Sekororo, in the former Le-
bowa ‘homeland’, the main concerns around water centred on domes-
tic water supply. Although the homeland system is now abolished, the 
current domestic water use situation still resembles that of the past. 
The black communities in the Lower Blyde region mainly depend on 
boreholes for water supply for domestic use. The quality of the 
groundwater is sometimes poor (salty and polluted). The main prob-
lem at this stage is not (yet) ground water availability but rather the 
poor technical infrastructure. The boreholes pump water into reser-
voirs, from where it runs to the public village taps. The villagers bring 
water containers on wheelbarrows to collect the water from the water 
taps. The tribal authorities in the villages have appointed water com-
mittees to allocate the water to different quarters in case of scarcity. 
These authorities play an important role in preventing and solving 
water conflicts in the communities.  
Some Mametja/Sekororo villages have severe water shortages 
mostly due to poor borehole infrastructure. The boreholes often face 
technical problems. Illegal water connections are another experienced 
problem. This sometimes disturbs proper flow to the public taps even. 
In case of broken boreholes the communities sometimes resort to 
highly polluted water from the Olifants River. Domestic water prob-
lems are still rated first amongst other problems by the respondents in 
the black communities of Mametja /Sekororo. 
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3.3 Interventions in the transition period: Adapting the idea of a 
pipeline. 
 
From 1989 until 1993 the region faced a very dry period with only 25 
percent of the normal rainfall. This forced DWAF to imposed water 
restrictions. The deterioration of the earthen irrigation canal system 
led to water losses of more than 50 percent. These enormous water 
losses became unacceptable for the government and for the farmers. In 
1993 the idea of a new irrigation pipeline came out as the most effec-
tive way forward.39 The plan consisted of a connecting pipeline sys-
tem between the Blyde Dam and the irrigation area (105 km pipeline 
with approx. 130 irrigation off-takes).40 
In 1994 the new government of South Africa came into power. 
Apartheid was abandoned, and important changes in government poli-
cies and legislation were set in motion. The first stages of the Lower 
Blyde Irrigation Pipeline project coincided with this revolutionary 
political atmosphere. In 1995, under the new Environment Conserva-
tion Act,41 an ‘Environmental Impact Assessment Study’ for the pipe-
line started (one of the first in the country). The study took nearly 3 
years and included an (extractive) participation process, surveying all 
interested and affected parties.42 In 1997 the (former) Irrigation Board 
officially proposed building a pipeline as replacement for the old canal 
system. Already in the early 1990s, the new South African govern-
ment policy suspended all subsidies towards so-called ‘former advan-
taged’ irrigation schemes. The pipeline project was to be privately 
financed by the farmers and a commercial Bank (Rand Merchant 
Bank). 
Under the new Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Kader As-
mal, negotiations started about the new water work and allocation. 
The DWAF’s interest was to save water and to empower formerly 
disadvantaged people at minimum costs. In the pipeline plans it was 
estimated that extra 10 percent water savings could be made on top of 
the regular savings. 
                                                 
39  Council for  Scientific and Industrial Research( CSIR) 1995. 
40  Council for  Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 1997. 
41  Act No 52 of 1994. 
42  Council for  Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 1997. 
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Eventually, the Minister agreed with the pipeline project but on condi-
tion that the pipeline would provide water for 800 ha for black emerg-
ing farmers in the region. On this basis the bank provided the neces-
sary loan and the work on the pipeline began. For the ‘Blyde 800 ha 
project’ DWAF provided the capital costs in the pipeline (approx. R20 
million). Along with the idea of the irrigation pipeline a plan was de-
veloped to link another pipeline for water supply to the neighbouring 
Mametja/Sekororo villages. The idea was that DWAF joins hands 
with the municipality, communities and the white farmers who were 
planning the pipeline for irrigation purposes.43 
Under the NWA, the existing IB was transformed into the Lower 
Blyde River Water Users Association (LBWUA) in 2002.44 According 
its constitution, the primary function of the LBWUA is the manage-
ment of the irrigation scheme in accordance with environmental poli-
cies and laws. 
The constitution recognises in its opening statements that to 
achieve the purpose of the NWA, appropriate community, racial and 
gender representation must be reflected in the establishment of the 
WUA. The WUA constitution is meant to serve as a basis for fair, 
effective and sustainable water resource management for the benefit 
of its members as well as surrounding communities and the resource 
in general. The prevention of water wastage is specifically mentioned 
as a function of the WUA. Ancillary functions are the provision of 
services, training for members, other water institutions and surround-
ing communities. The constitution mentions the function of facilitat-
ing integrated resource management in the Blyde River basin. In a 
footnote it is stated that the association envisages extending its skills 
and experiencing in water management to neighbouring communities. 
The WUA constitution provides for a management committee of 16 
members and an elected chairperson. The WUA enables gives three 
categories of members in the MC: irrigators, other water users (e.g. 
domestic water users, nature reserves, and industries) and other af-
fected parties (e.g. government agencies, communities). The Lower 
Blyde River WUA has to be primarily self-funded by its members. 
Each year, the WUA must produce an audited financial statement for 
                                                 
43  Department of  Water Affairs and Forrestry  Limpopo office / EVN 2002. 
44  Government Gazette, 17th January 2002. 
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the preceding year for DWAF and a financial business plan for the 
next year. 
As noted above, important initiatives were taken to work towards 
more integrated forms of water management. The adapted pipeline 
plan simultaneously dealt with irrigation and domestic water supply 
problems, and also forged linkages between development options for 
white irrigation farmers and those of neigbouring black communities. 
Moreover, new institutions where created which had a mandate to 
furthering the integration that had been set in motion.  
 
3.4 Stagnation in realising IWRM 
 
In this section we present the dynamics, tensions and stagnation that 
went along with efforts to implement the pipeline plans within the 
new legal and institutional set-up.  
 
3.4.1 Financial problems and frictions among irrigators 
The pipeline project faced many problems once the work started in 
1997. In the course of the project the costs were skyrocketing. The 
Bank formally owns the infrastructure until the loans are paid back. 
The contract for building the pipe already went up from R100 to 
approx. R150 million. The initial costs for the farmers had been esti-
mated at R1500 per ha but this had gone up to R4000 per ha, which 
severely jeopardised the economic viability of the project from the 
farmers’ perspective. Because of the spiralling costs the WUA, the 
Bank and DWAF found themselves in a financial deadlock. 
In this context it is relevant to note that there exists considerable 
diversity within the white irrigation community. As a consequence of 
the mango boom there are at present two sorts of commercial irriga-
tion farms working in the irrigation area. There are the smaller Afri-
kaner family farms (approx. 30/40 ha). The older family farms are 
mainly producing vegetables (corn, seed maize, lucerne, sweet pota-
toes, tomatoes among others), while some also produce citrus and 
mango. Some of these farmers are economically struggling to keep 
their head above the water. Second, there are the larger ‘estate farms’ 
(250 ha and over) growing mainly citrus and mango and mostly 
owned by large (foreign owned) companies. The high costs for using 
the pipeline are an economic limitation for especially the smaller fam-
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ily farms. Most respondents expect to see more large-scale foreign 
owned companies coming in and more family vegetable farms disap-
pearing in the next decade. Thus, the financial difficulties were aggra-
vated by a conflict between smaller farmers and bigger ones over the 
rising costs of the project. Some farmers simply refused to pay their 
contributions. Subsequently, the IB (as predecessor of the WUA) 
threatened to cut off their water. Farmers, in turn, threatened the IB 
with a lawsuit. As legal issues surfaced it became clear the IB was not 
properly delegated and mandated for the pipeline work by DWAF. A 
larger group of (small) farmers now refused to pay the Irrigation 
Board the money per ha necessary for the work to continue. The work 
was halted and delayed further. According to respondents the WUA 
was mainly established in 2002 by DWAF to ensure properly dele-
gated authority to continue work on the pipeline. Opponents blame the 
Irrigation Board / WUA-officials for dealing with the new government 
in Pretoria in favour of the large companies but forgetting the interests 
of the smaller family farms. 
As a result a group of farmers still refuses to pay the WUA contri-
bution. Some farmers say they will try to get separate water licenses 
from DWAF, which enables them to continue using water from the 
river and the canals. Negotiations between WUA, the Bank and 
DWAF have started to find a way forward. DWAF is willing to make 
a substantial extra financial contribution of in the irrigation project. 
This can help to prevent collapse or bankruptcy of the project. With 
this ‘subsidy’ the costs will be brought down to approx. R2800 per ha 
for the participating farmers. In this manner DWAF is financially 
drawn into subsidizing the ‘former advantaged’ irrigation farmers 
against its own policy. 
Against the background of these tensions, the building of the pipe-
line was delayed considerably, but eventually the irrigation pipeline 
became operational in August 2003. Meanwhile, distrust between 
DWAF and irrigation farmers continues to exist, as does the tension 
between small and large irrigation farmers. 
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3.4.2 The virtual status of the 800 ha project and multi- stakeholder 
participation 
After the completion of the pipeline in 2003, attempts were made to 
revive the ‘Blyde 800 ha black emerging farmers project’, which had 
also come to a hold due to the pipeline problems. The success of the 
800 ha project has become necessary to make the pipeline economi-
cally viable. The emerging farmers will have to pay for the operational 
costs of the pipeline (estimated at 600R per ha per year, DWAF paid 
for the capital costs).  
Six years after its original inception, however, the 800ha emerging 
farmer project still has a rather virtual character. It is undecided which 
kind of different farm-models (joint ventures, private or community 
farms) and crops (vegetables, fruit, sugar) are best suitable for the 
emerging farmers (MBB 2000, DWAF 2001). Considerable contro-
versy has arisen around a sugar production plan that was initiated by 
local businessmen (Blyde Valley Sugar Ltd, 2000). The resolution of 
such issues is complicated by the fact that there is disagreement about 
who is to take the lead in the development of the project. Formally, 
DWAF has central control over the 800ha project. However, the irri-
gation farmers have little confidence in government led farming pro-
jects and claim an important role for the WUA. Putting the WUA in 
charge of the project generates distrust at DWAF; not least since, 
without the emerging farmers on the ground, the WUA is not func-
tioning yet as a platform that can incorporate the emerging farmers’ 
interests. Officially, the WUA constitution provides 12 seats for irri-
gation farmers, of which maximum two seats are reserved for the 
black emerging farmers in the future. At present neither black emerg-
ing farmers, farm workers, women nor other so-called historically 
disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) are represented. So far only the irri-
gation farmers are present in the MC meetings, they are also the only 
paying members of the WUA. A telling statement in this context is 
that of a Maruleng Municipality representative who could take seat in 
the management committee of the WUA: “The municipality always 
gets an invitation but they never attend the meetings”. A municipality 
respondent argues that “it is understandable for an understaffed insti-
tution such as the municipality to stay away from meetings where the 
role is merely to observe, the subjects are mainly internal farmer is-
sues, and the influence in the decision-making process minimal”. In 
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practice the same farmers of the former IB now attend the MC meet-
ings of the WUA. 
 
3.4.3 Deadlocks in domestic water provision and use 
Based on new legislation the South African system of local govern-
ment has been fundamentally restructured. The creation of Maruleng 
Municipality is a result of this operation. Since June 2003 DWAF has 
delegated the authority on domestic water services to the municipality 
(based on the WSA). Maruleng Municipality is now in charge of the 
extension pipeline project. DWAF Polokwane (Polokwane, former 
Pietersburg, capital of Limpopo province) is still highly involved in 
the water supply plans. 
According to respondents in the communities, the issue of water 
supply through an extension of the Blyde River pipeline has been 
raised for many years (1995) but has still not been formalised. DWAF 
Polokwane has carried out a recent study on an extension of the irriga-
tion pipeline to supply 31 villages with domestic water. This study 
mentions a project deadline in 2009.45 A municipality respondent 
stated that the operational costs are approx R90 million, to be financed 
by DWAF Polokwane.  
Until now no concrete plans and construction works have been un-
dertaken. This causes considerable frustration in the black communi-
ties especially with the irrigation pipeline now running. According to 
a municipal respondent the project has been delayed not only by the 
problems in the irrigation pipeline project, but also because no proper 
financing arrangements are in place for the domestic water supply 
infrastructure. A feasibility study has shown that the costs of operation 
and maintenance of the domestic water network are too high for the 
municipality and the communities. A municipal respondent com-
plained that DWAF left them with a task without sufficient financial 
and human resources. Considerable uncertainty and doubt exists re-
garding the willingness and ability in the communities to pay for this 
new water infrastructure. A municipal respondent stated that a new 
feasibility study will be undertaken concerning the costs of the exten-
sion pipeline for domestic water use. In the meantime, DWAF Polok-
                                                 
45  DWAF Limpopo / EVN 2002. 
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wane has promised to fund intermediate solutions, such as solving 
technical problems with the boreholes. 
A related problem is that the deadlock in infrastructure develop-
ment also affects the allocation of water for the domestic water use 
plans. According to the rules, no more Blyde River water can be allo-
cated without new infrastructure being built. From the total runoff of 
the Blyde River Dam 160 million m3 per year can be used. DWAF 
has allocated that amount as follows: 90 million to the irrigation farm-
ers; 50 million to the Phalaborwa mines and community (domestic 
use) and 20 million for the Reserve (basic human needs and ecological 
reserve). Water for domestic use has to come from either the ‘Blyde 
800 water’ or from the water surplus of the farmers in the pipeline. In 
the last case the water has to be bought from the farmers. Another 
option is to buy or swap Blyde River water with the Phalaborwa 
mines. There is no DWAF decision on a water allocation for domestic 
water from the Blyde River for the Mametja / Sekororo communities. 
Formally the municipality has to request for new water allocation for 
domestic use. Such a request has not been done yet. In short, we see a 
situation of stagnation regarding the domestic water pipeline. 
A complicating issue in reaching agreement about the domestic wa-
ter pipeline project is a controversy about the kinds of water uses that 
will be allowed and the mechanisms in place to prevent illegitimate 
use of water. Important questions include whether water can be used 
for making bricks, for small-scale irrigation and/or as drink water for 
cattle. Productive use of domestic water will of course lead to a larger 
water use and demand. Some of the white irrigation farmers predict 
and fear water scarcity in the future. 
In relation to the domestic water use, the new institutional set-ups 
prove not to be very effective in securing progress, either. As noted 
earlier, Maruleng Communities do not participate actively in the 
WUA as they doubt they can effectively exert influence and negotiate 
their cause in that platform. Despite the integrative spirit of the WUA 
constitution, the WUA does not seem to feel a special responsibility in 
domestic water supply delivery for the communities. In a workshop, 
the WUA chairman made it clear that he regarded any WUA involve-
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ment in domestic water supply as a purely business decision.46 In 
practice, there is a remarkable lack of contact between the two institu-
tions that are supposed to cooperate under the new water legislation. 
 
3.4.4 Wider tensions in the area: a ticking time bomb 
In parallel with the frictions around water use, other issues are at play 
between black and white communities as well.  
The newly established Maruleng Municipality has to co-operate 
with the tribal authorities on water issues in the Mametja/Sekororo 
communities. In actual practice there is competition between the ANC 
politicians who dominate the Maruleng Municipality board and the 
tribal authorities worried about losing political power. In the new 
South African Constitution, tribal authority is recognised as part of 
local government. Nevertheless, whether is their role and function is 
relevant in the new South Africa is still debatable. Some ANC politi-
cians feel tribal authority is outdated and compromised its integrity by 
collaborating with the apartheid regime. 
Competition between cattle keeping and game farms is especially 
significant. In the black communities cattle is an important factor for 
status and wealth (both with respect to livelihood, Lebola/dowry, and 
ceremonies). Game farming for tourism is expanding in the area. The 
white game farms, some owned by rich foreigners consist of large 
areas of up to 3000 ha. But these game farms do not offer much em-
ployment in the region, 5 to 40 workers per farm. Most of the game 
farms are fenced off because of the wild animals and also to secure the 
property of the land. 
Respondents stated that cattle in the black communities often die in 
dry periods yet they could have survived on the game farms; “[s]ome 
game farms have helped out but the reluctance of the white farmers to 
save community cattle in their game farms caused anger in the black 
communities”. One of the respondents says “it is a strange situation 
that only a handful of farmers own land all the way up to the moun-
tains along the Blyde River with black communities suffering along-
side with droughts and dying cattle”. 
                                                 
46  Workshop: Integrated Water Management in the Lower Blyde River, Maruleng 
Municipality Hoedspruit, 30-10-2003. 
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The recently introduced obligatory minimum wages is also subject to 
controversy in the region. According to some of the white irrigation 
farmers (employing approximately 10.000 farm labourers), the new 
minimum wages will inevitably lead to job losses. However, many 
black farmers feel that the white farmers’ complaints are not genuine, 
and that they just want to maintain cheap labour. Some describe the 
overall social situation as a ticking time bomb. Some black respon-
dents fear ill treatment by the irrigation farmers, while some white 
respondents fear a ‘Zimbabwe-like situation’ of white expulsion. Most 
respondents agree that communication between the white farmers and 
the black communities has remained rather poor. 
One of the respondents argued that the detailed laws and regula-
tions (for example those on labour and water) through which the gov-
ernment tries to address problems have created a situation of ‘over-
legislation’ which is counter-productive for the establishment of better 
relationships between the communities: 
  
“First-world laws are to be implemented in a third world situation. This kind of 
over-legislation takes away the trust between the white and the black communi-
ties. Because of the implementation gap left by the government too much is ex-
pected from the white farmers. The government brings laws and taxes but not 
much administration. The rich are getting richer and blacker. The poor are getting 
poorer and stay black”.  
 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
On paper, IWRM and MSP are highly relevant approaches to accom-
modate and co-ordinate the complex water issues at hand, such as 
competition between different uses and users. IWRM and MSP indeed 
find expression in South Africa’s highly advanced water legislation. In 
the Lower Blyde area unacceptable water losses of the irrigation canal 
system coincided with unacceptable domestic water infrastructure in 
the black communities. After the transformation in South Africa, ini-
tiatives were taken to connect the existing plan for an irrigation pipe-
line with a plan to serve 800 ha of an emerging black farmers project, 
and with a plan to construct an extension pipeline for drink water for 
the neighbouring black communities. Thus, a promising start was 
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made to develop integrated solutions to the problems in the Lower 
Blyde region.  
 
Instead of a multi stakeholder participation towards integration, actual 
practice in the Lower Blysde case shows rather an avoidance of such a 
process by the stakeholders. Although positive initiatives and actions 
have been undertaken, we have seen that a range of conflicts have 
surfaced and that there is a high degree of historically shaped distrust. 
The conflicts and distrust have not been constructively addressed and 
dealt with so far.  
If we look in more detail at the dynamics in the Lower Blyde WUA 
we see that the WUA was instated mainly to secure the work on the 
pipeline. In practice the WUA has a strong focus on management im-
provement instead of accommodation of different stakeholders or em-
powerment of weaker stakeholders. Although the WUA needs to ac-
commodate a multiplicity of stakeholders with very different constitu-
encies and sources of legitimacy - emerging farmers, communities, 
local authorities, and traditional leaders - representation remains a 
problem. The interest-pay-say principle47 in the South African case 
means that wealthier stakeholders can easily overpower the WUA. In 
practice the membership of the WUA is more or less the same as that 
of the old IB. At this stage the WUA does not function as a platform 
for MSP. There has been no real transformation process so far.  
Despite the pipeline extension plan the domestic water situation has 
not improved for the black communities. This has resulted in growing 
tensions and frustrations, especially with the irrigation pipeline now 
running. The WSA provides basic domestic water rights but which the 
Maruleng Municipality cannot effectively deliver. Though DWARF 
has delegated water management to Maruleng Municipality, this has 
not been accompanied with the necessary financial and human re-
sources. 
Judged by its co-ordination mechanisms, IWRM in the Lower 
Blyde River has not been very effective so far. Co-ordination and co-
                                                 
47  The principle ‘interest-pay-say’, ‘inherited’ from the Dutch Water Boards 
means that the more an actor is interested in water management, the more they 
contribute to the Board’s budget, and the weightier their vote will be in the de-
cision-making process. It has been the guiding principle in Dutch local water 
governance for ages. 
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operation on crucial water issues between and within such key actors 
as WUA (small and large farms), Maruleng Municipality (ANC and 
tribal authority) and DWAF (Pretoria/ NWA and Polokwane/WSA) 
has been remarkably absent or strained in this case. 
The new water institutions and the pipeline project that could have 
facilitated/triggered such a process of integration, then, have not re-
sulted in IWRM and MSP. The pipeline project envisaged linking up 
of groups that habitually operate in isolation from each other and may 
have preferred to keep it that way. The case study indeed shows the 
problems with the implementation to be rather formidable and multi-
faceted. 
This should not be all that surprising. Without attention for a proc-
ess of altering social relationships and trust, formally created multi-
stakeholder platforms are unlikely to succeed. As Kooiman & Warner 
(1998) argue, new forms of co-operation between the state (whose key 
coordinating mechanism is coercion), the market (price) and civil-
society stakeholders (negotiation, self management) can only develop 
incrementally (see also Kooiman 1993). In this case, we observe a 
vacuum in the sense that no affirmative action is taken to address di-
vergence of interests and emergent tensions. It is clear that a process 
towards convergence (coordinated action) will not happen by itself in 
the Lower Blyde region. Such a process needs adequate process lead-
ership and facilitation in order to deal with tensions and damaged rela-
tions among the involved stakeholders.  
The current role of DWAF as facilitator is unlikely do the trick. 
DWAF itself has a keen interest in specific outcomes, and therefore its 
neutrality can be called into question. DWAF as the state agency most 
responsible for the implementation this legislation is in a period of 
transformation. The role of DWAF in this case can be characterized as 
control at arm’s length. It may be preferable to look for an authorita-
tive, neutral, mandated process leader on the ground that can deal with 
the tendency of the actors involved to avoid communication and inter-
action with other stakeholders, and get them to cross established 
boundaries. Process leadership requires initiative, moral authority, 
credibility, and acceptability to all parties (Mutimukuru and Leeuwis, 
2004), and these are qualities that cannot be simply secured by means 
of introducing a new law or platform. 
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The emphasis placed on an advanced legal framework has both posi-
tive and negative implications – the law can be a facilitator for change 
or a bottleneck impeding change. The advantage of a strong legal 
framework is that it provides enforceable principles that it is hard to 
wriggle out of. Claimants can come back to the principle when the 
implementation process stalls. However, rules can also limit the space 
for informal communication, relationship building and negotiation. 
Lawmaking defines the boundaries and space of the negotiation area, 
regulating the scope for discussion. Limiting the arena for negotiation 
to water issues also prevents hammering out package deals including 
adjacent issue-areas such as land rights, health, housing. Therefore, it 
is important to pay attention to the wider process and tensions. 
Interestingly, the ambitious nature of the 1998 water law in a way 
is a continuation of the past. South Africa has long made blueprints 
for its development, putting great trust in rules, to the point of enshrin-
ing Apartheid in law at a time when many other countries practiced 
the same race discrimination but kept the law silent on it. The ‘new’ 
South Africa seems to be intent on utilising the same instrument that 
helped make it an international pariah, but this time to bring about 
justice and progress.  
However, as one finds so often, there is a strong tendency to con-
fuse legislation with implementation (Bolding et al, 1998). The prin-
ciples need to be translated into tangible entitlements for those the law 
intends to benefit. When implementation and enforcement does not 
happen, the law remains a dead letter, allowing the government to 
hide behind rules and regulations instead of focussing on making the 
transformative process work. 
The fact that the project has highlighted conflict should not be an 
immediate source of worry, given that conflict is the companion of 
change. In spite of its many problems, South Africa does have a func-
tioning government and legal system, which can provide a stable envi-
ronment and entryways for addressing the numerous water challenges 
besetting the new South Africa. 
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